Gerrymandering: Difference between revisions

[[File:DifferingApportionment.svg|thumb|upright=1.1|Boundaries drawn to apportion five "districts" result in varying color majorities, including no yellow and 5 blue (top left), 3 yellow and 2 blue (top right), and 2 yellow and 3 blue (lower examples matching "voter" proportions).]]

'''Gerrymandering''', ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|dʒ|Er|i|m|æ|n|d|ər|ɪ|ŋ}} {{respell|JERR|ee|man|dər|ing}}, originally {{IPAc-en|ˈ|g|ɛr|i|m|æ|n|d|ər|ɪ|ŋ}} {{respell|GHERR|ee|man|dər|ing}})<ref>{{Cite web |date=15 June 2023 |title=Gerrymandering Definition & Meaning – Merriam-Webster |url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gerrymandering}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Wells |first=John |author-link=John C. Wells |title=Longman Pronunciation Dictionary |date=3 April 2008 |publisher=Pearson Longman |isbn=978-1-4058-8118-0 |edition=3rd}}</ref> defined in the contexts of [[Representative democracy|representative electoral systems]], is the political manipulation of [[Electoral boundary delimitation|electoral district boundaries]] to advantage a [[Political party|party]], group, or [[socioeconomic class]] within the [[constituency]].  

The term ''gerrymandering'' is a [[portmanteau]] of a [[salamander]] and [[Elbridge Gerry]],{{Efn|Pronounced with a [[Hard and soft G|hard "g"]], as if spelled "Gherry"}}<ref name="cokie">{{cite web |url=https://www.npr.org/2017/10/11/557051691/-askcokie-is-gerrymandering-rigging-americas-political-system |title=Ask Cokie: Is Gerrymandering Rigging America's Political System? |publisher=NPR Morning Edition |date=11 October 2017 |access-date=8 November 2020}}</ref> [[Vice President of the United States]] at the time of his death, who, as [[governor of Massachusetts]] in 1812, signed a bill that created a partisan district in the [[Boston]] area that was compared to the shape of a [[Cultural depictions of salamanders|mythological salamander]]. The term has negative connotations, and gerrymandering is almost always considered a corruption of the democratic process. The word ''gerrymander'' ({{IPAc-en|ˈ|dʒ|ɛr|i|ˌ|m|æ|n|d|ər|,_|ˈ|ɡ|ɛr|i|-}}) can be used both as a verb for the process and as a noun for a resulting district.<ref>{{cite book|title=The Big Book of Beastly Mispronunciations|last=Elster|first=Charles|publisher=Houghton Mifflin|year=2005|isbn=978-0-618-42315-6|location=Boston|page=224|oclc=317828351}}</ref><ref>{{Cite American Heritage Dictionary|gerrymander}}</ref>

 

[[File:The Gerry-Mander Edit.png|thumb|250px|Printed in March 1812, this political cartoon was made in reaction to the newly drawn state senate election district of [[Essex County, Massachusetts|South Essex]] created by the Massachusetts legislature to favor the [[Democratic-Republican Party]]. The caricature satirizes the bizarre shape of the district as a dragon-like "monster", and Federalist newspaper editors and others at the time likened it to a [[Cultural depictions of salamanders|salamander]].]]

The cartoon was most likely drawn by [[Elkanah Tisdale]], an early-19th-century painter, designer, and engraver who lived in Boston at the time.<ref> No evidence has been found that famous American portrait painter [[Gilbert Stuart]] had any involvement with either the design, drawing, or naming of the cartoon or with the coining of the term. Detailed biographies and academic journal articles about Stuart make no reference to gerrymandering. The myth of Stuart's association with the original gerrymander has been reproduced and spread without verification or sources, from one reference book and Internet site to another. Modern scholars of Stuart agree that no proof has been found to credit him with the term or cartoon, and that he tended not to be involved with such issues. {{cite journal |first=Kenneth C. |last=Martis |title=The Original Gerrymander |journal=Political Geography |volume=27 |issue=4 |year=2008 |pages=833–839 |doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.09.003 }}</ref> Tisdale had the engraving skills to cut the woodblocks to print the original cartoon.<ref>{{cite journal |last=O'Brien |first=D. C. |title=Elkanah Tisdale: Designer, Engraver and Miniature Painter |journal=Connecticut Historical Bulletin |volume=49 |issue=2 |year=1984 |pages=83–96 }}</ref> These woodblocks survive and are preserved in the [[Library of Congress]].<ref>Library of Congress. Original woodblocks for printing "Gerrymander" political cartoon. Geography and Map Reading Room. LCCN Permalink: http://lccn.loc.gov/2003620165.</ref> The creator of the term ''gerrymander'', however, may never be definitively established. Historians widely believe that the [[Federalist Party|Federalist]] newspaper editors [[Nathan Hale (journalist)|Nathan Hale]] and Benjamin and John Russell coined the term, but no definitive evidence shows who created or uttered the word for the first time.<ref name="Martis">{{cite journal |last=Martis |first=Kenneth C. |title=The Original Gerrymander |journal=[[Political Geography (journal)|Political Geography]] |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=833–839 |year=2008 |doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2008.09.003 }}</ref>

From time to time, other names have been suffixed with ''-{{zwj}}mander'' to tie a particular effort to a particular politician or group. Examples are the 1852 "[[Andrew Johnson#Congressman (1843–1853)|Henry-mandering]]", "Jerrymander" (referring to California Governor [[Jerry Brown]]),<ref>[[Thomas B. Hofeller]], "[https://www.politico.com/pdf/PPM116_rnc_hofeller_memo_051010.pdf The Looming Redistricting Reform; How will the Republican Party Fare?]", ''Politico'', 2011.</ref> "Perrymander" (a reference to Texas Governor [[Rick Perry]]),<ref>{{cite magazine |author=David Wasserman |date=19 August 2011 |title='Perrymander': Redistricting Map That Rick Perry Signed Has Texas Hispanics Up in Arms |url=http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/-perrymander-redistricting-map-that-rick-perry-signed-has-texas-hispanics-up-in-arms-20110819 |magazine=National Journal |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120509195817/http://www.nationaljournal.com/politics/-perrymander-redistricting-map-that-rick-perry-signed-has-texas-hispanics-up-in-arms-20110819 |archive-date=9 May 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |author=Mark Gersh |date=21 September 2011 |title=Redistricting Journal: Showdown in Texas—reasons and implications for the House, and Hispanic vote |url=https://www.cbsnews.com/news/redistricting-journal-showdown-in-texas-reasons-and-implications-for-the-house-and-hispanic-vote/ |work=CBS News |access-date=14 May 2012 |archive-date=22 September 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110922195655/http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-20109665-503544.html |url-status=live }}</ref> "[[Tullymander]]" (after the Irish politician [[James Tully (Irish politician)|James Tully]]),<ref>{{cite book

