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===Political influence===
====Pre-French colonization====
Marabouts have been prominent members of [[Wolof people|Wolof]] society since the arrival of Sufi brotherhoods from the Maghreb in the 15th century. Their advanced knowledge of the Quran and esteemed reputation have often allowed them to act as traders, priests, judges, or magicians in conjunction with their roles of community religious leaders.<ref name=Cruise>{{Cite book|last=Cruise O'Brien|first=D.B.|title=The Mourides of Senegal: The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1971|isbn=0198216629|location=London, U.K.|pages=[https://archive.org/details/mouridesofsenega0000crui/page/263 263]|url=https://archive.org/details/mouridesofsenega0000crui/page/263}}</ref> Additionally, because of their ability to read and write, village chiefs would frequently appoint marabouts as secretaries or advisers as a means to communicate with neighboring rulers.<ref name=Cruise/>
[[File:Marabout in Djenné.jpg|thumb|210px|Marabout in [[Djenné]], Mali]]
The marabouts' expanding influence in politics paired with their unique allegiance of the Muslim community eventually posed a real threat to the chiefs who had appointed them. In 1683, rising tensions between chiefs and the Muslim population led to a Muslim revolt in the Wolof kingdom of ''[[Cayor]]'', which concluded with the installation of a marabout as ''[[Damel]]''.<ref name=Cruise/> In the years following the revolt, relations between marabouts and Wolof chiefs remained relatively calm until a period of militant Islam in the Wolof states in the middle of the 19th century. Militant marabouts primarily of [[Toucouleur people|Tukulor]](l origin, called "warrior marabouts", completely rejected the authority of local chiefs and sought to install a theocratic Muslim state. As the authority of chiefs and royal armies were undermined by propaganda and military force used by the warrior marabouts, Muslim resistors turned to local marabouts for guidance and protection from their oppressors. After three decades of war and conflict, the warrior marabouts were gradually ousted from the Wolof states as French colonists began to take a tighter hold on the region. As confidence in the leadership abilities of chiefs and rulers declined as a result of the conflict, marabouts emerged as the most trusted and revered source of leadership in Wolof communities.<ref name=Cruise/>

====Post-French colonization====
French colonizers had difficulties adjusting to ruling over Muslim societies. Particularly in West Africa, constructing institutions of colonial rule that did not favor certain constituencies while neglecting others proved to be a tricky task. The French opted for forms of indirect rule through the local aristocracy in an effort to maintain order and keep administrative costs down, but found that many subjects detested these colonial chiefs and rulers and tended to gravitate towards their local marabouts. Marabouts were admired for their transparency and righteousness as they were known to renounce political powers, while ensuring economic, social, and religious stability within their communities.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Muslim Societies in African History|last=Robinson|first=David|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=2004|isbn=0521826276|location=Cambridge, U.K.|pages=187}}</ref> Since the judgment of marabouts is so influential, the success or failure of a politician would be almost entirely contingent on the support of more prominent marabouts. Because of this, politicians would try to appease marabouts by agreeing to promote their Sufi brotherhood's best interests in turn for their endorsement, with some politicians believing that winning an election would be impossible without the support of a marabout.<ref name=Cruise/> This political dynamic, based on patronage and exchanges, would lead to a somewhat of an alliance between marabouts and the French colonizers.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Saints and Politicians: Essays in the organisation of a Senegalese peasant society|last=Cruise O'Brien|first=D.B.|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1975|isbn=9780521205726|location=Cambridge, U.K.|pages=[https://archive.org/details/saintspolitician0000crui/page/177 177]|url=https://archive.org/details/saintspolitician0000crui/page/177}}</ref> Along with endorsing certain politicians in exchange for favors, French colonial administrators sought out marabouts and heads of Sufi brotherhoods to act as intermediaries between colonial administrators and West African Muslims to ensure appropriate allocation of power and resources to avoid any potential conflict.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Islam and Muslim Politics in Africa|url=https://archive.org/details/islammuslimpolit00soar|url-access=limited|last=Soares|first=Benjamin F.|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2007|isbn=9781403979636|location=New York City, U.S.A.|pages=[https://archive.org/details/islammuslimpolit00soar/page/n13 3]}}</ref>

