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[[File:Existential quantifier.svg|thumb|alt=Existential quantifier|The [[existential quantifier]] ∃ is often used in [[logic]] to express existence.]] | [[File:Existential quantifier.svg|thumb|alt=Existential quantifier|The [[existential quantifier]] ∃ is often used in [[logic]] to express existence.]] | ||
'''Existence''' is the state of having '''being''' or [[reality]] in contrast to '''nonexistence''' and | '''Existence''' is the state of having '''being''' or [[reality]] in contrast to '''nonexistence''' and nonbeing. Existence is often contrasted with [[essence]]: the essence of an [[entity]] is its essential features or qualities, which can be understood even if one does not know whether the entity exists. | ||
[[Ontology]] is the philosophical discipline studying the nature and types of existence. Singular existence is the existence of individual entities while general existence refers to the existence of [[concepts]] or [[universals]]. Entities present in space and time have [[Abstract and concrete|concrete]] existence in contrast to abstract entities, like numbers and sets. Other distinctions are between [[Subjunctive possibility|possible]], [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]], and [[Metaphysical necessity|necessary]] existence and between [[Matter|physical]] and [[Mind|mental]] existence. The common view is that an entity either exists or not with nothing in between, but some philosophers say that there are degrees of existence, meaning that some entities exist to a higher degree than others. | [[Ontology]] is the philosophical discipline studying the nature and types of existence. Singular existence is the existence of individual entities while general existence refers to the existence of [[concepts]] or [[universals]]. Entities present in space and time have [[Abstract and concrete|concrete]] existence in contrast to abstract entities, like numbers and sets. Other distinctions are between [[Subjunctive possibility|possible]], [[Contingency (philosophy)|contingent]], and [[Metaphysical necessity|necessary]] existence and between [[Matter|physical]] and [[Mind|mental]] existence. The common view is that an entity either exists or not with nothing in between, but some philosophers say that there are degrees of existence, meaning that some entities exist to a higher degree than others. | ||
The orthodox position in ontology is that existence is a second-order [[Property (philosophy)|property]], or a property of properties. For example, to say that lions exist means that the property of being a lion is possessed by | The orthodox position in ontology is that existence is a second-order [[Property (philosophy)|property]], or a property of properties. For example, to say that lions exist means that the property of being a lion is possessed by at least one entity. A different view sees existence as a first-order property, or a property of [[Particular|individuals]], meaning existence is similar to other properties of individuals, like color and shape. [[Alexius Meinong]] and his followers accept this idea and say that not all individuals have this property; they state that there are some individuals, such as [[Santa Claus]], that do not exist. Universalists reject this view; they see existence as a universal property of every individual. | ||
The concept of existence has been discussed throughout the [[history of philosophy]] and already played a role in [[ancient philosophy]], including [[Presocratic philosophy]] in [[Ancient Greece]], [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu]] and [[Buddhist philosophy]] in [[Ancient India]], and [[Daoist philosophy]] in [[ancient China]]. It is relevant to fields such as [[logic]], [[mathematics]], [[epistemology]], [[philosophy of mind]], [[philosophy of language]], and [[existentialism]]. | The concept of existence has been discussed throughout the [[history of philosophy]] and already played a role in [[ancient philosophy]], including [[Presocratic philosophy]] in [[Ancient Greece]], [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu]] and [[Buddhist philosophy]] in [[Ancient India]], and [[Daoist philosophy]] in [[ancient China]]. It is relevant to fields such as [[logic]], [[mathematics]], [[epistemology]], [[philosophy of mind]], [[philosophy of language]], and [[existentialism]]. | ||
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Disputes about the nature of existence are reflected in the distinction between thin and [[thick concept]]s of existence. Thin concepts of existence understand existence as a logical property that every existing thing shares; they do not include any substantial content about the metaphysical implications of having existence. According to one view, existence is the same as the logical property of [[Law of identity|self-identity]]. This view articulates a thin concept of existence because it merely states what exists is identical to itself without discussing any substantial characteristics of the nature of existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Robinson|2008|p=139}} |2={{harvnb|Vallicella|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2QBgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46–47]}} |3={{harvnb|Berto|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oMN1Si2wPVIC&pg=PA31 31–32]}} |4={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=15LIl3X8SnUC&pg=PA126 126]}} }}</ref> Thick concepts of existence encompass a metaphysical analysis of what it means that something exists and what essential features existence implies. According to one proposal, to exist is to be present in space and time, and to have effects on other things. This definition is controversial because it implies abstract objects such as numbers do not exist. Philosopher [[George Berkeley]] (1685–1753) gave a different thick concept of existence; he stated: "to be is to be perceived", meaning all existence is mental.