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{{Use American English|date=March 2019}} | {{Use American English|date=March 2019}} | ||
{{Use dmy dates|date=August 2020}} | {{Use dmy dates|date=August 2020}} | ||
{{Infobox | |||
{{Other uses|Contra}} | |||
{{Infobox militant organization | |||
| name = Contras | | name = Contras | ||
| war = | | war = Contra War and [[Cold War]] | ||
| image = Contra commandas 1987.jpg | | image = Contra commandas 1987.jpg | ||
| image_size = 275px | | image_size = 275px | ||
| caption = The Nicaraguan Contras in [[Nueva Guinea]] | | caption = The Nicaraguan Contras in [[Nueva Guinea]] in 1987 | ||
| active = 1979–1990 | | active = 1979–1990 | ||
| ideology = [[Anti-communism]] | | ideology = {{ubli|[[Anti-communism]]|[[Right-wing populism]]|[[Conservatism]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Marco |first=Pasquale De |url= |title=Counterrevolutionaries: Inside the Contra War in Nicaragua |date=2025-04-21 |publisher=Pasquale De Marco |pages=55 |language=en}}</ref>{{ISBN missing}}|[[Capitalism]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Marco |first=Pasquale De |url= |title=Counterrevolutionaries: Inside the Contra War in Nicaragua |date=2025-04-21 |publisher=Pasquale De Marco |pages=55 |language=en}}</ref>{{ISBN missing}}}} | ||
| position = [[Right-wing politics|Right-wing]] | | position = [[Right-wing politics|Right-wing]] | ||
| motives = Overthrowing the left-wing [[FSLN]] government of [[Nicaragua]] | | motives = Overthrowing the left-wing [[FSLN]] government of [[Nicaragua]] | ||
| leaders = [[Adolfo Calero]] | | leaders = {{ubli | ||
| | |[[Adolfo Calero]] | ||
| area = {{flag|Nicaragua}} | |[[Enrique Bermúdez]] | ||
| Comandante Franklin ([[Nicaraguan Democratic Force|FDN]]) | |||
|Cúpula of 6 regional commanders ([[Democratic Revolutionary Alliance|ARDE]] and Frente Sur{{efn|lit. 'Southern Front"}}) | |||
|Comandante Blas ([[YATAMA]]) | |||
|Steadman Fagoth ([[Nicaraguan Indigenous Organizations|MISURA]]) | |||
}} | |||
| clans<!--listed as "groups"--> = FDN, ARDE, Frente Sur, YATAMA, MISURA | |||
| area = {{flag|Nicaragua}}{{efn|All rural areas of Nicaragua, especially the highland departments of [[Matagalpa Department|Matagalpa]], [[Jinotega Department|Jinotega]], [[Nueva Segovia Department|Nueva Segovia]], and [[Chontales Department|Chontales]]. Also including the departments of [[Río San Juan Department|Río San Juan]] and western [[Zelaya Department|Zelaya]]. Excluding some Pacific regions like [[Managua]] and [[Granada, Nicaragua|Granada]].<ref>Brown 2001, p.118</ref>}} | |||
| size = 16,000 (1986)<ref>{{cite web|url=https://onwar.com/data/nicaragua1981.html|title=Contra Insurgency in Nicaragua 1981-1990|website=OnWar|access-date=2025-07-18}}</ref> | | size = 16,000 (1986)<ref>{{cite web|url=https://onwar.com/data/nicaragua1981.html|title=Contra Insurgency in Nicaragua 1981-1990|website=OnWar|access-date=2025-07-18}}</ref> | ||
| allies = {{flag|United States|1960}} | | allies = {{ubli|{{flag|United States|1960}} (see [[Iran-Contra Affair]])|{{flag|National Reorganization Process|name=Argentina}} (see [[Operation Charly]])|{{flag|Brazil|1968}}|{{flag|Chile}}|{{flag|Honduras|1949}}|{{flag|Israel}}|{{flag|Taiwan}}<ref>{{cite web |last1=Baron |first1=James |title=The Cold War History Behind Nicaragua's Break With Taiwan |url=https://magazine.thediplomat.com/#/issues/-Mxj3YLobyh0s-8ttFLw/read |website=thediplomat.com |publisher=The Diplomat |access-date=24 April 2022}}</ref>}} | ||
| opponents = {{flagicon image|Flag of the FSLN.png}} [[Sandinista National Liberation Front|FSLN]] | | opponents = {{flagicon image|Flag of the FSLN.png}} [[Sandinista National Liberation Front|FSLN]] | ||
| battles = Major operations at [[La Trinidad, Estelí|La Trinidad]], Rama highway, | | battles = Major operations at [[La Trinidad, Estelí|La Trinidad]], [[El Rama|Rama]] highway, [[Siuna]], and [[Bonanza, Nicaragua|Bonanza]].<br/>Numerous FSLN bases overrun throughout [[Jinotega]], [[Matagalpa]], [[Zelaya Department|Zelaya]], [[Chontales Department|Chontales]], and [[Río San Juan Department|Río San Juan]]. | ||
| successor = | | successor = | ||
}} | }} | ||
[[File:Bandera Resistencia Nicaragüense..jpg|thumb|border|Flag used by the Contras, RN stands for ''[[Nicaraguan Resistance|Resistencia nicaragüense]]''.]] | |||
{{Anti-communism|Organisations}} | {{Anti-communism|Organisations}} | ||
The '''Contras''' (from {{Langx|es|contrarrevolucionarios|4=[[counter-revolutionaries]]}}) were the [[anti-communist]] rebels who waged a [[guerrilla war]] against the [[Marxism|Marxist]] [[Sandinista National Liberation Front]] (FSLN) and the [[Junta of National Reconstruction]], which came to power after the [[Nicaraguan Revolution]] in 1979. The insurgency against the Sandinista government lasted from 1979 until 1990, and was one of the highest profile conflicts of the [[Cold War]].<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Contras Murdering Their Own: A Grisly Retribution {{!}} Alicia Patterson Foundation |url=https://aliciapatterson.org/stories/contras-murdering-their-own-grisly-retribution |access-date=2022-05-28 |website=aliciapatterson.org |archive-date=18 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220818113903/https://aliciapatterson.org/stories/contras-murdering-their-own-grisly-retribution |url-status=dead }}</ref> | |||
In July 1979, the FSLN took control of the capital [[Managua]] after weeks of heavy fighting. The president at the time, [[Anastasio Somoza Debayle]], fled the country and relinquished control of the central government, leaving the Sandinistas in power. The Sandinistas created a military junta that acted as an [[Provisional government|interim government]] immediately after.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://countrystudies.us/nicaragua/14.htm|title=Nicaragua - The Sandinista Revolution|publisher=U.S. Library of Congress}}</ref> Various groups were created in response to this, consisting of dissidents of the new government and members of the former [[National Guard (Nicaragua)|National Guard]]. These groups would regularly meet and establish the Contras in 1980.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.revistaenvio.org/articulo/3655|title=The Contras: Chronicle of a Defeat Foretold|publisher=Revista Envío|access-date=2025-12-23}}</ref> | |||
During the insurgency, the United States and several other countries [[CIA activities in Nicaragua|provided military assistance and financial aid]] to the Contras. In 1981, the CIA and Argentina's [[Secretariat of Intelligence]] persuaded several Contra groups to unite into the larger [[Nicaraguan Democratic Force]] (FDN). | |||
In 1982, the [[Boland Amendment]] was passed to end U.S. aid to the Contras; yet the [[Presidency_of_Ronald_Reagan|Reagan administration]] continued to illegally fund the Contras, which resulted in a scandal known as the [[Iran–Contra affair]]. By 1987, most of the Contra militias had united into the [[Nicaraguan Resistance]], within which the Nicaraguan Democratic Force was the largest group. | |||
During the war, the Contras' tactics featured [[terrorism]] and [[human rights violations]] against civilians.<ref name="Non-governmental Terrorism">{{cite journal|last=Feldmann|first=Andreas E.|author2=Maiju Perälä |title=Reassessing the Causes of Nongovernmental Terrorism in Latin America|journal=Latin American Politics and Society|date=July 2004|volume=46|issue=2|pages=101–132|doi=10.1111/j.1548-2456.2004.tb00277.x|s2cid=221247620}}</ref><ref name="Grandin & Joseph">{{cite book|author1=[[Greg Grandin]]|author2=Gilbert M. Joseph|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=YJ7ZBGy0wsIC|title=A Century of Revolution|year=2010|publisher=[[Duke University Press]]|location=[[Durham, North Carolina]]|page=89|isbn=978-0822392859}}</ref><ref name="Todd">{{cite news|title = Offensive by Nicaraguan "Freedom Fighters" May be Doomed as Arms, Aid Dry Up|work = Ottawa Citizen|url = https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=aK8yAAAAIBAJ&pg=1173,187657&dq=nicaragua&hl=en|date = 26 February 1986|first = Dave|last = Todd}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=Albert J. Jongman|author2=[[Alex P. Schmid]]|title=Political Terrorism: A New Guide To Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, And Literature|date=1988|publisher=[[Transaction Publishers]]|isbn=978-1-41280-469-1|pages=17–18|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=NgDks1hUjhMC}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|author1=[[Athan G. Theoharis]]|author2=[[Richard H. Immerman]]|title=The Central Intelligence Agency: Security Under Scrutiny|date=2006|publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group]]|isbn=978-0313332821|page=[https://archive.org/details/centralintellige00rich/page/216 216]|url=https://archive.org/details/centralintellige00rich|url-access=registration}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2021-04-27 |title=Empire Politician - 1980s: U.S. Support for Contra Death Squads in Nicaragua |url=https://theintercept.com/empire-politician/biden-contra-death-squads-nicaragua/ |access-date=2022-05-28 |website=The Intercept |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last1=Kinzer |first1=Stephen |date=1986-02-20 |title=Contras' Attacks on Civilians Cited |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/20/world/contras-attacks-on-civilians-cited.html |access-date=2022-05-28 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The Reagan administration contended that the Contras' tactics did not include deliberate attacks against civilians.