Consequentialism: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
imported>Srich32977 Cleaned up using AutoEd; provide less clutter & more uniformity in citations |
imported>Phlsph7 Undid revision 1345403788 by Dourmudroom (talk) too much text and too small to be useful as an image |
||
| Line 4: | Line 4: | ||
In [[moral philosophy]], '''consequentialism''' is a class of [[normative ethics|normative]], [[Teleology|teleological]] ethical theories that holds that the [[wikt:consequence|consequences]] of one's [[Action (philosophy)|conduct]] are the ultimate basis for judgement about the [[Morality|rightness or wrongness]] of that conduct. Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, a morally right act (including omission from acting) is one that will produce a good outcome. Consequentialism, along with [[eudaimonism]], falls under the broader category of '''teleological ethics''', a group of views which claim that the moral value of any act consists in its tendency to produce things of [[Intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]].<ref name=":0">"[https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/teleological-ethics Teleological Ethics]." ''[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''. via ''[[Encyclopedia.com]].'' 28 May 2020. Retrieved 2 July 2020.</ref> Consequentialists hold in general that an act is right ''[[if and only if]]'' the act (or in some views, the rule under which it falls) will produce, will probably produce, or is intended to produce, a greater balance of good over evil than any available alternative. Different consequentialist theories differ in how they define [[Value theory|moral goods]], with chief candidates including [[Hedonism|pleasure]], the [[Aponia|absence of pain]], the satisfaction of one's [[Preference utilitarianism|preferences]], and broader notions of the "[[Common good|general good]]". | In [[moral philosophy]], '''consequentialism''' is a class of [[normative ethics|normative]], [[Teleology|teleological]] ethical theories that holds that the [[wikt:consequence|consequences]] of one's [[Action (philosophy)|conduct]] are the ultimate basis for judgement about the [[Morality|rightness or wrongness]] of that conduct. Thus, from a consequentialist standpoint, a morally right act (including omission from acting) is one that will produce a good outcome. Consequentialism, along with [[eudaimonism]], falls under the broader category of '''teleological ethics''', a group of views which claim that the moral value of any act consists in its tendency to produce things of [[Intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]].<ref name=":0">"[https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/teleological-ethics Teleological Ethics]." ''[[Encyclopedia of Philosophy]]''. via ''[[Encyclopedia.com]].'' 28 May 2020. Retrieved 2 July 2020.</ref> Consequentialists hold in general that an act is right ''[[if and only if]]'' the act (or in some views, the rule under which it falls) will produce, will probably produce, or is intended to produce, a greater balance of good over evil than any available alternative. Different consequentialist theories differ in how they define [[Value theory|moral goods]], with chief candidates including [[Hedonism|pleasure]], the [[Aponia|absence of pain]], the satisfaction of one's [[Preference utilitarianism|preferences]], and broader notions of the "[[Common good|general good]]". | ||
Consequentialism is usually contrasted with [[deontological ethics]] (or deontology): deontology, in which rules and moral duty are central, derives the rightness or wrongness of one's conduct from the character of the behaviour itself, rather than the outcomes of the conduct. It is also contrasted with both [[virtue ethics]], which | Consequentialism is usually contrasted with [[deontological ethics]] (or deontology): deontology, in which rules and moral duty are central, derives the rightness or wrongness of one's conduct from the character of the behaviour itself, rather than the outcomes of the conduct. It is also contrasted with both [[virtue ethics]], which is concerned with the character of the [[Agency (philosophy)|agent]] rather than on the nature or consequences of the act (or omission) itself, and [[pragmatic ethics]], which treats morality like [[science]]: advancing collectively as a society over the course of many lifetimes, such that any moral criterion is subject to revision. | ||
Some argue that consequentialist theories (such as [[utilitarianism]]) and deontological theories (such as [[Kantian ethics]]) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, [[T. M. Scanlon]] advances the idea that [[human rights]], which are commonly considered | Some argue that consequentialist theories (such as [[utilitarianism]]) and deontological theories (such as [[Kantian ethics]]) are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, [[T. M. Scanlon]] advances the idea that [[human rights]], which are commonly considered to be deontological in nature, can only be justified with reference to the consequences of having those rights.<ref name="Scheffler"/> Similarly, [[Robert Nozick]] argued for a theory that is mostly consequentialist, but incorporates inviolable "side-constraints" which restrict the sort of actions agents are permitted to do.<ref name="Scheffler"/> [[Derek Parfit]] argued that, in practice, when understood properly, rule consequentialism, Kantian deontology, and [[contractualism]] would all end up prescribing the same behavior.<ref>Parfit, Derek. 2011. ''On What Matters''. Oxford: Oxford University Press</ref> | ||