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Robinson|2008|p=139}} | {{harvnb|Vallicella|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2QBgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46–47]}} | {{harvnb|Berto|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oMN1Si2wPVIC&pg=PA31 31–32]}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=96_CBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA9 9]}} }}</ref> | Disputes about the nature of existence are reflected in the distinction between thin and [[thick concept]]s of existence. Thin concepts of existence understand existence as a logical property that every existing thing shares; they do not include any substantial content about the metaphysical implications of having existence. According to one view, existence is the same as the logical property of [[Law of identity|self-identity]]. This view articulates a thin concept of existence because it merely states what exists is identical to itself without discussing any substantial characteristics of the nature of existence.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Robinson|2008|p=139}} |2={{harvnb|Vallicella|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2QBgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46–47]}} |3={{harvnb|Berto|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oMN1Si2wPVIC&pg=PA31 31–32]}} |4={{harvnb|Van Inwagen|2013|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=15LIl3X8SnUC&pg=PA126 126]}} }}</ref> Thick concepts of existence encompass a metaphysical analysis of what it means that something exists and what essential features existence implies. According to one proposal, to exist is to be present in space and time, and to have effects on other things. This definition is controversial because it implies abstract objects such as numbers do not exist. Philosopher [[George Berkeley]] (1685–1753) gave a different thick concept of existence; he stated: "to be is to be perceived", meaning all existence is mental.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Robinson|2008|p=139}} | {{harvnb|Vallicella|2014|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=2QBgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA46 46–47]}} | {{harvnb|Berto|2012|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=oMN1Si2wPVIC&pg=PA31 31–32]}} | {{harvnb|Mumford|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=96_CBQAAQBAJ&pg=PA9 9]}} }}</ref> | ||
Existence contrasts with nonexistence, a lack of reality. Whether objects can be divided into existent and nonexistent objects is a subject of controversy. This distinction is sometimes used to explain how it is possible to think of fictional objects like dragons and unicorns but the concept of nonexistent objects is not generally accepted; some philosophers say the concept is contradictory.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Reicher|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/ lead section, §1. The Concept of a Nonexistent Object]}} |2={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=8}} |3={{harvnb|Yao|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NZjOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> Closely related contrasting terms are [[nothingness]] and nonbeing.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Shūzō|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GVgEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA830 830]}} | {{harvnb|Leclerc|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_B2KaiGu038C&pg=PA49 49]}} | {{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Existence is commonly associated with mind-independent reality<ref>{{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}}</ref> but this position is not universally accepted because there could also be forms of mind-dependent existence, such as the existence of an idea inside a person's mind. According to some [[idealists]], this may apply to all of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Waxman|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1UwGAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA211 211]}} | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=30, 33–34}} }}</ref> | Existence contrasts with nonexistence, a lack of reality. Whether objects can be divided into existent and [[nonexistent objects]] is a subject of controversy. This distinction is sometimes used to explain how it is possible to think of fictional objects like dragons and unicorns but the concept of nonexistent objects is not generally accepted; some philosophers say the concept is contradictory.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Reicher|2022|loc=[https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nonexistent-objects/ lead section, §1. The Concept of a Nonexistent Object]}} |2={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=8}} |3={{harvnb|Yao|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=NZjOAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA140 140]}} }}</ref> Closely related contrasting terms are [[nothingness]] and nonbeing.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Shūzō|2011|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=GVgEEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA830 830]}} | {{harvnb|Leclerc|2002|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_B2KaiGu038C&pg=PA49 49]}} | {{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> Existence is commonly associated with mind-independent reality<ref>{{harvnb|Merriam-Webster|2024}}</ref> but this position is not universally accepted because there could also be forms of mind-dependent existence, such as the existence of an idea inside a person's mind. According to some [[idealists]], this may apply to all of reality.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Waxman|2014|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=1UwGAQAAQBAJ&pg=PA211 211]}} | {{harvnb|Gibson|1998|pp=30, 33–34}} }}</ref> | ||