<ref name=":0">{{Cite web |website=CIA |title=Atrocities in the Nicaraguan civil war |url=https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP85T01058R000100170001-7.pdf}}</ref> The CIA said that Contra terrorism resulted from "the poor discipline characteristic of irregular forces", that terrorism was not an official military doctrine of the Contras, and that the Contra leader responsible was executed.<ref name=":0" /> The [[Global Terrorism Database]] reports that Contras carried out more than 1,300 terrorist attacks.<ref name="lafree">{{cite book |last1=LaFree |first1=Gary |author2=Laura Dugan |author3=Erin Miller |title=Putting Terrorism in Context: Lessons from the global terrorism database |date=2015 |publisher=Routledge |location=London and New York |isbn=978-0-415-67142-2 |page=56 |edition=1 |quote=In Nicaragua, Contra groups including the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), and ultimately the Nicaraguan Resistance umbrella group carried out more than 1,300 terrorist attacks, mostly in opposition to the Sandinista government.}}</ref> | |||
After a cutoff in U.S. military support, and with both sides facing international pressure to bring an end to the conflict, the contras agreed to negotiations with the FSLN. With the help of five Central American presidents, including [[Daniel Ortega]] (then-President of Nicaragua), the sides agreed that a voluntary demobilization of the Contras should start in early December 1989. They chose this date to facilitate free and fair elections in Nicaragua in February 1990. | |||
==History== | ==History== | ||
| Line 41: | Line 50: | ||
The Contras were not a monolithic group, but a combination of three distinct elements of Nicaraguan society:<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 29"/> | The Contras were not a monolithic group, but a combination of three distinct elements of Nicaraguan society:<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 29"/> | ||
* Ex-guardsmen of the [[Nicaraguan National Guard]] and other right-wing figures who | * Ex-guardsmen of the [[Nicaraguan National Guard]] and other right-wing figures who fought in [[Anastasio Somoza García]]'s government before Somoza's government collapsed in 1979.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 29">Lee et al. 1987, p. 29</ref> The guardsmen later comprised a significant portion of the [[Nicaraguan Democratic Force]] (FDN), the largest Contra organization.<ref>"The contras are made up of a combination of: ex-National Guardsmen (especially the military wing of the FDN)" As seen at: Gill 1984, p. 204</ref> Remnants of the Guard later formed groups such as the [[Fifteenth of September Legion]], the Anti-Sandinista Guerrilla Special Forces, and the National Army of Liberation.{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}} Initially however, these groups were small and conducted little active raiding into Nicaragua.<ref>Dickey, Christopher. With the Contras, A Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua. Simon & Schuster, 1985.</ref> | ||
* Anti- | * Anti-Somoza activists who supported the revolution but felt betrayed by the Sandinista government,<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 29"/> such as [[Édgar Chamorro]], a member of the FDN's political directorate,<ref>"The contras are made up of a combination of: ... anti-Sandinista opponents of ex-dictator Somoza (some of the members of the FDN political directorate eg Messrs. Chamorro and Cruz)" As seen at: Gill 1984, p. 204</ref> and [[José Francisco Cardenal]], who briefly served in the Council of State before leaving Nicaragua following a disagreement with the Sandinista government's policies and founding the [[Nicaraguan Democratic Union]] (UDN), an opposition group of Nicaraguan exiles based in [[Miami]].<ref>International Court of Justice (IV) (1986), p. 446</ref> Another example was [[MILPAS]] (Milicias Populares Anti-Sandinistas), a peasant [[militia]] led by disillusioned Sandinista veterans from the northern mountains. Founded by Pedro Joaquín González, known as "Dimas", the Milpistas were also known as {{lang|es|chilotes}} (green corn). Following Dimas' death, MILPAS bands emerged in 1980 and 1981. The Milpistas were composed largely of {{lang|es|campesino}} ([[peasant]]) highlanders and rural workers.<ref>{{cite book |last=Dillon |first=Sam |title=Comandos: The CIA and Nicaragua's Contra Rebels |year=1991 |publisher=Henry Holt |location=New York |isbn=978-0-8050-1475-4 |oclc=23974023 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/comandoscianicar00dill/page/49 49–56] |url=https://archive.org/details/comandoscianicar00dill/page/49 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last=Horton |first=Lynn |title=Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979–1994 |year=1998 |publisher=Ohio University Center for International Studies |location=Athens |isbn=978-0-89680-204-9 |oclc=39157572 |pages=[https://archive.org/details/peasantsinarmswa00hort/page/95 95–117] |url=https://archive.org/details/peasantsinarmswa00hort/page/95 }}</ref><ref>Padro-Maurer, R. ''The Contras 1980–1989, a Special Kind of Politics''. NY: Praeger Publishers, 1990.</ref><ref>Brown, Timothy C. ''The Real Contra War, Highlander Peasant Resistance in Nicaragua''. University of Oklahoma Press, 2001.</ref> | ||
*Nicaraguans who had avoided direct involvement in the revolution but opposed the Sandinistas.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 29"/> | *Nicaraguans who had avoided direct involvement in the revolution but opposed the Sandinistas.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 29"/> | ||
===Main groups=== | ===Main groups=== | ||
[[File:Frente Sur Contras 1987.jpg|thumb|Contra Commandos from [[Nicaraguan Democratic Force|FDN]] and ARDE | [[File:Frente Sur Contras 1987.jpg|thumb|Contra Commandos from [[Nicaraguan Democratic Force|FDN]] and [[Democratic Revolutionary Alliance|ARDE]] in the [[Nueva Guinea]] region of [[Nicaragua]] in 1987]] | ||
[[File:Smoke break el serrano 1987.jpg|thumb|Members of ARDE | [[File:Smoke break el serrano 1987.jpg|thumb|Members of ARDE]] | ||
In September 1981, the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] and [[Argentina]]'s [[Secretariat of Intelligence|intelligence agency]], seeking to unify the anti-Sandinista cause before initiating large scale aid, persuaded 15 September Legion, the UDN, and several former smaller groups to merge as the [[Nicaraguan Democratic Force]], which was known in [[Spanish language|Spanish]] as Fuerza Democrática Nicaragüense and was often referred to as FDN, a Spanish acronym.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/cocaine/contra-story/orgs.html |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070613051424/https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/cocaine/contra-story/orgs.html |url-status=dead |archive-date=13 June 2007 |title=Contra Organizations: The Contra Story – Central Intelligence Agency |publisher=Cia.gov |access-date=2014-08-18}}</ref> | |||
The FDN was led by [[Enrique Bermudez]], its military commander, who led its war efforts against the Sandinistas, and [[Adolfo Calero|Adolfo Calero Portocarrero]], a Nicaraguan businessman who opposed the Somoza regime and led its political directorate.<ref>"Although Calero opposed Somoza, the FDN had its roots in two insurgent groups made up of former National Guardsmen" As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 29</ref> [[Édgar Chamorro]] later said that the UDN opposed working with the Guardsmen and that the merging only took place because of insistence by the CIA.<ref>"The UDN, including Cardenal, initially opposed any linkage with the Guardsmen. The CIA, and high-ranking United States government officials, insisted that we merge with the Guardsmen. Lt. General Vernon Walters, then a special assistant to the United States Secretary of State (and formerly Deputy Director of the CIA) met with Cardenal to encourage him to accept the CIA's proposal. We were well aware of the crimes the Guardsmen had committed against the Nicaraguan people while in the service of President Somoza and we wanted nothing to do with them. However, we recognized that without help from the United States Government we had no chance of removing the Sandinistas from power, so we eventually acceded to the CIA's, and General Walters', insistence that we join forces with the Guardsmen. Some UDN members resigned because they would not associate themselves with the National Guard under any circumstances, but Cardenal and I and others believed the CIA's assurances that we, the civilians, would control the Guardsmen in the new organization that was to be created." As seen at: International Court of Justice (IV) 1986, p. 446</ref> | |||