Some political science research suggests that contrary to common belief, gerrymandering does not decrease electoral competition and can even increase it. Some say that, rather than packing the voters of their party into uncompetitive districts, party leaders tend to prefer to spread their party's voters into multiple districts so that their party can win more races.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Masket |first1=Seth E. |last2=Winburn |first2=Jonathan |last3=Wright |first3=Gerald C. |title=The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won't Affect Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It |journal=PS: Political Science & Politics |date=January 2012 |volume=45 |issue=1 |pages=39–43 |doi=10.1017/S1049096511001703 |s2cid=45832354 }}</ref> (See scenario '''(c)''' in the box.) This may lead to increased competition. Instead of gerrymandering, some researchers find that other factors, such as partisan polarization and the incumbency advantage, have driven the recent{{when?|date=January 2025}} decreases in electoral competition.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Forgette |first1=Richard |last2=Winkle |first2=John W. |title=Partisan Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act |journal=Social Science Quarterly |date=March 2006 |volume=87 |issue=1 |pages=155–173 |doi=10.1111/j.0038-4941.2006.00374.x }}</ref> Similarly, a 2009 study found that "congressional polarization is primarily a function of the differences in how Democrats and Republicans represent the same districts rather than a function of which districts each party represents or the distribution of constituency preferences."<ref>{{cite journal|last1=McCarty|first1=Nolan|last2=Poole|first2=Keith T.|last3=Rosenthal|first3=Howard|date=July 2009|title=Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?|url=http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~miaryc/PEW/Nolan_McCarty_PEWCaltech.pdf|journal=American Journal of Political Science|volume=53|issue=3|pages=666–680|citeseerx=10.1.1.491.3072|doi=10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00393.x|access-date=24 October 2017|archive-date=30 June 2010|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100630200505/http://www.hss.caltech.edu/%7Emiaryc/PEW/Nolan_McCarty_PEWCaltech.pdf}}</ref>

Mann, a senior fellow of governance studies at the [[Brookings Institution]], has also noted, "Redistricting is a deeply political process, with incumbents actively seeking to minimize the risk to themselves (via bipartisan gerrymanders) or to gain additional seats for their party (via partisan gerrymanders)".<ref>Mann, Thomas E. "Redistricting Reform." The Brookings Institution. Brookings.edu, 1 June 2005. Web. 5 February 2013. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2005/06/01politics-mann></ref> The bipartisan gerrymandering Mann mentions refers to the fact that legislators often draw distorted legislative districts even when doing so does not give their party an advantage.

In the seven states where Republicans had complete control over the redistricting process, Republican House candidates received 16.7 million votes and Democratic House candidates received 16.4 million. The redistricting resulted in Republican victories in 73 out of the 107 affected seats; in those seven states, Republicans received 50.4% of the votes but won in over 68% of the congressional districts.<ref>Wang, Sam. "The Great Gerrymander of 2012." The New York Times. 2 February 2013. Web. 5 February 2013.

</ref> While it is but one example of how gerrymandering can have a significant effect on election outcomes, this kind of disproportional representation of the public will seems problematic for the legitimacy of democratic systems, regardless of one's political affiliation.

 

In [[Michigan]], redistricting was conducted by a Republican legislature in 2011.<ref name=":3">{{cite web|url=http://ballotpedia.org/Redistricting_in_Michigan|title=Redistricting in Michigan|work=ballotpedia.org}}</ref> Federal congressional districts were designed so that cities such as [[Battle Creek]], [[Grand Rapids]], [[Jackson, Michigan|Jackson]], [[Kalamazoo]], [[Lansing]], and [[East Lansing]] were separated into districts with large conservative-leaning hinterlands that diluted the Democratic votes in those cities in Congressional elections.<ref name=":3" />

Prison-based gerrymandering occurs when prisoners are counted as residents of a district, increasing its population with nonvoters when assigning political apportionment. This phenomenon violates the principle of [[one person, one vote]] because, although many prisoners come from (and return to) urban communities, they are counted as "residents" of the rural districts that contain large prisons, artificially inflating the political representation in districts with prisons at the expense of voters in districts without them.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/news/2006/05/20/NYT-gerrymandering|title=Prison-Based Gerrymandering|date=20 May 2006|newspaper=The New York Times|type=Editorial}}</ref> Others contend that prisoners should not be counted as residents of their original districts when they do not reside there and are [[disenfranchisement|not legally eligible to vote]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/NYS_A9710-D.html|title=New York Prison-Based Gerrymandering Bill – Policy|website=www.prisonersofthecensus.org}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.prisonersofthecensus.org/NYS_A11597.html|title=New York Prison-Based Gerrymandering Technical Amendment|website=www.prisonersofthecensus.org}}</ref>

US states Michigan, Colorado, Virginia, and Tennessee have all passed laws that restrict prison-based gerrymandering. In 2014, Massachusetts passed a resolution that asked the Census Bureau to stop counting incarcerated people as residents in the district where they are incarcerated. Pennsylvania also voted to redraw districts in a way that avoids prison-based gerrymandering.<ref>{{Cite web |last=PennLive.com |first=Spotlight PA {{!}} For |date=2021-08-24 |title=In major shift, Pa. panel votes to count incarcerated people in home districts, not state prisons |url=https://www.pennlive.com/news/2021/08/in-major-shift-pa-panel-votes-to-count-incarcerated-people-in-home-districts-not-state-prisons.html |access-date=2025-03-13 |website=pennlive |language=en}}</ref>

[[File:map22007.gif|thumb|250px|Electoral divisions in the Sydney area in 2007, drawn by the politically independent [[Australian Electoral Commission]]]]

Due to the perceived issues associated with gerrymandering and its effect on competitive elections and democratic accountability, numerous countries have enacted reforms making the practice more difficult or less effective. Countries such as the UK, Australia, Canada, and most of those in Europe have transferred responsibility for defining constituency boundaries to neutral or cross-party bodies. In Spain, they have been constitutionally fixed since 1978.<ref name="ES_Const" /> [[Open list|Open]] [[party-list proportional representation]] makes gerrymandering obsolete by erasing district lines and empowering voters to rank a list of candidates any party puts forth. This method is used in Austria, Brazil, Sweden, and Switzerland.{{citation needed|date=April 2022}}

In the U.S., such reforms are controversial and face particularly strong opposition from groups that benefit from gerrymandering. In a more neutral system, they might lose considerable influence.