==Etymology== | ==Etymology== | ||
| Line 12: | Line 12: | ||
==Classification== | ==Classification== | ||
One common view is to classify consequentialism, together with [[virtue ethics]], under a broader label of "teleological ethics".<ref name="Britannica">{{Cite web |title=Teleological ethics |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/teleological-ethics |access-date=5 August 2020 |website=Encyclopedia Britannica}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> Proponents of teleological ethics (Greek: ''[[telos]]'', 'end, purpose' and ''[[logos]]'', 'science') argue that the moral value of any act consists in its tendency to produce things of [[Intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]],<ref name=":0" /> meaning that an act is right ''if and only if'' it, or the rule under which it falls, produces, will probably produce, or is intended to produce, a greater balance of good over evil than any alternative act. This concept is exemplified by the famous [[aphorism]], "the [[End (philosophy)|end]] justifies the [[Instrumental and intrinsic value|means]]," variously attributed to [[Machiavelli]] or [[Ovid]]<ref> | One common view is to classify consequentialism, together with [[virtue ethics]], under a broader label of "teleological ethics".<ref name="Britannica">{{Cite web |title=Teleological ethics |url=https://www.britannica.com/topic/teleological-ethics |access-date=5 August 2020 |website=Encyclopedia Britannica}}</ref><ref name=":0" /> Proponents of teleological ethics (Greek: ''[[telos]]'', 'end, purpose' and ''[[logos]]'', 'science') argue that the moral value of any act consists in its tendency to produce things of [[Intrinsic value (ethics)|intrinsic value]],<ref name=":0" /> meaning that an act is right ''if and only if'' it, or the rule under which it falls, produces, will probably produce, or is intended to produce, a greater balance of good over evil than any alternative act. This concept is exemplified by the famous [[aphorism]], "{{vanchor|the [[End (philosophy)|end]] justifies the [[Instrumental and intrinsic value|means]]}}," variously attributed to [[Machiavelli]] or [[Ovid]]<ref>{{Cf.}} {{wikt-lang|en|the end justifies the means}} in the [[Wiktionary]].</ref> i.e. if a goal is morally important enough, any method of achieving it is acceptable.<ref>{{Cite web|title="The end justifies the means"|url=https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/end-justifies-the-means|website=Cambridge English Dictionary}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Mizzoni|first=John|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=AsGbVvQA23oC&q=consequentialist&pg=PA97|title=Ethics: The Basics|year=2009|publisher=John Wiley & Sons|isbn=978-1405189941|pages=97 f., 104}}</ref> | ||
Teleological ethical theories are contrasted with [[deontological]] ethical theories, which hold that acts themselves are ''[[inherent]]ly'' good or bad, rather than good or bad because of extrinsic factors (such as the act's consequences or the moral character of the person who acts).<ref>Thomas, A. Jean. 2015. "[http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/Vol19/Deontology.pdf Deontology, Consequentialism and Moral Realism]." ''Minerva'' 19:1–24. {{ISSN|1393-614X}}.</ref> | Teleological ethical theories are contrasted with [[deontological]] ethical theories, which hold that acts themselves are ''[[inherent]]ly'' good or bad, rather than good or bad because of extrinsic factors (such as the act's consequences or the moral character of the person who acts).<ref>Thomas, A. Jean. 2015. "[http://www.minerva.mic.ul.ie/Vol19/Deontology.pdf Deontology, Consequentialism and Moral Realism]." ''Minerva'' 19:1–24. {{ISSN|1393-614X}}.</ref> | ||
| Line 56: | Line 56: | ||
Ethical egoism can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the consequences for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any other result. Thus, [[egoism]] will prescribe actions that may be beneficial, detrimental, or neutral to the welfare of others. Some, like [[Henry Sidgwick]], argue that a certain degree of egoism ''promotes'' the general welfare of society for two reasons: because individuals know how to please themselves best, and because if everyone were an austere altruist then general welfare would inevitably decrease.<ref name="Sidgwick">{{Cite book|title=The Method of Ethics |orig-year=1907 |last=Sidgwick |first=Henry |author-link=Henry Sidgwick |publisher=Dover |year=1981 |location=NY |isbn=978-0915145287 |url=http://www.la.utexas.edu/methsidg/me/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071209092717/http://www.la.utexas.edu/methsidg/me/ |archive-date=December 9, 2007 }}</ref> | Ethical egoism can be understood as a consequentialist theory according to which the consequences for the individual agent are taken to matter more than any other result. Thus, [[egoism]] will prescribe actions that may be beneficial, detrimental, or neutral to the welfare of others. Some, like [[Henry Sidgwick]], argue that a certain degree of egoism ''promotes'' the general welfare of society for two reasons: because individuals know how to please themselves best, and because if everyone were an austere altruist then general welfare would inevitably decrease.<ref name="Sidgwick">{{Cite book|title=The Method of Ethics |orig-year=1907 |last=Sidgwick |first=Henry |author-link=Henry Sidgwick |publisher=Dover |year=1981 |location=NY |isbn=978-0915145287 |url=http://www.la.utexas.edu/methsidg/me/ |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071209092717/http://www.la.utexas.edu/methsidg/me/ |archive-date=December 9, 2007 }}</ref> | ||