Based in [[Honduras]], Nicaragua's northern neighbor, under the command of former [[Guardia Nacional (Nicaragua)|National Guard]] Colonel [[Enrique Bermúdez]], the new FDN | Based in [[Honduras]], Nicaragua's northern neighbor, under the command of former [[Guardia Nacional (Nicaragua)|National Guard]] Colonel [[Enrique Bermúdez]], the new FDN began recruiting other smaller insurgent forces in the north.{{Citation needed|date=May 2011}} Largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized by the U.S.,<ref>"On the basis of the available information, the Court is not able to satisfy itself that the Respondent State 'created' the Contra force in Nicaragua, but holds it established that it largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the FDN, one element of the force." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, VII (4)</ref> it emerged as the largest and most active Contra group.<ref>"The largest and most active of these groups, which later came to be known as ... (FDN)". As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 29</ref> | ||
In April 1982, [[Edén Pastora]] (''Comandante Cero''), one of the heroes in the fight against Somoza, organized the Sandinista Revolutionary Front (FRS) – embedded in the [[Democratic Revolutionary Alliance]] (ARDE)<ref name="Williams">{{Cite news| last = Williams| first = Adam| title = Edén Pastora: A wanted man| work = [[The Tico Times]]| date = 26 November 2010| url = http://www.ticotimes.net/News/Top-Story/News/Eden-Pastora-A-wanted-man_Friday-November-26-2010| url-status = dead| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20101215060509/http://www.ticotimes.net/News/Top-Story/News/Eden-Pastora-A-wanted-man_Friday-November-26-2010| archive-date = 15 December 2010}}</ref> – and declared war on the Sandinista government.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 32">Lee et al. 1987, p. 32</ref> Himself a former Sandinista who had held several high posts in the government, he had resigned abruptly in 1981 and defected,<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 32"/> believing that the newly found power had corrupted the Sandinistas' original ideas.<ref name="Williams"/> A popular and charismatic leader, Pastora initially saw his group develop quickly.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 32"/> He confined himself to operate in the southern part of Nicaragua;<ref>"He insisted on operating in the southern part of Nicaragua." As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 32</ref> after a press conference he was holding on [[La Penca bombing|30 May 1984 was bombed]], he "voluntarily withdrew" from the Contra struggle.<ref name="Williams"/> | In April 1982, [[Edén Pastora]] (''Comandante Cero''), one of the heroes in the fight against Somoza, organized the Sandinista Revolutionary Front (FRS) – embedded in the [[Democratic Revolutionary Alliance]] (ARDE)<ref name="Williams">{{Cite news| last = Williams| first = Adam| title = Edén Pastora: A wanted man| work = [[The Tico Times]]| date = 26 November 2010| url = http://www.ticotimes.net/News/Top-Story/News/Eden-Pastora-A-wanted-man_Friday-November-26-2010| url-status = dead| archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20101215060509/http://www.ticotimes.net/News/Top-Story/News/Eden-Pastora-A-wanted-man_Friday-November-26-2010| archive-date = 15 December 2010}}</ref> – and declared war on the Sandinista government.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 32">Lee et al. 1987, p. 32</ref> Himself a former Sandinista who had held several high posts in the government, he had resigned abruptly in 1981 and defected,<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 32"/> believing that the newly found power had corrupted the Sandinistas' original ideas.<ref name="Williams"/> A popular and charismatic leader, Pastora initially saw his group develop quickly.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 32"/> He confined himself to operate in the southern part of Nicaragua;<ref>"He insisted on operating in the southern part of Nicaragua." As seen at: Lee et al. 1987, p. 32</ref> after a press conference he was holding on [[La Penca bombing|30 May 1984 was bombed]], he "voluntarily withdrew" from the Contra struggle.<ref name="Williams"/> | ||
A third force, Misurasata, appeared among the [[Miskito people|Miskito]], [[Sumo (people)|Sumo]] and Rama [[Amerindian]] peoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following the government's efforts to nationalize [[Indigenous people of the Americas|Indian]] land. In the course of this conflict, forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians to relocation centers in the interior of the country and subsequent burning of some villages took place.<ref>The Americas Watch Committee. "Human Rights in Nicaragua 1986" (print), Americas Watch, February 1987.</ref> The Misurasata movement split in 1983, with the breakaway Misura group of | A third force, Misurasata, appeared among the [[Miskito people|Miskito]], [[Sumo (people)|Sumo]] and Rama [[Amerindian]] peoples of Nicaragua's Atlantic coast, who in December 1981 found themselves in conflict with the authorities following the government's efforts to nationalize [[Indigenous people of the Americas|Indian]] land. In the course of this conflict, forced removal of at least 10,000 Indians to relocation centers in the interior of the country and subsequent burning of some villages took place.<ref>The Americas Watch Committee. "Human Rights in Nicaragua 1986" (print), Americas Watch, February 1987.</ref> The Misurasata movement split in 1983, with the breakaway Misura group of Stedman Fagoth Muller, which aligned more closely with the FDN, and the rest accommodating themselves with the Sandinistas: on 8 December 1984 a ceasefire agreement known as the Bogota Accord was signed by Misurasata and the Nicaraguan government.<ref>{{Cite web |title=Bogota Accord |url=http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/services/cds/agreements/pdf/nic2.pdf |access-date=5 December 2022 |website=Ulster University}}</ref> A subsequent autonomy statute in September 1987 largely defused Miskito resistance.<ref>[http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/mrginicaragua39wg.pdf From Conflict to Autonomy in Nicaragua: Lessons Learned] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120916224139/http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/docs/info-ngos/mrginicaragua39wg.pdf|date=16 September 2012}}</ref> | ||
===Unity efforts=== | ===Unity efforts=== | ||
{{Unsourced section|date=June 2025}} | {{Unsourced section|date=June 2025}} | ||
U.S. officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups. In June 1985 most of the groups reorganized as the [[United Nicaraguan Opposition]] (UNO), under the leadership of [[Adolfo Calero]], [[Arturo Cruz]] and [[Alfonso Robelo]], | U.S. officials were active in attempting to unite the Contra groups. In June 1985 most of the groups reorganized as the [[United Nicaraguan Opposition]] (UNO), under the leadership of [[Adolfo Calero]], [[Arturo Cruz]], and [[Alfonso Robelo]], each of whom opposed the Sandinista revolution. After UNO's dissolution early in 1987, the [[Nicaraguan Resistance]] (RN) was organized along similar lines in May. | ||
==U.S. military and financial assistance== | ==U.S. military and financial assistance== | ||
{{See also|CIA activities in Nicaragua}} | {{See also|CIA activities in Nicaragua}} | ||
{{Covert United States involvement in regime change}} | |||
In front of the [[International Court of Justice]], the Nicaraguan government claimed that the Contras were altogether a creation of the U.S.<ref name="Gill 1989, p. 328">Gill 1989, p. 328</ref> This claim was rejected<ref name="Gill 1989, p. 328"/> but the evidence of a very close relationship between the Contras and the United States was considered overwhelming and incontrovertible.<ref>Gill 1989, p. 329</ref> The U.S. played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the Contras over a long period, and it is unlikely that the Contras would have been capable of carrying out significant military operations without this support, given the large amount of training and weapons shipments that the Sandinistas had received from [[Cuba]] and the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>"The United States has played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the Contras over a long period. The Contras only became capable of carrying out significant (para)military operations as a result of this support." As seen at: Gill 1989, p. 329</ref> | In front of the [[International Court of Justice]], the Nicaraguan government claimed that the Contras were altogether a creation of the U.S.<ref name="Gill 1989, p. 328">Gill 1989, p. 328</ref> This claim was rejected<ref name="Gill 1989, p. 328"/> but the evidence of a very close relationship between the Contras and the United States was considered overwhelming and incontrovertible.<ref>Gill 1989, p. 329</ref> The U.S. played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the Contras over a long period, and it is unlikely that the Contras would have been capable of carrying out significant military operations without this support, given the large amount of training and weapons shipments that the Sandinistas had received from [[Cuba]] and the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>"The United States has played a very large role in financing, training, arming, and advising the Contras over a long period. The Contras only became capable of carrying out significant (para)military operations as a result of this support." As seen at: Gill 1989, p. 329</ref> | ||