Another contrast is made between ''existence'' and ''[[essence]]''. Essence refers to the intrinsic nature or defining qualities of an entity. The essence of something determines what kind of entity it is and how it differs from other kinds of entities. Essence corresponds to what an entity is, while existence corresponds to the fact that it is. For instance, it is possible to understand what an [[Object (philosophy)|object]] is and grasp its nature even if one does not know whether this object exists.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=2}} |2={{harvnb|Ceylan|1993|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20840134 329–337]}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> According to some philosophers, there is a difference between entities and the fundamental characteristics that make them the entities they are.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nicholson|1996|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009875 357–374]}} |2={{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§2.2.1 The Question}} |3={{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=1}} }}</ref> [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) introduced this concept; he calls it the [[ontological difference]] and contrasts individual beings with being. According to his response to the question of being, being is not an entity but the background context that makes all individual entities intelligible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nicholson|1996|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009875 357–358]}} | {{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§2.2.1 The Question}} | {{harvnb|Inwood|1999|pp=89–100}} }}</ref>{{efn|In [[Heideggerian terminology|his own terminology]], Heidegger reserves the terms "''Existenz''" and "''Ek-sistenz''" to characterize the mode of being of [[Dasein]], which is the mode of being characteristic of human beings.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Reck|2000|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZpkdBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 155–156]}} | {{harvnb|Aho|2021|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-heidegger-lexicon/eksistence-eksistenz/C78548237FFDBE1D518259C7DFA0BC9C 268–270]}} | {{harvnb|Inwood|1999|p=60}} }}</ref>}} | Another contrast is made between ''existence'' and ''[[essence]]''. Essence refers to the intrinsic nature or defining qualities of an entity. The essence of something determines what kind of entity it is and how it differs from other kinds of entities. Essence corresponds to what an entity is, while existence corresponds to the fact that it is. For instance, it is possible to understand what an [[Object (philosophy)|object]] is and grasp its nature even if one does not know whether this object exists.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Gibson|1998|p=2}} |2={{harvnb|Ceylan|1993|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20840134 329–337]}} |3={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=Lead Section}} }}</ref> According to some philosophers, there is a difference between entities and the fundamental characteristics that make them the entities they are.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nicholson|1996|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009875 357–374]}} |2={{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§2.2.1 The Question}} |3={{harvnb|Vallicella|2010|p=1}} }}</ref> [[Martin Heidegger]] (1889–1976) introduced this concept; he calls it the [[ontological difference]] and contrasts individual beings with being. According to his response to the question of being, being is not an entity but the background context that makes all individual entities intelligible.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Nicholson|1996|pp=[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20009875 357–358]}} | {{harvnb|Wheeler|2020|loc=§2.2.1 The Question}} | {{harvnb|Inwood|1999|pp=89–100}} }}</ref>{{efn|In [[Heideggerian terminology|his own terminology]], Heidegger reserves the terms "''Existenz''" and "''Ek-sistenz''" to characterize the mode of being of [[Dasein]], which is the mode of being characteristic of human beings.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Reck|2000|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=ZpkdBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA156 155–156]}} | {{harvnb|Aho|2021|pp=[https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-heidegger-lexicon/eksistence-eksistenz/C78548237FFDBE1D518259C7DFA0BC9C 268–270]}} | {{harvnb|Inwood|1999|p=60}} }}</ref>}} | ||