===Two-level consequentialism=== | ===Two-level consequentialism=== | ||
| Line 71: | Line 67: | ||
Another consequentialist application view is motive consequentialism, which looks at whether the [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]] that results from the motive to choose an action is better or at least as good as each alternative state of affairs that would have resulted from alternative actions. This version gives relevance to the motive of an act and links it to its consequences. An act can therefore not be wrong if the decision to act was based on a right motive. A possible inference is that one can not be blamed for mistaken judgments if the motivation was to do good.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Adams |first=R.M. |year=1976 |title=Motive Utilitarianism |journal=Journal of Philosophy |volume=73 |issue=14 |pages=467–81 |doi=10.2307/2025783 |jstor=2025783 }}</ref> | Another consequentialist application view is motive consequentialism, which looks at whether the [[State of affairs (philosophy)|state of affairs]] that results from the motive to choose an action is better or at least as good as each alternative state of affairs that would have resulted from alternative actions. This version gives relevance to the motive of an act and links it to its consequences. An act can therefore not be wrong if the decision to act was based on a right motive. A possible inference is that one can not be blamed for mistaken judgments if the motivation was to do good.<ref>{{cite journal |last=Adams |first=R.M. |year=1976 |title=Motive Utilitarianism |journal=Journal of Philosophy |volume=73 |issue=14 |pages=467–81 |doi=10.2307/2025783 |jstor=2025783 }}</ref> | ||
=== | ==Issues== | ||
One | ===Action guidance=== | ||
One important characteristic of many [[Normative ethics|normative]] moral theories such as consequentialism is the ability to produce practical moral judgements. At the very least, any moral theory needs to define the standpoint from which the goodness of the consequences are to be determined. What is primarily at stake here is the ''[[moral responsibility|responsibility]]'' of the agent.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Stables |first1=Andrew |date=2016 |title=Responsibility beyond rationality: The case for rhizomatic consequentialism |journal=International Journal of Children's Spirituality |volume=9 |issue=2 |pages=219–225|doi=10.1080/1364436042000234404 |s2cid=214650271 }}</ref> | |||
====The ideal observer==== | |||
One common tactic among consequentialists, particularly those committed to an [[Altruism|altruistic]] (selfless) account of consequentialism, is to employ an ideal, neutral observer from which moral judgements can be made. [[John Rawls]], a critic of utilitarianism, argues that utilitarianism, in common with other forms of consequentialism, relies on the perspective of such an [[Ideal observer theory|ideal observer]].<ref name="Scheffler"/> The particular characteristics of this ideal observer can vary from an [[Omniscience|omniscient]] observer, who would grasp all the consequences of any action, to an ideally informed observer, who knows as much as could reasonably be expected, but not necessarily all the circumstances or all the possible consequences. Consequentialist theories that adopt this paradigm hold that right action is the action that will bring about the best consequences from this ideal observer's perspective.{{Citation needed|date=February 2012}} | |||
====The real observer==== | |||
In practice, it is very difficult, and at times arguably impossible, to adopt the point of view of an [[Ideal observer theory|ideal observer]]. Individual [[Moral agency|moral agents]] do not know everything about their particular situations, and thus do not know all the possible consequences of their potential actions. For this reason, some theorists have argued that consequentialist theories can only require agents to choose the best action in line with what they know about the situation.<ref name="Mackie">{{Cite book|last=Mackie |first=J. L. |author-link=J. L. Mackie |orig-year=1977 |title=Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong |publisher=Penguin |location=London |isbn=978-0140135589 |year=1990}}</ref> However, if this approach is naïvely adopted, then moral agents who, for example, recklessly fail to reflect on their situation, and act in a way that brings about terrible results, could be said to be acting in a morally justifiable way. Acting in a situation without first informing oneself of the circumstances of the situation can lead to even the most well-intended actions yielding miserable consequences. As a result, it could be argued that there is a moral imperative for agents to inform themselves as much as possible about a situation before judging the appropriate course of action. This imperative, of course, is derived from consequential thinking: a better-informed agent is able to bring about better consequences.{{Citation needed|date=February 2012}} | |||