===Political background=== | ===Political background=== | ||
{{See also|Reagan Doctrine|History of Nicaragua ( | {{See also|Reagan Doctrine|History of Nicaragua (1979–1990)}} | ||
The U.S. government viewed the leftist Sandinistas as a threat to economic interests of American corporations in Nicaragua and to national security. U.S. President Ronald Reagan stated in 1983 that "The defense of [the USA's] southern frontier" was at stake.<ref>John A. | The U.S. government viewed the leftist Sandinistas as a threat to economic interests of American corporations in Nicaragua and to national security. U.S. President Ronald Reagan stated in 1983 that "The defense of [the USA's] southern frontier" was at stake.<ref>{{cite journal |first=John A. |last=Thompson |title=The Exaggeration of American Vulnerability: An Anatomy of Tradition |journal=Diplomatic History |volume=16 |issue=1 |year=1992 |page=23 |doi=10.1111/j.1467-7709.1992.tb00482.x }}</ref> "In spite of the Sandinista victory being declared fair, the United States continued to oppose the left-wing Nicaraguan government."<ref name="BBC On This Day" /><ref>{{cite news |quote=President Reagan renewed his commitment to the Nicaraguan insurgents Sunday, though he appeared to shift the focus of his Administration's policy away from the military situation to the need to ''restore democracy'' to the Central American country. |url=https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1987-05-04-mn-4758-story.html |title=President Shifts Emphasis From Contra Warfare |newspaper=[[Los Angeles Times]] |date=4 May 1987}}</ref> and opposed its ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=c6wvAQAAIAAJ&q=+the+United+States%2C+which+is+working+through+the+contras+to+restore+democracy+to+Nicaragua+and+break+the+Sandinistas%27+Cuban+and+Soviet+ties. |title=The Foreign Connection |newspaper=The Washington Post |date=6 January 1987}}</ref><ref>{{cite news | url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/12/world/mudslinging-over-contras.html | title=Mudslinging over Contras | newspaper=The New York Times| date=12 March 1986 | first=R. W. Jr. | last=Apple | access-date=21 September 2017 }}</ref> [[Ronald Reagan]], who had assumed the American presidency in January 1981, accused the Sandinistas of importing Cuban-style socialism and aiding [[FMLN|leftist guerrillas]] in El Salvador.<ref name="Fas.org">{{cite web|url=https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-017.htm |title=NSDD – National Security Decision Directives – Reagan Administration |publisher=Federation of American Scientists |date=30 May 2008}}</ref> The Reagan administration continued to view the Sandinistas as undemocratic despite the 1984 Nicaraguan elections being generally declared fair by foreign observers.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ni0027) |title=Nicaragua |publisher=Library of Congress |access-date=2014-08-18}}</ref><ref name="BBC On This Day">{{Cite news|url=https://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/5/newsid_2538000/2538379.stm|title=BBC On This Day – 5 – 1984: Sandinistas claim election victory|work=BBC News|date=<!--n.d. NOT from 1984-11-05 – it was written much later-->|access-date=15 September 2025}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1984/11/16/opinion/l-nicaraguan-vote-free-fair-hotly-contested-089345.html |title=Nicaraguan Vote: 'Free, Fair, Hotly Contested' |newspaper=The New York Times |date=16 November 1984}}</ref> Throughout the 1980s the Sandinista government was regarded as "Partly Free" by [[Freedom House]], an organization financed by the U.S. government.<ref name="FH1972">{{cite web | url = http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%20All%20Scores%2C%20Countries%2C%201973-2012%20%28FINAL%29.xls | title = Country ratings and status, FIW 1973–2012 | access-date = 2012-08-22 | publisher = [[Freedom House]] | year = 2012 | format = Microsoft Excel}}</ref> | ||
[[File:Bush reagan.jpg|thumb|President [[Ronald Reagan]] and Vice President [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush]] in 1984]] | [[File:Bush reagan.jpg|thumb|U.S. President [[Ronald Reagan]] and Vice President [[George H. W. Bush|George Bush]] in 1984. Under the [[Reagan Doctrine]], the [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]] provided overt and covert assistance to the Contras.]] | ||
On 4 January 1982, Reagan signed the [[Classified information|top secret]] National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17),<ref name="Fas.org"/> giving the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] the authority to recruit and support the Contras with $19 million in military aid. The effort to support the Contras was one component of the [[Reagan Doctrine]], which called for providing military support to movements opposing [[Soviet Union|Soviet-supported]], communist [[communist state|governments]]. | On 4 January 1982, Reagan signed the [[Classified information|top secret]] National Security Decision Directive 17 (NSDD-17),<ref name="Fas.org"/> giving the [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] the authority to recruit and support the Contras with $19 million in military aid. The effort to support the Contras was one component of the [[Reagan Doctrine]], which called for providing military support to movements opposing [[Soviet Union|Soviet-supported]], communist [[communist state|governments]]. | ||
By December 1981, the United States had already begun to support armed opponents of the Sandinista government. From the beginning, the CIA was in charge.<ref>Lee et al. 1987, p.3</ref> The arming, clothing, feeding, and supervision of the Contras<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3">Lee et al. 1987, p. 3</ref> became the most ambitious paramilitary and political action operation mounted by the agency in nearly a decade.<ref>"In December 1982, ''The New York Times'' reported intelligence officials as saying that Washington's 'covert activities have ... become the most ambitious paramilitary and political action operation mounted by the C.I.A. in nearly a decade ...'" | By December 1981, the United States had already begun to support armed opponents of the Sandinista government. From the beginning, the CIA was in charge.<ref>Lee et al. 1987, p.3</ref> The arming, clothing, feeding, and supervision of the Contras<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3">Lee et al. 1987, p. 3</ref> became the most ambitious paramilitary and political action operation mounted by the agency in nearly a decade.<ref>"In December 1982, ''The New York Times'' reported intelligence officials as saying that Washington's 'covert activities have ... become the most ambitious paramilitary and political action operation mounted by the C.I.A. in nearly a decade ...{{'"}} Lee et al. 1987, p. 33</ref> | ||
In the fiscal year 1984, the U.S. Congress approved $24 million in aid to the Contras.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3"/> After this, since the Contras failed to win widespread popular support or military victories within Nicaragua,<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3"/> opinion polls indicated that a majority of the U.S. public was not supportive of the Contras,<ref>"opinion polls indicated that a majority of the public was not supportive." | In the fiscal year 1984, the U.S. Congress approved $24 million in aid to the Contras.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3"/> After this, since the Contras failed to win widespread popular support or military victories within Nicaragua,<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3"/> opinion polls indicated that a majority of the U.S. public was not supportive of the Contras,<ref>"... opinion polls indicated that a majority of the public was not supportive." Lee et al. 1987, p. 3</ref> the Reagan administration lost much of its support regarding its Contra policy within Congress after disclosure of CIA mining of Nicaraguan ports,<ref>"Following disclosure ... that the CIA had a role in connection with the mining of the Nicaraguan harbors ..., public criticism mounted and the administration's Contra policy lost much of its support within Congress". Lee et al. 1987, p. 3</ref> and a report of the [[Bureau of Intelligence and Research]] commissioned by the [[United States Department of State|State Department]] found Reagan's allegations about Soviet influence in Nicaragua "exaggerated",<ref>{{cite news |url=http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?p_product=MH&s_site=miami&p_multi=MH&p_theme=realcities&p_action=search&p_maxdocs=200&p_topdoc=1&p_text_direct-0=0EB3607DABC0BCB3&p_field_direct-0=document_id&p_perpage=10&p_sort=YMD_date:D&s_trackval=GooglePM |title=U.S. Delayed Report On Soviets in Nicaragua |newspaper=The Miami Herald |date=18 September 1984}}</ref> Congress cut off all funds for the Contras in 1985 by the third [[Boland Amendment]].