====Post-independence====
[[File:Marabouts citant la fatiah lors d'un baptême au Niger.jpg|thumb|Marabouts reciting [[Al-Fatiha]] during a baptism in [[Niger]]]]
After Senegal gained its [[Senegal#Independence (1960)|independence from France]] in 1960, marabouts and leaders of Sufi Brotherhoods (also marabouts), or the ''Khalife-Général'', have continued to play influential roles in Senegalese politics. Some have questioned the utility of having clientelist relationships between marabouts and government officials in a modern democracy.<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last=Beck|first=Linda J.|date=2001|title=Reining in the Marabouts? Democratization and Local Governance in Senegal|journal=African Affairs|volume=100|issue= 401|pages=602|doi=10.1093/afraf/100.401.601}}</ref> The new "grandson" generation of marabouts has cultivated a more independent and secular political outlook and have proven that they are willing to question the authority of their predecessors. In Senegal's 1988 presidential election, ''Khalife-Général'' Abdou Lahatte Mbakke supported [[Abdou Diouf]] for reelection. Both as public endorsement and as a reward for installing new roads and street lamps in [[Touba]] while in office, the ''Khalife-Général'' declared a ''ndiggël'' (a binding command issued by the ''Khalife-Général'' to all members of the Mouride Brotherhood) that proclaimed that all men must vote for Diouf. Although multiple ''Khalife-Général'' have issued '''ndiggël politique''<nowiki/>' in support of a presidential candidate in previous elections, several marabouts of the "grandson" generation openly rejected the command by voting for the opposition instead.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Africa|last=Loimeier|first=Roman|publisher=Edinburgh University Press|year=2016|isbn=9780748695430|location=Edinburgh, U.K.|pages=96}}</ref> These marabouts believed that the ''ndiggël'' violated their secular political rights, which was a sentiment shared among many other Mourides in Touba.<ref name=":1" />

In 1997, a rural council of Touba Mosquée in Senegal issued a set of new taxes meant to fund an ambitions development project in the holy city. City merchants promptly voiced their displeasure of the new taxes and threatened to kick the rural council, whose members were all appointed by the Mouride ''Khalife-Général,'' out of the city. Although tax revolts are not uncommon elsewhere, this incident was particularly noteworthy as the merchants' blatant refusal exhibited a departure from typical state-society relations in Senegal. Declining economic performance in Senegal may lead to more taxes in the future, which means political actors may have to adjust or fundamentally alter their clientelist relationships with marabouts and ''Khalife-Général''.<ref name=":1" />

'''The Political Influence of Marabouts in Senegal’s Democratization'''

The political influence of marabouts in Senegal has been a significant aspect of Senegal’s democratization process. Leaders of Sufi brotherhoods, primarily the [[Mouride]] and [[Tijaniyyah|Tijaniyya]] orders, served as bridges connecting civilians and political elites in Senegal. The influence marabouts have had in Senegal is far more than spiritual, as they’ve been involved in numerous institutional changes throughout the decades. [[Marabout|Marabouts]] have a wide array of rural support, community welfare systems, and organized networks that provide them with institutional and political influence.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Behrman |first=Lucy Greevey |date=June 1977 |title=Muslim Politics and Development in Senegal |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x00053933 |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |volume=15 |issue=2 |pages=261–277 |doi=10.1017/s0022278x00053933 |issn=0022-278X|url-access=subscription }}</ref> In creating and maintaining these networks, marabouts act as electoral brokers during elections, usually being the deciding factor of what parties can mobilize local support. Marabout’s institutional influence has contributed to Senegal’s pathway to democratization. 