This is the system used in the UK, where independent [[boundary commissions (United Kingdom)|boundary commissions]] determine the boundaries for [[United Kingdom constituencies|constituencies]] in the [[British House of Commons|House of Commons]] and the [[Devolution in the United Kingdom|devolved legislatures]], subject to ratification by the body in question (almost always granted without debate). A similar situation exists in Australia, where the independent [[Australian Electoral Commission]] and its state-based counterparts determine electoral boundaries for federal, state, and local jurisdictions.

In the U.S. state of [[Iowa]], the nonpartisan Legislative Services Bureau (LSB, akin to the [[U.S. Congressional Research Service]]) determines electoral district boundaries. Aside from satisfying federally mandated contiguity and population equality criteria, the LSB mandates unity of counties and cities. Consideration of political factors such as location of incumbents, previous boundary locations, and political party proportions is specifically forbidden. Since Iowa's counties are chiefly regularly shaped [[polygons]], the LSB process has led to districts that follow county lines.<ref name="7_buck_trust.html" />

In 2017, Representative [[John Delaney (Maryland politician)|John Delaney]] submitted the [[Open Our Democracy Act of 2017]] to the [[U.S. House of Representatives]] as a means to implement nonpartisan redistricting. It ultimately did not pass.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Delaney |first=John K. |date=2017-07-10 |title=Text - H.R.2981 - 115th Congress (2017-2018): To require all candidates for election for the office of Senator or Member of the House of Representatives to run in an open primary regardless of political party preference or lack thereof, to limit the ensuing general election for such office to the two candidates receiving the greatest number of votes in such open primary, and for other purposes. |url=https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/2981/text |access-date=2025-02-28 |website=www.congress.gov}}</ref>

Many redistricting reforms seek to remove partisanship to ensure fairness in the redistricting process. The [[I cut, you choose|I-cut-you-choose]] method achieves fairness by putting the two major parties in direct competition. I-cut-you-choose is a [[fair division]] method to divide resources amongst two parties, regardless of which party cuts first.<ref>{{cite arXiv|title=A partisan districting protocol with provably nonpartisan outcomes|last1=Pegden|first1=Wesley|date=24 October 2017 <!-- |publisher=Cornell University --> |class=cs.GT|eprint=1710.08781}}</ref> This method typically relies on assumptions of contiguity of districts, but ignores all other constraints such as keeping communities of interest together. This method has been applied to nominal redistricting problems,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/02/how-the-i-cut-you-choose-method-of-redistricting-could-fix-a-broken-system.html|title=A new method of redistricting could solve gerrymandering|last1=Riedel|first1=Will|date=27 February 2018|publisher=Slate.com|access-date=12 December 2020}}</ref> but it generally has less public interest than other types of redistricting reforms. The I-cut-you-choose concept was popularized by the board game ''Berrymandering''. Problems with this method arise when minor parties are shut out of the process, which will reinforce the [[two-party system]]. Additionally, while this method is provably fair to the two parties creating the districts, it is not necessarily fair to the communities they represent.

As gerrymandering relies on the wasted-vote effect, the use of a different voting system with fewer wasted votes can help reduce gerrymandering. In particular, the use of [[multimember district]]s alongside voting systems establishing [[proportional representation]] such as [[party-list proportional representation]] or [[single transferable voting]] can reduce wasted votes and gerrymandering. Semiproportional voting systems such as [[single nontransferable vote]] or [[cumulative voting]] are relatively simple and similar to ''[[first past the post]]'' and can also reduce the proportion of wasted votes and thus potential gerrymandering. Electoral reformers have advocated all three as replacement systems.<ref>See, e.g., Richard L. Engstrom, The Single Transferable Vote: An Alternative Remedy for Minority Vote Dilution, 27 U.S.F.L.Rev. 781, 806 (1993) (arguing that the Single Transferable Voting systems maintain minority electoral opportunities); Steven J. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out: A Remedial Road Map for the Use of Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Act Remedies, 77 N.C.L.Rev. 1867, 1923 (1999) (concluding that ranked-ballot voting systems avoid minority vote dilution); Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 Harv.C.R.-C.L.L.Rev. 333, 350 (1998) (arguing that preferential voting systems enhance minority representation); and Alexander Athan Yanos, Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote With the Voting Rights Act, 92 Colum.L.Rev. 1810, 1865–66 (1992) (arguing that Single Transferable Voting serves to preserve the minority party's right to representation).</ref>

Another way to avoid gerrymandering is simply to stop redistricting altogether and use existing political boundaries such as state, county, or provincial lines. While this prevents future gerrymandering, any existing advantage may become deeply ingrained. The [[United States Senate]], for instance, has more competitive elections than the House of Representatives due to the use of existing state borders rather than gerrymandered districts {{Ndash}}Senators are elected by their entire state whereas Representatives are elected in legislatively drawn districts.

Depending on the distribution of voters for a particular party, metrics that maximize compactness can be opposed to metrics that minimize the efficiency gap.  For example, in the United States, voters registered with the Democratic Party tend to be concentrated in cities, potentially resulting in a large number of "wasted" votes if compact districts are drawn around city populations.  Neither of these metrics take into consideration other possible goals,<ref>{{cite web|url=https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/hating-gerrymandering-is-easy-fixing-it-is-harder/|title=Hating Gerrymandering Is Easy. Fixing It Is Harder.|last=Wasserman|first=David|date=25 January 2018|website=[[FiveThirtyEight]]}}</ref> such as proportional representation based on other demographic characteristics (such as race, ethnicity, gender, or income), maximizing competitiveness of elections (the greatest number of districts where party affiliation is 50/50), avoiding splits of existing government units (like cities and counties), and ensuring representation of major interest groups (like farmers or voters in a specific transportation corridor), though any of these could be incorporated into a more complicated metric.

Another criticism of the system is that splitline districts sometimes divide and diffuse the voters in a large metropolitan area. This condition is most likely to occur when one of the first splitlines cuts through the metropolitan area. It is often considered a drawback of the system because residents of the same agglomeration are assumed to be a community of common interest. This is most evident in the splitline allocation of [[Colorado]].<ref>{{Cite web | url = http://www.rangevoting.org/SSHR/co_final.png| title = Untitled | website = rangevoting.org| access-date = 30 June 2021}}</ref>

The efficiency gap is a simply-calculable measure that can show the effects of gerrymandering.<ref name="TheNewRepublic">{{cite magazine|url=https://newrepublic.com/article/118534/gerrymandering-efficiency-gap-better-way-measure-gerrymandering|title=Here's How We Can End Gerrymandering Once and for All|magazine=The New Republic|author=Nicholas Stephanopoulas|date=3 July 2014|access-date=8 May 2018}}</ref> It measures wasted votes for each party: the sum of votes cast in losing districts (losses due to cracking) and excess votes cast in winning districts (losses due to packing). The difference in these wasted votes are divided by total votes cast, and the resulting percentage is the efficiency gap.