<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 3"/> The Boland Amendment had first been passed by Congress in December 1982. At this time, it only outlawed U.S. assistance to the contras "for the purpose of overthrowing the Nicaraguan government", while allowing assistance for other purposes.<ref name="clr">{{cite journal |last=Riesenfeld|first=Stefan A.|date=January 1987|title=The Powers of Congress and the President in International Relations: Revisited|journal=California Law Review|volume= 75|issue= 1 |pages=405–414|doi=10.2307/3480586|quote=The Boland Amendment was part of the Joint Resolution of December 21, 1982, providing further continuing appropriations for the fiscal year 1983 |jstor=3480586 |url=http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1975&context=californialawreview|url-access=subscription}}</ref> In October 1984, it was amended to forbid action by not only the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency but all U.S. government agencies. | ||
Nevertheless, the case for support of the Contras continued to be made in Washington, D.C., by both the Reagan administration and [[the Heritage Foundation]], which argued that support for the Contras would counter Soviet influence in Nicaragua.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Boyd |first1=Gerald M. | Nevertheless, the case for support of the Contras continued to be made in Washington, D.C., by both the Reagan administration and [[the Heritage Foundation]], which argued that support for the Contras would counter Soviet influence in Nicaragua.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Boyd |first1=Gerald M. |date=1986-02-19 |title=Reagan Says Support for the Contras Must Go Beyond 'Band-Aids' |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/19/world/reagan-says-support-for-the-contras-must-go-beyond-band-aids.html |access-date=2023-01-23 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Conservative Think Tank Funneled Money to North Associates |url=https://apnews.com/article/9022634f7b9fd7ff0d23f1924c5036fa |access-date=2023-01-23 |website=AP News |language=en}}</ref> | ||
On 1 May 1985 President Reagan announced that his administration perceived Nicaragua to be "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States", and declared a "national emergency" and a [[United States embargo against Nicaragua|trade embargo]] against Nicaragua to "deal with that threat".<ref> | On 1 May 1985 President Reagan announced that his administration perceived Nicaragua to be "an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States", and declared a "national emergency" and a [[United States embargo against Nicaragua|trade embargo]] against Nicaragua to "deal with that threat".<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12513.html |title=Executive Order 12513—Prohibiting trade and certain other transactions involving Nicaragua |work=Federal Register |date=15 August 2016 |publisher=National Archives}}</ref> It "is now a given; it is true", the Washington Post declared in 1986, "the Sandinistas are communists of the Cuban or Soviet school"; that "The Reagan administration is right to take Nicaragua as a serious menace—to civil peace and democracy in Nicaragua and to the stability and security of the region"; that we must "fit Nicaragua back into a Central American mode" and "turn Nicaragua back toward democracy", and with the "Latin American democracies" "demand reasonable conduct by regional standard."<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1986/03/14/is-there-a-chance-in-nicaragua/d7d4a7ff-058d-45d5-ae3b-996246bf64c0/ |title=Is There a Chance in Nicaragua? |newspaper=Washington Post |date=14 March 1986}}</ref> | ||
Soon after the embargo was established, [[Managua]] re-declared "a policy of nonalignment" and sought the aid of Western Europe, who were opposed to U.S. policy, to escape dependency on the Soviet Union.<ref> | Soon after the embargo was established, [[Managua]] re-declared "a policy of nonalignment" and sought the aid of Western Europe, who were opposed to U.S. policy, to escape dependency on the Soviet Union.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.csmonitor.com/1985/0516/oteg.html |title=Ortega collects warm words of support on European trip. Yet his visit is unlikely to drum up much concrete aid |newspaper=Christian Science Monitor |date=16 May 1985}}</ref> Since 1981 U.S. pressures had curtailed Western credit to and trade with Nicaragua, forcing the government to rely almost totally on the Eastern bloc for credit, other aid, and trade by 1985.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 112">{{cite book |first1=John A. |last1=Booth |first2=Christine J. |last2=Wade |first3=Thomas W. |last3=Walker |title=Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change |date=2014 |publisher=Avalon |page=112 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UcA_BAAAQBAJ |isbn=9780813349589}}</ref> In his 1997 study on U.S. low intensity warfare, Kermit D. Johnson, a former Chief of the U.S. Army Chaplains, contends that U.S. hostility toward the revolutionary government was motivated not by any concern for "national security", but rather by what the world relief organization Oxfam termed "the threat of a good example": | ||
{{quote|It was alarming that in just a few months after the Sandinista revolution, Nicaragua received international acclaim for its rapid progress in the fields of literacy and health. It was alarming that a socialist-mixed-economy state could do in a few short months what the Somoza dynasty, a U.S. client state, could not do in 45 years! It was truly alarming that the Sandinistas were intent on providing the very services that establish a government's political and moral legitimacy.<ref name="D. Johnson, p. 19">{{cite book|first1=Kermit D. |last1=Johnson|title=Ethics and Counterrevolution: American Involvement in Internal Wars|date=1997|publisher=University Press of Americas|page=19|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=aPBZXeRev9AC|isbn=9780761809067}}</ref><}} | |||
The government's program included increased wages, subsidized [[food prices]], and expanded health, welfare, and education services. And though it nationalized Somoza's former properties, it preserved a private sector that accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of GDP.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 107">{{cite book| | The government's program included increased wages, subsidized [[food prices]], and expanded health, welfare, and education services. And though it nationalized Somoza's former properties, it preserved a private sector that accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of GDP.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 107">{{cite book|first1=John A. |last1=Booth|first2=Christine J. |last2=Wade|first3=Thomas W. |last3=Walker|title=Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change|date=2014|publisher=Avalon |page=107|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UcA_BAAAQBAJ|isbn=9780813349589}}</ref> | ||
=== Atrocities === | === Atrocities === | ||
The United States began to support Contra activities against the Sandinista government by December 1981, with the CIA at the forefront of operations. The CIA supplied the funds and the equipment, coordinated training programs, and provided intelligence and target lists. While the Contras had little military successes, they did | The United States began to support Contra activities against the Sandinista government by December 1981, with the CIA at the forefront of operations. The CIA supplied the funds and the equipment, coordinated training programs, and provided intelligence and target lists. While the Contras had little military successes, they did “prove adept at carrying out CIA guerrilla warfare strategies from training manuals which advised them to incite mob violence, "neutralize" civilian leaders and government officials and attack "soft targets"”. The agency added to the Contras' sabotage efforts by blowing up refineries and pipelines, and mining ports.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 107" /><ref>{{cite book |quote=The Contras did prove adept at carrying out U.S. guerrilla warfare strategies, supplied in the CIA training manuals, which advised them to 'neutralize' civilian leaders, incite mob violence and attack 'soft' targets such as agricultural cooperatives. |first=Thomas W. |last=Walker|title=Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicaragua|date=1991|publisher=Westview Press|page=335|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=d1FqAAAAMAAJ|isbn=9780813308623}}</ref>{{refn|name=Sklar, p. 179|As recounted by Holly Sklar, the CIA manual, ''Tayacan'', advises the paramilitaries "to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets, such as court judges ''etc.''" In the section entitled "Implicit and Explicit Terror", the manual states that it is necessary to "kidnap all officials or agents of the Sandinista government" or "individuals in tune with the regime", who then should be removed from the town "without damaging them ''publicly''".