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There are many academic debates about the existence of merely possible objects. According to [[actualism]], only actual entities have being; this includes both contingent and necessary entities but excludes merely possible entities.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§3. An Anti-Meinongian First-Order View}} |2={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49–50]}} }}</ref> [[Possibilism (philosophy)|Possibilists]] reject this view and state there are also merely possible objects besides actual objects.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49–50]}} }}</ref> For example, metaphysician [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]] (1941–2001) states that possible objects exist in the same way as actual objects so as to provide a robust explanation of why statements about what is possible and necessary are true. According to him, possible objects exist in possible worlds while actual objects exist in the actual world. Lewis says the only difference between possible worlds and the actual world is the location of the speaker; the term "actual" refers to the world of the speaker, similar to the way the terms "here" and "now" refer to the spatial and temporal location of the speaker.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} | {{harvnb|Weatherson|2021|loc=§ 6. Modal Metaphysics}} }}</ref> | There are many academic debates about the existence of merely possible objects. According to [[actualism]], only actual entities have being; this includes both contingent and necessary entities but excludes merely possible entities.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§3. An Anti-Meinongian First-Order View}} |2={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49–50]}} }}</ref> [[Possibilism (philosophy)|Possibilists]] reject this view and state there are also merely possible objects besides actual objects.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Nelson|2022|loc=§2. Meinongianism}} |2={{harvnb|Jubien|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=uoCh8mpbZO4C&pg=PA49 49–50]}} }}</ref> For example, metaphysician [[David Lewis (philosopher)|David Lewis]] (1941–2001) states that possible objects exist in the same way as actual objects so as to provide a robust explanation of why statements about what is possible and necessary are true. According to him, possible objects exist in possible worlds while actual objects exist in the actual world. Lewis says the only difference between possible worlds and the actual world is the location of the speaker; the term "actual" refers to the world of the speaker, similar to the way the terms "here" and "now" refer to the spatial and temporal location of the speaker.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} | {{harvnb|Weatherson|2021|loc=§ 6. Modal Metaphysics}} }}</ref> | ||
The problem of contingent and necessary existence is closely related to the ontological question of [[why there is anything at all]] or why is there something rather than [[nothing]]. According to one view, the existence of something is a contingent fact, meaning the world could have been totally empty. This is not possible if there are necessary entities, which could not have failed to exist. In this case, global nothingness is impossible because the world needs to contain at least all necessary entities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} | {{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §4. Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?}} | {{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section, §1. Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?}} | {{harvnb|Pruss|Rasmussen|2018|pp=4–5}}}}</ref> | The problem of contingent and necessary existence is closely related to the ontological question of [[Why is there anything at all?|why there is anything at all]] or why is there something rather than [[nothing]]. According to one view, the existence of something is a contingent fact, meaning the world could have been totally empty. This is not possible if there are necessary entities, which could not have failed to exist. In this case, global nothingness is impossible because the world needs to contain at least all necessary entities.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2005|loc=[https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780199264797.001.0001/acref-9780199264797-e-828 Existence]}} | {{harvnb|Casati|Fujikawa|loc=Lead Section, §4. Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?}} | {{harvnb|Sorensen|2023|loc=Lead Section, §1. Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?}} | {{harvnb|Pruss|Rasmussen|2018|pp=4–5}}}}</ref> | ||
=== Physical and mental === | === Physical and mental === | ||
Entities that exist on a physical level include objects encountered in everyday life, like stones, trees, and human bodies, as well as entities discussed in [[modern physics]], like electrons and protons.<ref>{{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>{{efn|According to the [[Standard Model]] of [[particle physics]], [[elementary particles]] together with the [[four fundamental forces]] acting on them are the most basic constituents of the universe. [[String theory]] provides an alternative explanation by focusing one-dimensional [[String (physics)|strings]] and their interactions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Martin|Wells|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xVyYEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–4]}} | {{harvnb|Schwichtenberg|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bipBDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA8 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Chang|2024|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=c2L8EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA247 247]}} }}</ref>}} Physical entities can be observed and measured; they possess mass and a location in space and time.