 

Given such theoretical difficulties, a robust, however sub-optimal, anti-gerrymandering rule may be as simple as identifying all maps satisfying a rough efficiency measure, like expected outcome matching voter affiliation proportions, then choosing the one most compact.

Gerrymandering in its original sense should not be confused with [[malapportionment]], whereby the number of eligible voters per elected representative can vary widely. In Australia, however, the term was widely used to refer to malapportionment. Moreover, the ''-mander'' suffix was applied to particular malapportionments, such as the [[Playmander]] in South Australia.  

Sometimes political representatives use both gerrymandering and malapportionment to try to maintain power.<ref>{{Cite encyclopedia|url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/gerrymandering|title=gerrymandering {{!}} politics|encyclopedia=Encyclopedia Britannica|access-date=27 May 2017|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite magazine|last=Barasch|first=Emily|title=The Twisted History of Gerrymandering in American Politics|url=https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/the-twisted-history-of-gerrymandering-in-american-politics/262369/|magazine=The Atlantic|language=en-US|access-date=27 May 2017}}</ref> One of the earliest examples of [[malapportionment]], [[rotten boroughs]], was practiced in England from the 13th century until the [[Reform Act 1832|1832 reform act]].<ref>{{Cite book |last=Seabrook |first=Nick |date=2022 |title=One Person, One Vote: A Surprising History of Gerrymandering in America |edition=First |location=New York |publisher=Pantheon Books |isbn=978-0-593-31586-6 |oclc=1286675891}}</ref> A striking modern example of [[malapportionment]] is the [[U.S. senate]], where states receive equal representation despite widely varying populations.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Griffin |first=John D. |date=2006 |title=Senate Apportionment as a Source of Political Inequality |journal=Legislative Studies Quarterly |volume=31 |issue=3 |pages=405–432 |doi=10.3162/036298006X201869 |jstor=40263393 |issn=0362-9805}}</ref>

In the state of [[Queensland]], malapportionment combined with a gerrymander under [[National Party of Australia – Queensland|Country Party]] Premier Sir [[Joh Bjelke-Petersen]] (knighted by [[Queen Elizabeth II]] at his own request) became nicknamed the [[Bjelkemander]] in the 1970s and 1980s.<ref>{{cite journal|last1=Orr|first1=Graham D.|last2=Levy|first2=Ron|title=Electoral Malapportionment: Partisanship, Rhetoric and Reform in the Shadow of the Agrarian Strong-Man|journal=[[Griffith Law Review]]|year=2009|volume=18|issue=3|pages=638–665|ssrn=1579826|doi=10.1080/10854659.2009.10854659|s2cid=145695031}}</ref>

In 2014 the conservative Liberal Party NSW State Government gerrymandered the local [[City of Sydney]] council elections as part of their continued attempts to remove [[Clover Moore]] from elected positions. Moore had already been removed as a state government representative by laws banning serving simultaneously as a state representative and a local council member, and their attempt to remove her from the Council saw the State Government introduce a law giving all businesses in the area two votes and requiring the council to constantly update the electoral roll and inform each business of its eligibility to vote. Moore called the laws an "undemocratic gerrymander" and election analyst [[Antony Green]] said the changes were "clearly an attempt to disadvantage Clover Moore". The laws were specific to the City of Sydney council and not rolled out across the rest of the state councils. The attempt failed, and Moore retained her position as Lord Mayor of Sydney through multiple further elections.<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.sbs.com.au/news/the-feed/article/comment-why-clover-moore-is-better-at-politics-than-everyone-else/5xno6tpjt | title=Comment: Why Clover Moore is better at politics than everyone else }}</ref><ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/clover-moores-power-under-threat-after-more-than-20000-business-voters-enrolled-20160808-gqn92d.html | title=Clover Moore's power under threat after more than 20,000 'business' voters enrolled | date=8 August 2016 }}</ref>

Gerrymandering used to be prominent in [[Canadian politics]], but is no longer prominent, after independent [[redistricting commission|electoral boundary redistribution commission]]s were established in all provinces.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|last=Prokop|first=Andrew|date=15 April 2014|title=How Canada ended gerrymandering|url=https://www.vox.com/2014/4/15/5604284/us-elections-are-rigged-but-canada-knows-how-to-fix-them|access-date=8 April 2021|website=Vox|language=en}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal |last1=Courtney |first1=John C. |title=Redistricting: What the United States Can Learn from Canada |journal=Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy |date=September 2004 |volume=3 |issue=3 |pages=488–500 |doi=10.1089/1533129041492123 }}</ref> Early in [[Canada|Canadian]] history, both the federal and provincial levels used gerrymandering to try to maximize partisan power. When [[Alberta]] and [[Saskatchewan]] were admitted to [[Canadian Confederation|Confederation]] in 1905, their original district boundaries were set forth in the respective [[Alberta Act|Alberta]] and [[Saskatchewan Act]]s. Federal [[Liberal Party of Canada|Liberal]] [[cabinet (government)|cabinet]] members devised the boundaries to ensure the election of provincial Liberal governments.<ref>Breen, David. "The Turner Thesis and the Canadian West: A Closer Look at the Ranching Frontier." In ''Essays on Western History.'' Thomas, Lewis G., ed. (University of Alberta

Press: Edmonton, 1976), 153–54. {{ISBN|0-88864-013-7}}</ref> [[British Columbia]] used a combination of [[single-member]] and [[Dual-member proportional representation|dual-member constituencies]] to solidify the power of the center-right [[British Columbia Social Credit Party]] until [[1991 British Columbia general election|1991]].

Since responsibility for drawing federal and provincial electoral boundaries was handed over to independent agencies, the problem has largely been eliminated at those levels of government. [[Manitoba]] was the first province to authorize a non-partisan group to define constituency boundaries in the 1950s.<ref name=":0" /> In 1964, the [[Government of Canada|federal government]] delegated the drawing of boundaries for [[Electoral district (Canada)|federal electoral districts]] to the non-partisan agency [[Elections Canada]] which answers to [[Parliament of Canada|Parliament]] rather than the government of the day.

As a result, gerrymandering is not generally a major issue in Canada except at the civic level.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Silver |first1=Jim |title=The failure of civic reform movements in Winnipeg civic elections: 1971–1992 |date=1995 |hdl=10680/1046 |hdl-access=free |publisher=Institute of Urban Studies |oclc=938955594 }}</ref> Although city wards are recommended by independent agencies, [[city councils]] occasionally overrule them. That is much more likely if the city is not homogenous and different neighborhoods have sharply different opinions about city policy direction.