<ref name="Sklar 1988">{{cite book|first=Holly |last=Sklar|title=Washington's War on Nicaragua|date=1988|publisher=South End Press|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=d1FqAAAAMAAJ|isbn=9780813308623}}</ref>{{rp|p=179}}}} Finally, according to former Contra leader [[Edgar Chamorro]], CIA trainers also gave Contra soldiers large knives. "A commando knife [was given], and our people, everybody wanted to have a knife like that, to kill people, to cut their throats".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2288&C=2189 |title=War Against the Poor: Low-Intensity Conflict and Christian Faith |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170406110730/http://www.religion-online.org/showchapter.asp?title=2288&C=2189 |archive-date=6 April 2017 |first=Jack |last=Nelson-Pallmeyer |year=1989}}</ref><ref name="West 57th">{{cite episode |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eYT8IX14W44 |series=[[West 57th (TV program)|West 57th]] |title=Nicaragua: The Dirty War |station=CBS |via=YouTube}}</ref>{{rp|at=11:34}}{{fcn|reason=missing date|date=September 2025}} In 1985 ''Newsweek'' published a series of photos taken by Frank Wohl, a conservative student admirer traveling with the Contras, entitled "Execution in the Jungle": | ||
{{quote|The victim dug his own grave, scooping the dirt out with his hands ... He crossed himself. Then a contra executioner knelt and rammed a k-bar knife into his throat. A second enforcer stabbed at his jugular, then his abdomen. When the corpse was finally still, the contras threw dirt over the shallow grave—and walked away.<ref name="Sklar 1988"/>{{rp|p=268}}<ref name="West 57th"/>{{rp|at=11:20}}}} | |||
The CIA officer in charge of the covert war, [[Duane Clarridge|Duane "Dewey" Clarridge]], admitted to the House Intelligence Committee staff in a secret briefing in 1984 that the Contras were routinely murdering "civilians and Sandinista officials in the provinces, as well as heads of cooperatives, nurses, doctors and judges". But he claimed that this did not violate President Reagan's executive order prohibiting assassinations because the agency defined it as just 'killing'. "After all, this is war—a paramilitary operation", Clarridge said in conclusion.<ref> | The CIA officer in charge of the covert war, [[Duane Clarridge|Duane "Dewey" Clarridge]], admitted to the House Intelligence Committee staff in a secret briefing in 1984 that the Contras were routinely murdering "civilians and Sandinista officials in the provinces, as well as heads of cooperatives, nurses, doctors and judges". But he claimed that this did not violate President Reagan's executive order prohibiting assassinations because the agency defined it as just 'killing'. "After all, this is war—a paramilitary operation", Clarridge said in conclusion.<ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/120079409/ |title=CIA-assisted 'contras' murdered Sandinistas, official reportedly says <!--|last?=Knight-Ridder--> |newspaper=The Arizona Republic |via=Newspapers.com |date=20 October 1984}}</ref> Edgar Chamorro explained the rationale behind this to a U.S. reporter. "Sometimes terror is very productive. This is the policy, to keep putting pressure until the people cry 'uncle{{'"}}.<ref>{{cite book|first=Mary J. |last=Ruwart|title=Healing Our World in an Age of Aggression|date=2003|publisher=SunStar Press|page=309|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=IIlZAAAAYAAJ|isbn=9780963233660}}</ref><ref name="West 57th"/>{{rp|at=1:50}} The CIA manual for the Contras, ''Tayacan'', states that the Contras should gather the local population for a public tribunal to "shame, ridicule and humiliate" Sandinista officials to "reduce their influence". It also recommends gathering the local population to witness and take part in public executions.<ref name="Sklar 1988"/>{{rp|p=179}} These types of activities continued throughout the war. | ||
In April 1987, an American aid worker named [[Benjamin Linder]] was killed by Contras. After the signing of the Central American Peace Accord in August 1987, the year war related deaths and economic destruction reached its peak, the Contras eventually entered negotiations with the Sandinista government (1988), and the war began to deescalate.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 107" /> | In April 1987, an American aid worker named [[Benjamin Linder]] was killed by Contras. After the signing of the Central American Peace Accord in August 1987, the year war related deaths and economic destruction reached its peak, the Contras eventually entered negotiations with the Sandinista government (1988), and the war began to deescalate.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 107" /> | ||
By 1989 the | By 1989 the war and economic isolation had inflicted severe economic suffering on Nicaraguans. Nicaraguans had been exhausted from the war, which had cost 30,865 lives. By the late 1980s Nicaragua's internal conditions had changed radically. A united opposition of 14 political parties organized into the [[National Opposition Union (Nicaragua, 1990)|National Opposition Union]] (Unión Nacional Oppositora, UNO) with the support of the United States [[National Endowment for Democracy]]. UNO presidential nominee [[Violeta Chamorro]] was received by President [[George H. W. Bush]] at the White House.{{cn|date=April 2026}} | ||
The Contra war escalated over the year before the election. The U.S. promised to end the economic embargo should Chamorro win.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 113">{{cite book| | The Contra war escalated over the year before the election. The U.S. promised to end the economic embargo should Chamorro win.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 113">{{cite book|first1=John A. |last1=Booth |first2=Christine J. |last2=Wade |first3=Thomas W. |last3=Walker |title=Understanding Central America: Global Forces, Rebellion, and Change |year=2014 |publisher=Avalon |page=113 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=UcA_BAAAQBAJ |isbn=9780813349589}}</ref> | ||
The UNO scored a decisive victory on 25 February 1990. Chamorro won with 55 percent of the presidential vote as compared to [[Daniel Ortega]]'s 41 percent. Of 92 seats in the National Assembly, UNO gained 51, and the FSLN won 39. On 25 April 1990, Chamorro assumed presidency from Ortega.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 113" /> | The UNO scored a decisive victory on 25 February 1990. Chamorro won with 55 percent of the presidential vote as compared to [[Daniel Ortega]]'s 41 percent. Of 92 seats in the National Assembly, UNO gained 51, and the FSLN won 39. On 25 April 1990, Chamorro assumed presidency from Ortega.<ref name="Booth, Wade, Walker, p. 113" /> | ||
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===Illegal covert operations=== | ===Illegal covert operations=== | ||
{{See also|Iran–Contra affair}} | {{See also|Iran–Contra affair}} | ||
With Congress blocking further aid to the Contras, the Reagan administration sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third countries and private sources.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4">Lee et al. 1987, p. 4</ref> Between 1984 and 1986, $34 million from third countries and $2.7 million from private sources were raised this way.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> The secret Contra assistance was run by the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], with officer [[Lieutenant Colonel|Lt. Col.]] [[Oliver North]] in charge.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> With the third-party funds, North created an organization called ''The Enterprise'', which served as the secret arm of the NSC staff and had its own airplanes, pilots, airfield, ship, operatives, and secret Swiss bank accounts.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> It also received assistance from personnel from other government agencies, especially from CIA personnel in Central America.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> This operation functioned, however, without any of the accountability required of U.S. government activities.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> The Enterprise's efforts culminated in the [[Iran Contra affair|Iran–Contra Affair of 1986–1987]], which facilitated | With Congress blocking further aid to the Contras, the Reagan administration sought to arrange funding and military supplies by means of third countries and private sources.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4">Lee et al. 1987, p. 4</ref> Between 1984 and 1986, $34 million from third countries and $2.7 million from private sources were raised this way.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> The secret Contra assistance was run by the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], with officer [[Lieutenant Colonel|Lt. Col.]] [[Oliver North]] in charge.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> With the third-party funds, North created an organization called ''The Enterprise'', which served as the secret arm of the NSC staff and had its own airplanes, pilots, airfield, ship, operatives, and secret Swiss bank accounts.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> It also received assistance from personnel from other government agencies, especially from CIA personnel in Central America.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> This operation functioned, however, without any of the accountability required of U.S. government activities.<ref name="Lee et al. 1987, p. 4"/> The Enterprise's efforts culminated in the [[Iran Contra affair|Iran–Contra Affair of 1986–1987]], which facilitated Contra funding through the proceeds of arms sales to Iran. | ||