===Acts and omissions=== | ===Acts and omissions=== | ||
| Line 91: | Line 90: | ||
Douglas W. Portmore has suggested that these and other problems of actualism and possibilism can be avoided by constraining what counts as a genuine alternative for the agent.<ref name="Portmore3">{{cite book |last1=Portmore |first1=Douglas W. |title=Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options |date=2019 |publisher=New York, NY: Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT |chapter=3. What's the Relevant Sort of Control?}}</ref> On his view, it is a requirement that the agent has rational control over the event in question. For example, eating only one cookie and stopping afterward only is an option for Gifre if she has the rational capacity to repress her temptation to continue eating. If the temptation is irrepressible then this course of action is not considered to be an option and is therefore not relevant when assessing what the best alternative is. Portmore suggests that, given this adjustment, we should prefer a view very closely associated with ''possibilism'' called ''maximalism''.<ref name="Portmore5"/> | Douglas W. Portmore has suggested that these and other problems of actualism and possibilism can be avoided by constraining what counts as a genuine alternative for the agent.<ref name="Portmore3">{{cite book |last1=Portmore |first1=Douglas W. |title=Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options |date=2019 |publisher=New York, NY: Oxford University Press |url=https://philpapers.org/rec/POROFT |chapter=3. What's the Relevant Sort of Control?}}</ref> On his view, it is a requirement that the agent has rational control over the event in question. For example, eating only one cookie and stopping afterward only is an option for Gifre if she has the rational capacity to repress her temptation to continue eating. If the temptation is irrepressible then this course of action is not considered to be an option and is therefore not relevant when assessing what the best alternative is. Portmore suggests that, given this adjustment, we should prefer a view very closely associated with ''possibilism'' called ''maximalism''.<ref name="Portmore5"/> | ||
===Consequences for whom=== | ===Consequences for whom=== | ||
| Line 121: | Line 109: | ||
===Value of consequences=== | ===Value of consequences=== | ||
One way to divide various consequentialisms is by the types of consequences that are taken to matter most, that is, which consequences count as good states of affairs. According to [[utilitarianism]], a good action is one that results in an increase in [[pleasure]], and the best action is one that results in the most pleasure for the greatest number. Closely related is [[eudaimonia|eudaimonic]] consequentialism, according to which a full, flourishing life, which may or may not be the same as enjoying a great deal of pleasure, is the ultimate aim. Similarly, one might adopt an aesthetic consequentialism, in which the ultimate aim is to produce beauty. However, one might fix on non-psychological goods as the relevant effect. Thus, one might pursue an increase in [[Equality of outcome|material equality]] or [[Freedom (political)|political liberty]] instead of something like the more ephemeral "pleasure". Other theories adopt a package of several goods, all to be promoted equally. As the consequentialist approach contains an inherent assumption that the outcomes of a moral decision can be quantified in terms of "goodness" or "badness," or at least put [[Order theory|in order of increasing preference]], it is an especially suited moral theory for a [[Probability|probabilistic]] and [[Decision theory|decision theoretical]] approach.<ref>Simmons, H. J. 1986. "[https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/5782/1/fulltext.pdf The quantification of 'happinenss' in utilitarianism]" ([[Ph.D. thesis]]). Hamilton, ON: [[McMaster University]].</ref><ref>[[Robert Audi|Audi, Robert]]. 2007. "Can Utilitarianism Be Distributive? Maximization and Distribution as Criteria in Managerial Decisions." ''[[Business Ethics Quarterly]]'' 17(4):593–611.