In 2006, a controversy arose in [[Prince Edward Island]] over the [[Government of Prince Edward Island|provincial government]]'s decision to throw out an electoral map drawn by an independent commission. Instead, they created two new maps. The government adopted the second of them, which was designed by the [[caucus]] of the governing [[Progressive Conservative Party of Prince Edward Island]]. Opposition parties and the media attacked Premier [[Pat Binns]] for what they saw as gerrymandering of districts. Among other things, the government adopted a map that ensured that every current [[Member of the Legislative Assembly]] from the premier's party had a district to run in for re-election, but in the original map, several had been redistricted.<ref>{{cite news |title=No Christmas election: Binns |url=https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/prince-edward-island/no-christmas-election-binns-1.608298 |work=[[cbc.ca]] |date=16 November 2006 }}</ref> However, in the [[2007 Prince Edward Island general election|2007 provincial election]] only seven of 20 incumbent Members of the Legislative Assembly were re-elected (seven did not run for re-election), and the government was defeated.

On 30 December 2022, Salvadoran president [[Nayib Bukele]] tweeted that he believed that the country's [[Municipalities of El Salvador|262 municipalities]] should be reduced to 50.<ref name="PLmun1">{{cite web|url=https://www.prensa-latina.cu/2023/01/04/reforma-de-municipios-en-el-salvador-crea-fricciones|title=Reforma de Municipios en El Salvador Crea Fricciones|trans-title=Municipality Reform in El Salvador Creates Frictions|language=es|work=[[Prensa Latina]]|date=4 January 2023|access-date=5 January 2023|archive-date=5 January 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230105080223/https://www.prensa-latina.cu/2023/01/04/reforma-de-municipios-en-el-salvador-crea-fricciones}}</ref> Opposition politicians accused him of attempting to gerrymander the municipalities and consolidate his power ahead of the [[2024 Salvadoran legislative election|2024 legislative election]].<ref name="ESmun1">{{cite web|url=https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/reduccion-municipios-debe-ser-base-censo/1029562/2023/|title=Reducción de Municipios Debe Ser con Base en Censo, Señala VAMOS|trans-title=Municipality Reduction Should be Based on Census, Signals VAMOS|date=4 January 2022|access-date=5 January 2022|first1=Eugenia|last1=Velásquez|work=[[El Diario de Hoy|El Salvador.com]]}}</ref><ref name="ESmun2">{{cite web|url=https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/alcaldias-asamblea-legislativa-nayib-bukele/1028982/2023/|title=Intención de Bukele de Reducir Municipios es para Concentrar Más Poder, Afirman Expertos|trans-title=Bukele's Intention to Reduce Municipalities is to Concentrate More Power, Affirm Experts|language=es|work=[[El Diario de Hoy|El Salvador.com]]|date=3 January 2023|access-date=5 January 2023|first1=Eugenia|last1=Velásquez}}</ref><ref name="Esmun4">{{cite web|url=https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/accion-ciudadana-reduccion-municipal/1029584/2023/|title=Reducir Municipios Generaría un Efecto para Deteriorar las Elecciones Municipales, Reitera Acción Ciudadana|trans-title=Reducing Municipalities Will Generate and Effect to Deteriorate the Municipal Elections, Reiterates Citizen Action|date=5 January 2023|access-date=5 January 2023|language=es|work=[[El Diario de Hoy|El Salvador.com]]|first1=Abigail|last1=Parada}}</ref> On 20 February 2023, [[List of presidents of the Legislative Assembly of El Salvador|Legislative Assembly President]] [[Ernesto Castro]] announced that the [[Nuevas Ideas]] (NI) political party was formally evaluating a proposal to reduce the number of municipalities as suggested by Bukele.<ref name="LPG64">{{cite web|url=https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Oficialismo-evalua-proponer-reduccion-en-el-numero-de--los-municipios-y-diputados-20230220-0100.html|title=Oficialismo Evalúa Proponer Reducción en el Número de los Municipios y Diputados|trans-title=Officials Evaluate Proposing Reduction in the Number of Municipalities and Deputies|language=es|date=21 February 2023|access-date=21 February 2023|work=[[La Prensa Gráfica]]|first1=Lissette|last1=Mondragón}}</ref>

France is one of the few countries to let legislatures redraw the map with no check.<ref>Balinski & Baïou (2002), ''Découpage électoral'', Pour la science</ref> In practice, the [[Parliament of France]] sets up an executive commission. Districts called ''[[arrondissement]]s'' were used in the [[French Third Republic|Third Republic]] and under the [[French Fifth Republic|Fifth Republic]] they are called ''circonscriptions''. During the Third Republic, some reforms of arrondissements, which were also used for administrative purposes, were largely suspected to have been arranged to favor the [[kingmaker]] in the [[National Assembly (France)|National Assembly]], the [[Radical Party (France)|Radical Party]].

The constituencies in [[New Caledonia]] are accused of being adjusted to ensure a loyalist win. The [[New Caledonia's 1st constituency|1st constituency]] combines the [[Loyalty Islands]] (a separatist province)<ref name=RNZ>{{cite web|url=https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/517954/emmanuel-macron-s-gamble-on-new-caledonia-s-crisis|title=Emmanuel Macron's gamble on New Caledonia's crisis|date=28 May 2024|access-date=3 September 2024|author=Patrick Decloitre|work=[[Radio New Zealand]]}}</ref> with the capital [[Noumea]], while the [[New Caledonia's 2nd constituency|2nd constituency]] combines the rural separatist-dominated [[North Province, New Caledonia|North Province]]<ref name=RNZ/> with most of the [[South Province, New Caledonia|South Province]].<ref name=IB>{{cite web|url=https://islandsbusiness.com/news-break/tjibaou-and-metzdorf-win-new-caledonias-seats-in-french-national-assembly/|title= Tjibaou and Metzdorf win New Caledonia's seats in French National Assembly|author=Nic Maclellan|date=July 8, 2024|access-date=3 September 2024|work=[[Islands Business]]}}</ref> There had been no separatist deputy from the [[1986 French legislative election|1986]] to the [[2024 French legislative election|2024]] election with the victory of [[Emmanuel Tjibaou]].<ref name=IB/>

Another scenario in which gerrymandering could affect German federal election was when a party won more constituencies than their overall share of the popular vote—those extra seats, called "[[Overhang seat|Überhangmandate]]". In the [[2009 German federal election|Bundestag election of 2009]], [[Angela Merkel]]'s [[CDU/CSU]] gained 24 such extra seats, while no other party gained any;<ref name=":2">{{cite web |title=Overhang mandates – The Federal Returning Officer |url=https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/service/glossar/u/ueberhangmandate.html |access-date=10 May 2020 |publisher=Statistisches Bundesamt}}</ref> this skewed the result so much that the [[Federal Constitutional Court of Germany]] issued two rulings declaring the existing election laws invalid and requiring the Bundestag to pass a new law limiting such extra seats to no more than 15. In 2013, Germany's Federal Constitutional Court ruled on the constitutionality of Überhangmandate. Each other party would receive seats as well to remedy the disproportion, thereby making it impossible to have disproportionate election results. As this could potentially lead to ever increasing size of the Bundestag, in 2023 a reform was passed ending both extra seats and a party being able to gain seats without winning more than 5% of the vote. <ref>https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2023/kw11-de-bundeswahlgesetz-937896</ref>.