According to the London Spectator, U.S. journalists in Central America had long known that the CIA was flying in supplies to the Contras inside Nicaragua before the scandal broke. No journalist paid it any attention until the alleged CIA supply man, [[Eugene Hasenfus]], was shot down and captured by the Nicaraguan army. Similarly, reporters neglected to investigate many leads indicating that Oliver North was running the Contra operation from his office in the National Security Council.<ref>[http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/16th-may-1987/13/who-helped-oliver-north "Who Helped Oliver North?"] ''[[The Spectator]]'', 15 May 1987</ref> | According to the London Spectator, U.S. journalists in Central America had long known that the CIA was flying in supplies to the Contras inside Nicaragua before the scandal broke. No journalist paid it any attention until the alleged CIA supply man, [[Eugene Hasenfus]], was shot down and captured by the Nicaraguan army. Similarly, reporters neglected to investigate many leads indicating that Oliver North was running the Contra operation from his office in the National Security Council.<ref>[http://archive.spectator.co.uk/article/16th-may-1987/13/who-helped-oliver-north "Who Helped Oliver North?"] ''[[The Spectator]]'', 15 May 1987</ref> | ||
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===International Court of Justice ruling=== | ===International Court of Justice ruling=== | ||
{{Main|Nicaragua v. United States}} | {{Main|Nicaragua v. United States}} | ||
In 1984 the Sandinista government filed a suit in the [[International Court of Justice]] (ICJ) against the United States (''Nicaragua v. United States''), which resulted in a 1986 judgment against the United States. The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated [[international law]] as well as a 1956 treaty by supporting the contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by [[Naval mine|mining]] Nicaragua's harbors. Regarding the alleged human rights violations by the contras, however, the ICJ took the view that the United States could be held accountable for them only if it would have been proven that the U.S. had effective control of the Contra operations resulting in these alleged violations.<ref>"Having reached the above conclusion, the Court takes the view that the contras remain responsible for their acts, in particular the alleged violations by them of humanitarian law. For the United States to be legally responsible, it would have to be proved that that State had effective control of the operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, VII (5)</ref> Nevertheless, the ICJ found that the U.S. encouraged acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law by producing the manual ''[[Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare]] (Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas'') and disseminating it to the | |||
{{History of Nicaragua}} | |||
In 1984 the Sandinista government filed a suit in the [[International Court of Justice]] (ICJ) against the United States (''Nicaragua v. United States''), which resulted in a 1986 judgment against the United States. The ICJ held that the U.S. had violated [[international law]] as well as a 1956 treaty by supporting the contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by [[Naval mine|mining]] Nicaragua's harbors. Regarding the alleged human rights violations by the contras, however, the ICJ took the view that the United States could be held accountable for them only if it would have been proven that the U.S. had effective control of the Contra operations resulting in these alleged violations.<ref>"Having reached the above conclusion, the Court takes the view that the contras remain responsible for their acts, in particular the alleged violations by them of humanitarian law. For the United States to be legally responsible, it would have to be proved that that State had effective control of the operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, VII (5)</ref> Nevertheless, the ICJ found that the U.S. encouraged acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law by producing the manual ''[[Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare]] (Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas'') and disseminating it to the Contras.<ref>"Finds that the United States of America, by producing in 1983 a manual entitled 'Operaciones sicológicas en guerra de guerrillas', and disseminating it to contra forces, has encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, (9)</ref> The manual, amongst other things, advised on how to rationalize killings of civilians<ref name="ReferenceC">In the case of shooting "a citizen who was trying to leave the town or city in which the guerrillas are carrying out armed propaganda or political proselytism", the manual suggests that the contras "explain that if that citizen had managed to escape, he would have alerted the enemy." As seen at: Sklar 1988, p. 179</ref> and recommended to hire professional killers for specific selective tasks.<ref name="Sklar 1988, p. 181">Sklar 1988, p. 181</ref> | |||
The United States, which did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings, maintained that the ICJ's power did not supersede the [[Constitution of the United States]] and argued that the court did not seriously consider the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador, while it accused Nicaragua of actively supporting armed groups there, specifically in the form of supply of arms.<ref>International Court of Justice 1986, VIII (1)</ref> The ICJ had found that evidence of a responsibility of the Nicaraguan government in this matter was insufficient.<ref>"In any event the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court that the Government of Nicaragua was responsible for any flow of arms at either period." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, VIII (1)</ref> The U.S. argument was affirmed, however, by the dissenting opinion of ICJ member U.S. Judge Schwebel,<ref>"But the Court, remarkably enough, while finding the United States responsible for intervention in Nicaragua, failed to recognize Nicaragua's prior and continuing intervention in El Salvador." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel</ref> who concluded that in supporting the Contras, the United States acted lawfully in collective self-defence in El Salvador's support.<ref>"concluded that the United States essentially acted lawfully in exerting armed pressures against Nicaragua, both directly and through its support of the contras, because Nicaragua's prior and sustained support of armed insurgency in El Salvador was tantamount to an armed attack upon El Salvador against which the United States could react in collective self-defence in El Salvador's support." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel</ref> The U.S. blocked enforcement of the ICJ judgment by the [[United Nations Security Council]] and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation.<ref name="law">{{cite journal|author=Morrison, Fred L. |title=Legal Issues in The Nicaragua Opinion |journal=American Journal of International Law |date=January 1987 |volume=81 |issue=1 |pages=160–166 |url=http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/55750.html |doi=10.2307/2202146 |jstor=2202146 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205163909/http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/55750.html |archive-date=5 February 2012|url-access=subscription }} "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision. Nicaragua vs United States (Merits)"</ref> The Nicaraguan government finally withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 (under the later, post-FSLN, government of [[Violeta Chamorro]]), following a repeal of the law requiring the country to seek compensation.