'''Marabouts in Patronage-Clientelism''' 

While Senegal has maintained multiparty institutions for decades, early democratization was controlled by a patronage-[[clientelism]] system between political leaders/elites and Sufi authorities.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Creevey |first=Lucy E. |date=1985 |title=Muslim Brotherhoods and Politics in Senegal in 1985 |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/160686 |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |volume=23 |issue=4 |pages=715–721 |issn=0022-278X}}</ref> Senegal’s democratization is not just a simple transition from traditional practice to modern politics. It is a process that integrates attributes of negotiation, coexistence, and adaptation between religious elites (marabouts) and democratic institutions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Villalón |first=Leonardo A. |date=2015-04-23 |title=Cautious Democrats: Religious Actors and Democratization Processes in Senegal |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048315000176 |journal=Politics and Religion |volume=8 |issue=2 |pages=305–333 |doi=10.1017/s1755048315000176 |issn=1755-0483|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Patronage ties between politicians and marabouts shape how resources are distributed to local communities, how political participation is mobilized, and how legitimacy is constructed in public life.<ref name=jb>{{Cite journal |last=Barker |first=Jonathan |date=March 1988 |title=The Making of a Liberal Democracy: Senegal's Passive Revolution, 1975–1985. By Robert FattonJr., (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987. ix, 189p. $25.00). |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/1958110 |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=82 |issue=1 |pages=313–314 |doi=10.2307/1958110 |issn=0003-0554|url-access=subscription }}</ref>

Political elites sought endorsements from marabouts in exchange for state resources, a variety of development projects, or favors in order to gain votes. Politicians have granted marabouts favors such as water and electricity during religious events they may be hosting, like the [[Grand Magal of Touba]], an annual pilgrimage of the Sufi brotherhoods. Some go as far as distributing diplomatic passports, or pilgrimage to Mecca.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Beck |first=Linda J. |date=2001 |title=Reining in the Marabouts? Democratization and Local Governance in Senegal |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518703 |journal=African Affairs |volume=100 |issue=401 |pages=601–621 |issn=0001-9909}}</ref> In the 1980s and 1990s, during the height of political liberalization, Sufi leaders had contradicting roles. On one hand, some marabouts encouraged communities to be politically involved and sought the distribution of power.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Villalón |first=Leonardo A. |date=2015-04-23 |title=Cautious Democrats: Religious Actors and Democratization Processes in Senegal |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/s1755048315000176 |journal=Politics and Religion |volume=8 |issue=2 |pages=305–333 |doi=10.1017/s1755048315000176 |issn=1755-0483|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Others maintained close personal ties with elites, helping weaken potential opposition movements rather than confrontational forms of politics. This dual role that marabouts played in Senegal, some mobilizing voters while others discouraging political radicalism, enabled the persistence of democratic institutions, but at the same time, limited the power of autonomous civil society organizations.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Beck |first=Linda J. |date=2001 |title=Reining in the Marabouts? Democratization and Local Governance in Senegal |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518703 |journal=African Affairs |volume=100 |issue=401 |pages=601–621 |issn=0001-9909}}</ref> While marabouts kept democracies going, this created a system that blocked communities from making large political changes. This constrained form of politics is what allowed marabouts to be intermediaries between political elites and communities. 

'''Patronage-Clientelism in Rural Communities''' 

Critics argue that the transactional changes between Sufi authorities and politicians negatively reinforce toxic social hierarchy systems.<ref name=jb/> Sufi brotherhoods often demand favors to benefit their communities; therefore, communities that lack strong ties with the brotherhoods may face an unequal distribution of resources.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Behrman |first=Lucy C. |date=December 1971 |title=The Mourides of Senegal; The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood. By Donal B. Cruise O'Brien. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. 321. $11.25.) |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/1953544 |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=65 |issue=4 |pages=1202–1203 |doi=10.2307/1953544 |issn=0003-0554|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This arrangement between marabouts and politicians is described as a “patrimonial democracy,” in which democratic institutions coexist with informal systems of authority that mediate state–society relations.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Beck |first=Linda J. |date=2001 |title=Reining in the Marabouts? Democratization and Local Governance in Senegal |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/3518703 |journal=African Affairs |volume=100 |issue=401 |pages=601–621 |issn=0001-9909}}</ref>