In 2011, [[Fidesz]] politician [[János Lázár]] has proposed a redesign to Hungarian voting districts; considering the territorial results of previous elections, this redesign would favor right-wing politics according to the opposition.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://index.hu/belfold/2011/11/28/igy_lesz_jobboldali_magyarorszag/ |title=Index – Belföld – Így lesz jobboldali Magyarország |date=28 November 2011 |publisher=Index.hu |access-date=18 November 2012}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzes/156/pid_hungarian_politics_in_depth_2011_week48.pdf |title=Gerrymandering Fidesz' way to re-election? |access-date=16 September 2020 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120426070629/http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/elemzesek/PID_Hungarian%20Politics%20In-Depth_2011_Week48.pdf |archive-date=26 April 2012 }}</ref> Since then, the law has been passed by the Fidesz-majority [[National Assembly (Hungary)|National Assembly]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://index.hu/belfold/2011/12/23/elfogadtak_az_uj_valasztojogi_torvenyt/ |title=Index – Belföld – Elfogadták az új választójogi törvényt |date=23 December 2011 |publisher=Index.hu |access-date=18 November 2012}}</ref>  By the political think tanks and media close to the opposition, it took twice as many votes to gain a seat in some election districts as in some others. However, their findings are controversial.<ref>{{cite web |author=Hornyák József |url=http://www.vg.hu/kozelet/vg_online/kozelet_-_belfold/090112_capital_255559 |title=Fellebbez a Political Capital a választókerületi aránytalanságok miatt &#124; Közélet &#124; Világgazdaság Online |date=12 January 2009 |publisher=Vg.hu |access-date=18 November 2012 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140312021118/http://www.vg.hu/kozelet/vg_online/kozelet_-_belfold/090112_capital_255559 |archive-date=12 March 2014 }}</ref> Gerrymandering was seen in the [[2018 Hungarian parliamentary election|2018 election results]].<ref>[https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2022/04/02/a-wild-gerrymander-makes-hungarys-fidesz-party-hard-to-dislodge A wild gerrymander makes Hungary's Fidesz party hard to dislodge, The Economist, 2022]</ref>

Until the 1980s [[Dáil]] boundaries in [[Republic of Ireland|Ireland]] were drawn not by an independent commission but by government ministers. Successive arrangements by governments of all political characters have been attacked as gerrymandering. Ireland uses the [[single transferable vote]], and as well as the actual boundaries drawn, the main tool of gerrymandering has been the number of seats per constituency used, with three-seat constituencies normally benefiting the strongest parties in an area, whereas four-seat constituencies normally help smaller parties.

Gerrymandering in India is loosely claimed by many political analysts, however there is no conclusive evidence whether the exercise has benefited a particular political party or not.<ref>[https://www.forbesindia.com/article/special/forbes-india-investigation-indias-most-gerrymandered-constituencies/53011/1 Forbes India Investigation: India's most gerrymandered constituencies, Karthik Shashidhar, 2019]</ref> The last nationwide delimitation was done in 2009 and two successive elections threw two different results giving mandate to both the political parties one after another.

{{Multiple image|total_width = 400

|image1=Elderships where Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance had majority of votes during 2020 Lithuania's parliamentary election.jpg

|image2=Lithuanian Seimas 2020 election second round – SMC results.svg

|footer=[[Elderships of Lithuania|Elderships]] won by the Polish minority [[Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance|LLRA–KŠS]] in [[2020 Lithuanian parliamentary election|2020]]. The governing [[Homeland Union|TS–LKD]] dominated [[Vilnius]].

For the [[2024 Lithuanian parliamentary election]], the electoral districts were redrawn. 10 elderships of the [[Vilnius District Municipality]] which has a large Polish minority were merged with elderships of [[Vilnius]] to form the new Southern Vilnius district thus extending the total count of districts in Vilnius from 13 to 14. The [[Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania – Christian Families Alliance|LLRA–KŠS]] criticized the decision to rather choose Polish-dominated towns like [[Juodšiliai]] and [[Valčiūnai]] over Lithuanian-dominated towns like [[Riešė]] and [[Avižieniai]] to merge with Vilnius.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://kurierwilenski.lt/2023/12/06/zmiany-granic-okregow-wyborczych-dotkna-polska-mniejszosc-narodowa/|title=Zmiany granic okręgów wyborczych dotkną polską mniejszość narodową|date=December 6, 2023|access-date=August 8, 2024|author=Anna Pieszko|language=pl|work=[[Kurier Wileński]]}}</ref>

An example was in [[Camarines Sur]], where two districts were divided into three districts which allegedly favors the Andaya and the Arroyo families; it caused Rolando Andaya and [[Dato Arroyo]], who would have otherwise run against each other, run in separate districts, with one district allegedly not even surpassing the 250,000-population minimum.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.philstar.com/nation/558593/noynoy-hits-creation-camarines-sur-district-dato |title= Noynoy hits creation of Camarines Sur district for Dato |date=18 March 2010 |first=Aurea |last=Calica |work=[[The Philippine Star]] |access-date=30 July 2013}}</ref> The [[Supreme Court of the Philippines|Supreme Court]] later ruled that the 250,000 population minimum does not apply to an additional district in a province.<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.philstar.com/headlines/564542/supreme-court-ruling-camsur-clears-senate |title=  Supreme Court ruling on Camsur clears Senate |date=9 April 2010 |first=Christina |last=Mendez |work=[[The Philippine Star]] |access-date=30 July 2013}}</ref> The resulting splits would later be the cause of another gerrymander, where the province would be split into a new province called [[Nueva Camarines]]; the bill was defeated in the Senate in 2013.<ref>{{cite news |url=http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/06/08/13/senate-fails-pass-nueva-camarines-measure |title=Senate fails to pass Nueva Camarines measure |date=8 June 2013 |first=Christina |last=Mendez |work=[[The Philippine Star]] |publisher=ABS-CBNnews.com |access-date=30 July 2013 }}{{Dead link|date=June 2025 |bot=InternetArchiveBot |fix-attempted=yes }}</ref>