</ref> | One way to divide various consequentialisms is by the types of consequences that are taken to matter most, that is, which consequences count as good states of affairs. According to [[utilitarianism]], a good action is one that results in an increase in [[pleasure]], and the best action is one that results in the most pleasure for the greatest number. Closely related is [[eudaimonia|eudaimonic]] consequentialism, according to which a full, flourishing life, which may or may not be the same as enjoying a great deal of pleasure, is the ultimate aim. Similarly, one might adopt an aesthetic consequentialism, in which the ultimate aim is to produce beauty. However, one might fix on non-psychological goods as the relevant effect. Thus, one might pursue an increase in [[Equality of outcome|material equality]] or [[Freedom (political)|political liberty]] instead of something like the more ephemeral "pleasure". Other theories adopt a package of several goods, all to be promoted equally. As the consequentialist approach contains an inherent assumption that the outcomes of a moral decision can be quantified in terms of "goodness" or "badness," or at least put [[Order theory|in order of increasing preference]], it is an especially suited moral theory for a [[Probability|probabilistic]] and [[Decision theory|decision theoretical]] approach.<ref>Simmons, H. J. 1986. "[https://macsphere.mcmaster.ca/bitstream/11375/5782/1/fulltext.pdf The quantification of 'happinenss' in utilitarianism]" ([[Ph.D. thesis]]). Hamilton, ON: [[McMaster University]].</ref><ref>[[Robert Audi|Audi, Robert]]. 2007. "Can Utilitarianism Be Distributive? Maximization and Distribution as Criteria in Managerial Decisions." ''[[Business Ethics Quarterly]]'' 17(4):593–611.</ref> | ||
==Criticisms== | ==Criticisms== | ||
| Line 187: | Line 163: | ||
* {{annotated link|Omission bias}} | * {{annotated link|Omission bias}} | ||
* {{annotated link|Principle of double effect}} | * {{annotated link|Principle of double effect}} | ||
* {{annotated link|Problem of dirty hands}} | |||
* {{annotated link|Situational ethics}} | * {{annotated link|Situational ethics}} | ||
* {{annotated link|Utilitarianism}} | * {{annotated link|Utilitarianism}} | ||
* {{annotated link|Welfarism}} | * {{annotated link|Welfarism}} | ||
{{Div col end}} | * {{Annotated link|Non-consequential reasoning}} | ||
* {{Div col end}} | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
| Line 198: | Line 176: | ||
* {{Cite book| title = Consequentialism | year = 2002 | editor-last = Darwall | editor-first = Stephen| publisher = Blackwell | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0631231080 |ref=none}} | * {{Cite book| title = Consequentialism | year = 2002 | editor-last = Darwall | editor-first = Stephen| publisher = Blackwell | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0631231080 |ref=none}} | ||
* {{Cite book| last = Goodman | first = Charles | title = Consequences of Compassion: An interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics | url = https://archive.org/details/consequencesofco0000good | url-access = registration | year = 2009 | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0195375190 |ref=none}} | * {{Cite book| last = Goodman | first = Charles | title = Consequences of Compassion: An interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics | url = https://archive.org/details/consequencesofco0000good | url-access = registration | year = 2009 | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = Oxford | isbn = 978-0195375190 |ref=none}} | ||
* {{Cite journal |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |author1-link=Ted Honderich |title=Consequentialism, Moralities of Concern and Selfishness |url=https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/ted9.htm |doi=10.1017/S0031819100053432 |journal=Philosophy |volume=71 |issue=278 |date=October 1996 | | * {{Cite journal |last1=Honderich |first1=Ted |author1-link=Ted Honderich |title=Consequentialism, Moralities of Concern and Selfishness |url=https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/ted9.htm |doi=10.1017/S0031819100053432 |journal=Philosophy |volume=71 |issue=278 |date=October 1996 |pages=499–520 |s2cid=146267944 |ref=none |access-date=2023-09-18|url-access=subscription }} | ||
* {{Cite book| last = Portmore | first = Douglas W. | title = Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality | year = 2011 | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = New York | isbn = 978-0199794539 | url = https://sites.google.com/site/commonsenseconsequentialism/home |ref=none}} | * {{Cite book| last = Portmore | first = Douglas W. | title = Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality | year = 2011 | publisher = Oxford University Press | location = New York | isbn = 978-0199794539 | url = https://sites.google.com/site/commonsenseconsequentialism/home |ref=none}} | ||
* {{cite encyclopedia |last= Price |first= Terry |editor-first=Ronald |editor-last=Hamowy |editor-link=Ronald Hamowy |encyclopedia=The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism |chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=yxNgXs3TkJYC |year=2008 |publisher= [[SAGE Publishing|SAGE]]; [[Cato Institute]] |location= Thousand Oaks, CA |doi=10.4135/9781412965811.n60 |isbn= 978-1412965804 |oclc=750831024| lccn = 2008009151 |pages= 91–93 |chapter= Consequentialism |ref=none}} | * {{cite encyclopedia |last= Price |first= Terry |editor-first=Ronald |editor-last=Hamowy |editor-link=Ronald Hamowy |encyclopedia=The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism |chapter-url= https://books.google.com/books?id=yxNgXs3TkJYC |year=2008 |publisher= [[SAGE Publishing|SAGE]]; [[Cato Institute]] |location= Thousand Oaks, CA |doi=10.4135/9781412965811.n60 |isbn= 978-1412965804 |oclc=750831024| lccn = 2008009151 |pages= 91–93 |chapter= Consequentialism |ref=none}} | ||