<ref name="HRW report">{{cite web|title=Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 – Nicaragua |url=http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,NIC,467fca491e,0.html |access-date=18 September 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121009082531/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher%2CHRW%2C%2CNIC%2C467fca491e%2C0.html |archive-date=9 October 2012}}</ref> | The United States, which did not participate in the merits phase of the proceedings, maintained that the ICJ's power did not supersede the [[Constitution of the United States]] and argued that the court did not seriously consider the Nicaraguan role in El Salvador, while it accused Nicaragua of actively supporting armed groups there, specifically in the form of supply of arms.<ref>International Court of Justice 1986, VIII (1)</ref> The ICJ had found that evidence of a responsibility of the Nicaraguan government in this matter was insufficient.<ref>"In any event the evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court that the Government of Nicaragua was responsible for any flow of arms at either period." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, VIII (1)</ref> The U.S. argument was affirmed, however, by the dissenting opinion of ICJ member U.S. Judge Schwebel,<ref>"But the Court, remarkably enough, while finding the United States responsible for intervention in Nicaragua, failed to recognize Nicaragua's prior and continuing intervention in El Salvador." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel</ref> who concluded that in supporting the Contras, the United States acted lawfully in collective self-defence in El Salvador's support.<ref>"concluded that the United States essentially acted lawfully in exerting armed pressures against Nicaragua, both directly and through its support of the contras, because Nicaragua's prior and sustained support of armed insurgency in El Salvador was tantamount to an armed attack upon El Salvador against which the United States could react in collective self-defence in El Salvador's support." As seen at: International Court of Justice 1986, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Schwebel</ref> The U.S. blocked enforcement of the ICJ judgment by the [[United Nations Security Council]] and thereby prevented Nicaragua from obtaining any actual compensation.<ref name="law">{{cite journal|author=Morrison, Fred L. |title=Legal Issues in The Nicaragua Opinion |journal=American Journal of International Law |date=January 1987 |volume=81 |issue=1 |pages=160–166 |url=http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/55750.html |doi=10.2307/2202146 |jstor=2202146 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120205163909/http://bailey83221.livejournal.com/55750.html |archive-date=5 February 2012|url-access=subscription }} "Appraisals of the ICJ's Decision. Nicaragua vs United States (Merits)"</ref> The Nicaraguan government finally withdrew the complaint from the court in September 1992 (under the later, post-FSLN, government of [[Violeta Chamorro]]), following a repeal of the law requiring the country to seek compensation.<ref name="HRW report">{{cite web|title=Human Rights Watch World Report 1993 – Nicaragua |url=http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,HRW,,NIC,467fca491e,0.html |access-date=18 September 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121009082531/http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher%2CHRW%2C%2CNIC%2C467fca491e%2C0.html |archive-date=9 October 2012}}</ref> | ||
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==Military successes and election of Violeta Chamorro== | ==Military successes and election of Violeta Chamorro== | ||
By 1986 the | By 1986 the Contras were besieged by charges of corruption, human-rights abuses, and military ineptitude.<ref>{{cite magazine | ||
|title = Nicaragua Is It Curtains? | |title = Nicaragua Is It Curtains? | ||
|magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] | |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] | ||
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{{Gallery | {{Gallery | ||
|title=Maps of militias in Nicaragua (1984 – 1988) | |title=Maps of rebel militias in Nicaragua (1984 – 1988) | ||
|width=160 | height=170 |noborder=yes | |width=160 | height=170 |noborder=yes | ||
|align=center | |align=center | ||
|File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1984).png | |File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1984).png | ||
|1984 | |{{center|1984}} | ||
|alt1=Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1984) | |alt1=Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1984) | ||
|File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1985).png | |File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1985).png | ||
|1985 | |{{center|1985}} | ||
|alt2=Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1985) | |alt2=Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1985) | ||
|File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1986).png | |File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1986).png | ||
|1986 | |{{center|1986}} | ||
|class3=bg-transparent | |class3=bg-transparent | ||
|alt3=Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1986) | |alt3=Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1986) | ||
|File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1988).png | |File:Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1988).png | ||
|1988 | |{{center|1988}} | ||
|class4=bg-transparent | |class4=bg-transparent | ||
|alt4=Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1988) | |alt4=Insurgency area in Nicaragua (1988) | ||
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*''[[Snowfall (TV series)|Snowfall]]'' a TV series following several characters, including an undercover CIA officer facilitating cocaine smuggling into the US on the behalf of the Nicaraguan Contras and his connection to a 20-year-old drug dealer in Los Angeles in the mid-1980s, the early days of the crack cocaine epidemic. | *''[[Snowfall (TV series)|Snowfall]]'' a TV series following several characters, including an undercover CIA officer facilitating cocaine smuggling into the US on the behalf of the Nicaraguan Contras and his connection to a 20-year-old drug dealer in Los Angeles in the mid-1980s, the early days of the crack cocaine epidemic. | ||
*''[[The Last Narc]]'', a 2020 documentary about the kidnapping and murder of DEA agent [[Kiki Camarena]] by Mexican drug cartels, ends up covering parts of the Iran-Contra scandal. | *''[[The Last Narc]]'', a 2020 documentary about the kidnapping and murder of DEA agent [[Kiki Camarena]] by Mexican drug cartels, ends up covering parts of the Iran-Contra scandal. | ||
*Scenes covering the war are shown in the 1987 feature film ''[[Broadcast News (film)|Broadcast News]]''. | |||
==See also== | ==See also== | ||
*[[Anti-communism]] | *[[Anti-communism]] | ||
*[[Central American Crisis]] | |||
*[[CIA involvement in Contra cocaine trafficking]] | *[[CIA involvement in Contra cocaine trafficking]] | ||
*[[Cold War]] | *[[Cold War]] | ||
*[[Foreign interventions by the United States]] | *[[Foreign interventions by the United States]] | ||
*[[Latin America–United States relations]] | *[[Latin America–United States relations]] | ||
* [[Nicaraguan Revolution]] | |||
*[[Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare]] | *[[Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare]] | ||
*[[Reagan Doctrine]] | *[[Reagan Doctrine]] | ||
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==Notes== | ==Notes== | ||
{{ | {{notelist}} | ||
==References== | == References== | ||
{{reflist}} | |||
==Bibliography== | |||
{{refbegin|30em}} | {{refbegin|30em}} | ||
*Asleson, Vern. (2004) ''Nicaragua: Those Passed By''. Galde Press {{ISBN|1-931942-16-1}} | *Asleson, Vern. (2004) ''Nicaragua: Those Passed By''. Galde Press {{ISBN|1-931942-16-1}} | ||
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*[https://web.archive.org/web/20090412154510/http://www.whitepinepictures.com/wsw/twswfmr.htm "The World Stopped Watching"], a documentary film directed by Peter Raymont. White Pine Pictures, 2003. | *[https://web.archive.org/web/20090412154510/http://www.whitepinepictures.com/wsw/twswfmr.htm "The World Stopped Watching"], a documentary film directed by Peter Raymont. White Pine Pictures, 2003. | ||
*[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm "The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations"] – National Security Archive. | *[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB2/nsaebb2.htm "The Contras, Cocaine, and Covert Operations"] – National Security Archive. | ||
*[ | *[https://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/27/newsid_2520000/2520169.stm US administration disregarding the UN verdict] Video provided by BBC. | ||
*[https://archive.org/details/whenak47sfallsil00timo <!-- quote=When the AK-47s Fall Silent. --> ''When the AK-47s Fall Silent'', by Timothy Brown] | *[https://archive.org/details/whenak47sfallsil00timo <!-- quote=When the AK-47s Fall Silent. --> ''When the AK-47s Fall Silent'', by Timothy Brown] | ||
{{United States intervention in Latin America}} | {{United States intervention in Latin America}} | ||
[[Category:Contras| ]] | [[Category:Contras| ]] | ||
[[Category:Anti-communist guerrilla organizations]] | [[Category:Anti-communist guerrilla organizations]] | ||