The landmark [[1948 South African general election|1948 general election]] was influenced by provisions of the [[South Africa Act 1909|Constitution]] granting rural areas more constituencies in [[Parliament of South Africa|Parliament]] than urban areas. Thus the [[white-supremacist]] [[National Party (South Africa)|National Party]] won a plurality against the more moderate [[United Party (South Africa)|United Party]] despite receiving fewer votes and implemented [[apartheid]].<ref>{{Cite book|last=Clark|first=Nancy L.|title=South Africa: the rise and fall of apartheid|date=2016|author2=William H. Worger|isbn=978-1-138-12444-8|edition=Third |location=Abingdon, Oxon |publisher=Routledge |oclc=883649263}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|title=Book 4: Industrialisation, Rural Change and Nationalism - Chapter 3 - Afrikaner Nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s by Albert Grundlingh {{!}} South African History Online|url=https://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/book-4-industrialisation-rural-change-and-nationalism-chapter-3-afrikaner-nationalism-1930s|access-date=8 November 2021|website=www.sahistory.org.za}}</ref>

Prior to the establishment of [[Irish Home Rule|Home Rule]] in [[Northern Ireland]], the UK government had installed the [[single transferable vote]] (STV) system in Ireland to secure fair elections in terms of proportional representation in its [[Parliament of Northern Ireland|Parliaments]]. After two elections under that system, [[House of Commons (Method of Voting and Redistribution of Seats) Act (Northern Ireland) 1929|in 1929]] Stormont changed the electoral system to be the same as the rest of the [[United Kingdom]]: a single-member [[first past the post]] system. The only exception was for the election of four Stormont MPs to represent the [[Queen's University of Belfast]]. Some believe that the boundaries were gerrymandered to under-represent Nationalists.<ref name="coogan637" /> Other geographers and historians, for instance Professor [[John H. Whyte]], disagree.<ref name="whyte" /><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/hnihoc.htm |title=Northern Ireland House of Commons, 1921–1972 |publisher=Ark.ac.uk |access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref> They have argued that the electoral boundaries for the [[Parliament of Northern Ireland]] were not gerrymandered to a greater level than that produced by any single-winner election system, and that the actual number of Nationalist MPs barely changed under the revised system (it went from 12 to 11 and later went back up to 12). Most observers{{who?|date=May 2025}} have acknowledged that the change to a single-winner system was a key factor, however, in stifling the growth of smaller political parties, such as the [[Northern Ireland Labour Party]] and [[Independent Unionist]]s. In the 1967 election, Unionists won 35.5% of the votes and received 60% of the seats, while Nationalists got 27.4% of the votes but received 40% of the seats. This meant that both the Unionist and Nationalist parties were over-represented, while the Northern Ireland Labour Party and [[Independent politician|Independents]] (amounting to more than 35% of the votes cast) were severely under-represented.

After Westminster reintroduced direct rule in 1973, it restored the single transferable vote (STV) for [[1973 Northern Ireland Assembly election|elections]] to the [[Northern Ireland Assembly (1973)|Northern Ireland Assembly]] in the following year, using the same definitions of constituencies as for the Westminster Parliament. Currently, in Northern Ireland, all elections use STV except those for positions in the [[Westminster Parliament]], which follow the pattern in the rest of the United Kingdom by using "first past the post."

{{Unbalanced|date=April 2020|section}}

<!-- I coun't find a more appropriate or inline template. I have put a POV tag below to highlight the problem. The problem is that An Phoblacht is a publication whose sole purpose is to disseminate a separatist or republican viewpoint to readers, and which has close links to Sinn Féin and the IRA. Also, the section (including a selection at the top of the article) is unbalanced in terms of explaining any counter-argument to the claim of gerrymandering in Northern Ireland. -->

Gerrymandering (in {{Langx|ga|Claonroinnt}}) in local elections was introduced in 1923 by the Leech Commission. This was a one-man commission: Sir John Leech, K.C. was appointed by [[Dawson Bates]], Northern Ireland's [[Minister of Home Affairs]], to redraw Northern Ireland's local government electoral boundaries.<ref>{{cite book |last1=Bew|first1=Paul|last2=Patterson|first2=Henry|last3=Gibbon|first3=Peter|title=The state in Northern Ireland, 1921–72: political forces and social classes  |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RXm7AAAAIAAJ&q=leech |pages=  |publisher=Manchester University Press |year=1979 |isbn=978-0-7190-0814-6|oclc= }}</ref>{{rp|68}} Leech was also chairman of the Advisory Committee who recommended the release or continued detention of the persons that the Northern Irish government was interning without trial at that time.<ref>{{cite book |last= McConville |first= Sean |title=Irish Political Prisoners 1920–1962: Pilgrimage of Desolation |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=au_eDwAAQBAJ&q=Leech |pages= |publisher=Taylor & Francis |year= 2020 |isbn= 978-1-000-08274-6 |oclc= }}</ref> Leech's changes (gerrymandered electoral boundaries, abolishing proportional representation),<ref>McCluskey, Fergal, (2013), ''The Irish Revolution 1912-23: Tyrone'', Four Courts Press, Dublin, pg 126, ISBN 9781846822995</ref> together with a resultant boycott by the [[Irish Nationalist]] community, resulted in [[Irish unionism|Unionists]] gaining control of [[Londonderry County Borough Council]], [[Fermanagh County Council|Fermanagh]] and [[Tyrone County Council]]s, and retaking eight rural district councils. These county councils, and most of the district councils, remained under Unionist control despite the majority of their population being Catholic until the UK government imposed [[Direct rule (Northern Ireland)|Direct Rule]] in 1972.<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Callanan |first1=Mark |title=Local Government in Ireland: Inside Out |last2=Keogan |first2=Justin F. |publisher=Institute of Public Administration |year=2003 |isbn=1-902448-93-6 |location=Dublin |pages=460–462}}</ref><ref name="Magill">{{Cite news |url=https://magill.ie/archive/north-crisis-realities-discrimination |date=1 September 1969 |title=The North in crisis-The realities of discrimination |work=[[Magill Magazine]]}}</ref><!-- <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/22187|title=Gerrymandering electoral boundaries {{!}} An Phoblacht|website=www.anphoblacht.com|access-date=29 August 2019}}</ref>{{POV statement|date=April 2020}}-->