Urban and rural voters in Senegal show extremely different levels of support for incumbents. Studies show that rural communities are more likely to be influenced by Sufi brotherhoods, compared to their urban counterparts. Marabouts can leverage their prestige, religious influence, and community networks to influence national decision-making, primarily in rural communities.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gifford |first=Paul |date=2016-09-01 |title=Religion and politics in contemporary Senegal |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adw047 |journal=African Affairs |volume=115 |issue=461 |pages=688–709 |doi=10.1093/afraf/adw047 |issn=0001-9909|url-access=subscription }}</ref> The patron-clientelism system is a large factor for higher rural incumbent support. Incumbents have a lot of resource advantages and leverage them to gain support. It allows them to employ brokers (“Porteurs de Voix”) more effectively in rural communities. Rewards range from cash, cars, pilgrimages, and Qur’ans. In 2012, rewards went as far as allowances for 30,000 village chiefs and even 2 billion CFA sent to Touba.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Koter |first=Dominika |date=December 2013 |title=Urban and rural voting patterns in Senegal: the spatial aspects of incumbency, c. 1978–2012 |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0022278X13000621/type/journal_article |journal=The Journal of Modern African Studies |language=en |volume=51 |issue=4 |pages=653–679 |doi=10.1017/S0022278X13000621 |issn=0022-278X|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Politicians report that bloc voting, social pressure, and easier monitoring make rural clientelism extremely effective. 

'''Modern-Day Political Influence''' 

While marabout endorsements are still valuable to political leaders, [[Y'en a Marre|urban youth movements]] and educated community members have created new and modern strategies for mobilization. This gives the marabouts, who were once seen as the sole mobilizers, a run for their money.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gifford |first=Paul |date=2016-09-01 |title=Religion and politics in contemporary Senegal |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adw047 |journal=African Affairs |volume=115 |issue=461 |pages=688–709 |doi=10.1093/afraf/adw047 |issn=0001-9909|url-access=subscription }}</ref> This shift shows the rapid urbanization, growth in literacy rates, and rise of digital media technology, which in turn reduces marabout’s access to mobilize others.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Villalón |first=Leonardo A. |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511598647 |title=Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal |date=1995-02-16 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-46007-1}}</ref> 

Despite these changes, marabouts continue to serve as important political intermediaries. Their influence holds strong because Sufi brotherhoods are deeply embedded in Senegal’s society, providing welfare services, education, and informal mediation that the state does not always fully supply.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Behrman |first=Lucy C. |date=December 1971 |title=The Mourides of Senegal; The Political and Economic Organization of an Islamic Brotherhood. By Donal B. Cruise O'Brien. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. 321. $11.25.) |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/1953544 |journal=American Political Science Review |volume=65 |issue=4 |pages=1202–1203 |doi=10.2307/1953544 |issn=0003-0554|url-access=subscription }}</ref> Marabouts have constantly acted as mediators between political institutions and communities. This role has been shaping perceptions of legitimacy and moral authority during elections and political debates.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Villalón |first=Leonardo A. |url=https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511598647 |title=Islamic Society and State Power in Senegal |date=1995-02-16 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-46007-1}}</ref> Despite the youth seeking new agendas on voter mobilization, they continue to look up to marabouts, often seeking blessings, symbolic legitimacy, and access to community networks.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gifford |first=Paul |date=2016-09-01 |title=Religion and politics in contemporary Senegal |url=https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adw047 |journal=African Affairs |volume=115 |issue=461 |pages=688–709 |doi=10.1093/afraf/adw047 |issn=0001-9909|url-access=subscription }}</ref>