View source for Totila

==Initial victories==
{{Main|Gothic War (535–554)}}

Eraric's murder and replacement with Totila suggested to the Byzantines—since Eraric favoured negotiation with Imperial power—that this Gothic successor likely preferred war and so a Byzantine expeditionary force of twelve thousand men was sent north from Ravenna to Verona to stave off any possible impending attack.{{sfn|Heather|2018|pp=255–256}}

At Verona, a local sympathizer allowed a contingent of Roman soldiers into the city and while the Goths panicked at first, they soon realized that the main army was stopped some distance from the city.{{sfn|Heather|2018|p=256}} They promptly shut the gates and the Roman soldiers who had made it into the city escaped by leaping from the walls. Meanwhile, the Roman forces retreated back to [[Faenza]] ([[Battle of Faventia (542)|Battle of Faventia]]), where Totila met them with 5,000 men to give battle, while another 300 Gothic archers surprised them from the rear, resulting in a rout, whereby the Goths acquired both prisoners and battle standards.{{sfn|Heather|2018|p=256}}{{efn|Not only were the Romans contending with Totila, they were also in a conflagration with Persia, while at the same time a [[Justinian plague|plague was ravaging]] the Imperial provinces in 542. In Constantinople, upwards of 300,000 people may have succumbed to sickness, and Justinian himself fell ill but survived.{{sfn|Ward|Heichelheim|Yeo|2016|p=497}}}} Correspondingly, historian Thomas Burns claims that Totila was a gifted warrior and governor, and as an Ostrogoth ranks only second to Theodoric the Great himself.{{sfn|Burns|1991|p=212}}

After securing victory in 542 at Faenza, Totila's Goths besieged the stoutly-defended [[Florence]] in an effort to open the Via Cassia to Rome but when Imperial forces arrived to relieve the city, Totila withdrew to the [[Mugello region|Mugello valley]], where historian Herwig Wolfram states, they "inflicted a crushing defeat on the enemy", at the [[Battle of Mucellium]].{{sfn|Wolfram|1988|pp=354–355}} Since this region was relatively spared of any previous conflicts, Totila's Goths were able to secure significant provisions and booty.{{sfn|Wolfram|1988|p=355}} In the meantime, instead of pursuing the conquest of central Italy, where the Imperial forces were too formidable for his small army, he decided to transfer his operations to the south of the peninsula.{{sfn|Bury|1958|p=231}} He captured [[Benevento|Beneventum]] as well as [[Cumae]], which remained a Gothic stronghold even after Gothic kingship no longer existed.{{sfn|Wolfram|1988|p=355}}

During a period of crisis amid the Eastern Roman military leadership, which placed strains on its civilian population across its domains, historian [[Victor Davis Hanson]] asserts that Totila posed as a "national liberator who would throw off the renewed chains of Roman oppression."{{sfn|Hanson|2014|p=83}} Hanson further contends that this squabbling among Byzantine generals from "different factions and ethnicities" caused the forfeiture of what Belisarius had previously won in 540.{{sfn|Hanson|2014|p=83}} In the aftermath of the Battle of Faenza, Totila not only achieved a tactical victory over the Roman forces but also succeeded in attracting Roman deserters to his own ranks. Historian Marco Cristini argues that undermining the cohesion of the Roman army was a deliberate and strategic component of Totila’s military approach.{{sfn|Cristini|2022|p=198}} Equally important, according to Cristini, was the reinforcement of his own forces through the integration of disaffected Roman soldiers. These individuals, often disgruntled due to unpaid wages, disputes with commanding officers, or personal ambitions, were exploited by Totila to gain intelligence and logistical advantages. Cristini further notes, citing Procopius (Wars 3.36.26), that in a similar episode in 548, following Totila’s capture of the fortress of Roscianum, approximately 300 Roman soldiers defected to his side, choosing to oppose Belisarius.{{sfn|Cristini|2022|pp=198–199}}
[[Image:Totila fa dstruggere la città di Firenze.jpg|thumb|300px|Totila razes the walls of [[Florence]]: illumination from the Chigi manuscript of [[Giovanni Villani|Villani's ''Cronica'']]]]

Totila's strategy was to move fast and take control of the countryside, leaving the Byzantine forces in control of well-defended cities, and especially the ports. When Belisarius eventually returned to Italy, Procopius relates that "during a space of five years he did not succeed once in setting foot on any part of the land{{nbsp}}... except where some fortress was, but during this whole period he kept sailing about visiting one port after another."{{sfn|Procopius, ''The Secret History'', ch. V}} Totila circumvented those cities where a drawn-out siege would have been required, razing the walls of cities that capitulated to him, such as [[Benevento|Beneventum]]. Totila's conquest of Italy was marked not only by celerity but also by mercy, and [[Edward Gibbon|Gibbon]] says "none were deceived, either friends or enemies, who depended on his faith or his clemency."{{sfn|Gibbon|1841|p=128}} However, Totila could be merciless, as Procopius recounts. For instance, after a successful siege of a resisting city like Perugia, Totila had its bishop, St. [[Herculanus of Perugia]], beheaded by a soldier (though originally planned to be [[flaying|flayed]]). Procopius left a written portrayal of Totila before his troops were drawn up for battle:
<blockquote>The armour in which he was clad was abundantly plated with gold and the ample adornments which hung from his cheek plates as well as his helmet and spear were not only purple, but in other respects befitting a king … And he himself, sitting upon a very large horse, began to dance under arms skillfully between the two armies. And as he rode he hurled his javelin into the air and caught it again as it quivered above him, then passed it rapidly from hand to hand, shifting it with consummate skill.{{sfn|Procopius, ''The Wars of Procopius,'' Book VIII}}</blockquote>
Where Totila learned this "dance" is never made clear by Procopius, but these actions likely meant something to the Goths and despite his firm conviction of coexistence with the Romans and their culture, Burns relates, much like Theodoric, he "remained a Goth."{{sfn|Burns|1991|p=214}} Despite his ethnic status as a Germanic warrior, Totila did not plunder the countryside for supplies like other barbarians had done; instead, he collected rent and taxes to provide the income he needed without ruining the cities and towns he captured. He also recruited slaves into the ranks of his army.{{sfn|Ward|Heichelheim|Yeo|2016|p=496}}{{efn|On a couple of occasions, Procopius even praises Totilla (''Wars'', 7.20.29–31 and 7.6.4) for having restrained his soldiers from raping captured women, which won him renown for his moderation.{{sfn|Parnell|2017|p=183}}}} While some sources, including Procopius, claim that Totila recruited slaves into his army, historian Marco Cristini suggests this may be an exaggeration intended to portray the Gothic forces as desperate or illegitimate.{{sfn|Cristini|2022|p=163}} Although it is plausible that slaves were present within the Gothic military context, Cristini argues that their roles were likely limited to auxiliary functions such as cooking, maintaining equipment, laundering, and tending to the wounded, rather than participating directly in combat. He emphasises that Totila’s core military force primarily consisted of trained cavalrymen, skilled in the use of spears and accustomed to warfare from a young age.{{sfn|Cristini|2022|p=163}}  While it is not impossible that a small number of slaves may have taken up arms, Cristini contends that their lack of military training and the logistical challenges of equipping and preparing them for battle make widespread slave participation in combat unlikely, contrary to Procopius’s portrayal.{{sfn|Cristini|2022|pp=163–164}}