Leech's new electoral boundaries for the 1924 Londonderry County Borough Council election reduced the number of wards from four to three, only one of which had a Nationalist majority. This resulted in election of a [[Unionists (Ireland)|Unionist]] council in every election, until the County Borough Council's replacement in 1969 by the unelected Londonderry Development Commission, in a city where [[Irish nationalism|Nationalists]] had a large majority and had won [[1920 Londonderry County Borough Council election|previous elections]].<ref name="Laffan">{{cite book |last=Laffan |first=Michael |title=The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916–1923 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=zbz6p-O39aoC&q=labour+ireland+1920+394+seats&pg=PA327 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |page=327 |isbn= 978-1-139-42629-9|year=1999 }}</ref><ref name="whyte">{{cite web |url=http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/whyte.htm |title=CAIN: Issues – Discrimination: John Whyte, 'How much discrimination was there under the Unionist regime, 1921–1968?' |publisher=Cain.ulst.ac.uk |access-date=5 August 2009 |archive-date=16 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190116023959/http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/whyte.htm }}</ref>

 

Some critics and supporters spoke at the time of "[[A Protestant Parliament for a Protestant People]]".<ref>See: Ferriter D. ''The Transformation of Ireland 1900–2000'' London: Profile Press 2004, p.281; {{ISBN|1-86197-307-1}}. Buckland P., ''The Factory of Grievances: Devolved Government in Northern Ireland 1921–1939'' New York: Barnes & Noble; Dublin: Gill & MacMillan 1979, p.72 {{ISBN|0-06-490752-X}}. Cronin S., ''Irish Nationalism: A History of its Roots and Ideology'' New York: Continuum, 1981; p.177 {{ISBN|0-8264-0062-0}}. Tierney M., ''Modern Ireland 1850–1950'' Dublin; Gill and Macmillan, 1978; p.230. {{ISBN|0-7171-0886-4}}.</ref><!-- No context. No reference to the fact that the phrase "Protestant Parliament and a Protestant State" was used in direct response to the claim made by Éamon Devalera that the Irish Free State was a "Catholic nation". --> This passed also into local government, where supporters of the elected majorities were given jobs and appointments.<ref name= Magill /> [[Stephen Gwynn]] noted as early as 1911 that since the introduction of the [[Local Government (Ireland) Act 1898]]:

 

<blockquote>In [[County Armagh|Armagh]] there are 68,000 Protestants, 56,000 Catholics. The County Council has twenty-two Protestants and eight Catholics. In [[County Tyrone|Tyrone]], Catholics are a majority of the population, 82,000 against 68,000; but the electoral districts have been so arranged that Unionists return sixteen as against thirteen Nationalists (one a Protestant). This Council gives to the Unionists two to one majority on its Committees, and out of fifty-two officials employs only five Catholics. In [[County Antrim|Antrim]], which has the largest Protestant majority (196,000 to 40,000), twenty-six Unionists and three Catholics are returned. Sixty officers out of sixty-five are good Unionists and Protestants.<ref>Gwynn S.L. ''The Case for Home Rule'' (1911) pp. 104–105. (http://www.ucc.ie/celt/online/E900030.html book text here; accessed August 2010)</ref></blockquote>

 

Initially Leech drew the boundaries, but from the 1920s to the 1940s the [[Parliament of Northern Ireland|province-wide government]] redrew them to reinforce the gerrymander.<ref name="whyte" />{{rp|1(c)}}<ref>{{Cite news |first=Robert |last=Kee |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/clips/zmfqhyc |date=17 February 1981 |title=Gerrymandering in Londonderry in the late 1960s |publisher=BBC Bitesize}}</ref>

[[Cahir Healy]], the long time MP for Counties Fermanagh and Tyrone highlighted the extent of gerrymandering in County Borough Councils elections of the 1930s: Fermanagh reported 30,196 Nationalists and 24,272 Unionists yet Nationalists retained only seven seats while Unionists retained 12. Similar results occurred in County Tyrone: 70,595 Nationalists retained 11 seats while 56,981 Unionists held 16 seats.<ref>Healy, Cahir (1945), ''The Mutilation of a Nation : The Story behind Partition in Ireland'', The Derry Journal Ltd, pg 40, JSTOR, https://jstor.org/stable/community.29825522. Accessed 24 July 2023.</ref>

{{main|Gerrymandering in the United States}}

[[File:TravisCountyDistricts.png|thumb|250px|U.S. congressional districts covering [[Travis County, Texas]] (outlined in red), in 2002, left, and 2004, right. In 2003, the majority Republicans in the Texas legislature [[2003 Texas redistricting|redistricted the state]], diluting the voting power of the heavily Democratic county by parceling its residents out to more Republican districts.]]

[[File:North Carolina 12th Congressional District (National Atlas).gif|thumb|''[[Shaw v. Reno]]'' was a [[United States Supreme Court]] case involving the [[redistricting]] and racial gerrymandering of [[North Carolina's 12th congressional district]] ''(pictured)''.]]

The United States, among the first countries with an elected representative government, was the source of the term ''gerrymander'' as stated above.

The practice of gerrymandering the borders of new states continued past the [[American Civil War]] and into the late 19th century. The [[Republican Party (United States)|Republican Party]] used its control of Congress to secure the admission of more states in territories friendly to their party—the admission of [[Dakota Territory]] as two states instead of one being a notable example. By the rules for representation in the [[United States Electoral College|Electoral College]], each new state carried at least three electoral votes regardless of its population.<ref>Compare a map of the United States in 1860 [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/united_states/us_terr_1860.jpg] with a map from 1870 [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/united_states/us_terr_1870.jpg]. <!-- These images need to be put in wikimedia commons, rather than external links--></ref>

International election observers from the [[Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]] Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, who were invited to observe and report on the [[2004 United States presidential election|2004 national elections]], expressed criticism of the U.S. congressional redistricting process and made a recommendation that the procedures be reviewed to ensure genuine competitiveness of Congressional election contests.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/usa/14028 |title=XI |format=PDF |access-date=5 August 2009}}</ref>

With the [[civil rights movement]] and passage of the [[Voting Rights Act of 1965]], federal enforcement and protections of suffrage for all citizens were enacted. Gerrymandering for the purpose of reducing the political influence of a racial or ethnic minority group was prohibited. After the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was passed, some states created "majority-minority" districts to enhance minority voting strength. This practice, also called "[[Affirmative action|affirmative]] gerrymandering", was supposed to redress historic discrimination and ensure that [[Minorities in the United States|ethnic minorities]] would gain some seats and representation in government.  

* [[Boundary problem (spatial analysis)]]

* [[Electoral fraud]]

* ''[[Gill v. Whitford]]''

* [[Modifiable areal unit problem]]

* [[Proposed Croat federal unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina]]

* [[Schelling's model of segregation]]

* [[Voter suppression]]