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Smart|2023|loc=Lead Section, §Types of Materialist Theory}} |2={{harvnb|Markosian|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lQ2xDwAAQBAJ 486–487]|loc=Physical Object}} }}</ref> Mental entities like perceptions, experiences of pleasure and pain as well as beliefs, desires, and emotions belong to the realm of the mind; they are primarily associated with conscious experiences but also include unconscious states like unconscious beliefs, desires, and memories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2006|loc=[https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMPOM-3 § 1. Introduction]}} | {{harvnb|Addis|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Vk6ZEN6vByUC&pg=PA49 49–50]}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5G_iBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT183 183]}} }}</ref> | Entities that exist on a physical level include objects encountered in everyday life, like stones, trees, and human bodies, as well as entities discussed in [[modern physics]], like electrons and protons.<ref>{{harvnb|Mackie|1998|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>{{efn|According to the [[Standard Model]] of [[particle physics]], [[elementary particles]] together with the [[four fundamental forces]] acting on them are the most basic constituents of the universe. [[String theory]] provides an alternative explanation by focusing one-dimensional [[String (physics)|strings]] and their interactions.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Martin|Wells|2022|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=xVyYEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1 1–4]}} | {{harvnb|Schwichtenberg|2017|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=bipBDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA8 7–8]}} | {{harvnb|Chang|2024|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=c2L8EAAAQBAJ&pg=PA247 247]}} }}</ref>}} Physical entities can be observed and measured; they possess mass and a location in space and time.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Smart|2023|loc=Lead Section, §Types of Materialist Theory}} |2={{harvnb|Markosian|2009|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=lQ2xDwAAQBAJ 486–487]|loc=Physical Object}} }}</ref> Mental entities like perceptions, experiences of pleasure and pain as well as beliefs, desires, and emotions belong to the realm of the mind; they are primarily associated with conscious experiences but also include unconscious states like unconscious beliefs, desires, and memories.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kim|2006|loc=[https://philpapers.org/rec/KIMPOM-3 § 1. Introduction]}} | {{harvnb|Addis|2013|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Vk6ZEN6vByUC&pg=PA49 49–50]}} | {{harvnb|Searle|2004|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=5G_iBwAAQBAJ&pg=PT183 183]}} }}</ref> | ||
The [[mind–body problem]] concerns the ontological status of and relation between physical and mental entities and is a frequent topic in [[metaphysics]] and [[philosophy of mind]].{{efn|Philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of mental phenomena and how they are related to the physical world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2000|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mH12kYm1RKAC&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Crumley|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Yf4eAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2–3]}} }}</ref>}} According to [[materialists]], only physical entities exist on the most-fundamental level. Materialists usually explain mental entities in terms of physical processes; for example, as brain states or as patterns of neural activation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kelly|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=AFwr3CCoqAEC&pg=PA87 87–88]}} | {{harvnb|Smart|2023|loc=Lead Section, § Types of Materialist Theory}} }}</ref> Idealism,{{efn|Some theorists use the term "ontological idealism" to distinguish it from idealistic views in epistemology.<ref>{{harvnb|Berendzen|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=C0DAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17]}}</ref>}} a minority view in contemporary philosophy,<ref>{{harvnb|Guyer|Horstmann|2023|loc=§ 9. The Fate of Idealism in the Twentieth Century}}</ref> rejects matter as ultimate and views the mind as the most basic reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Sprigge|1998|loc=Lead Section|ps=, "Idealism is now usually understood in philosophy as the view that mind is the most basic reality and that the physical world exists only as an appearance to or expression of mind, or as somehow mental in its inner essence."}}</ref> [[Dualists]] like [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650) believe both physical and mental entities exist on the most-fundamental level. They state they are connected to one another in several ways but that one cannot be reduced to the other.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kelly|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=AFwr3CCoqAEC&pg=PA87 87–88]}} | {{harvnb|Calef|loc=Lead Section, § 3. | The [[mind–body problem]] concerns the ontological status of and relation between physical and mental entities and is a frequent topic in [[metaphysics]] and [[philosophy of mind]].{{efn|Philosophy of mind is the branch of philosophy that studies the nature of mental phenomena and how they are related to the physical world.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Lowe|2000|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=mH12kYm1RKAC&pg=PA1 1–2]}} | {{harvnb|Crumley|2006|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Yf4eAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA2 2–3]}} }}</ref>}} According to [[materialists]], only physical entities exist on the most-fundamental level. Materialists usually explain mental entities in terms of physical processes; for example, as brain states or as patterns of neural activation.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kelly|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=AFwr3CCoqAEC&pg=PA87 87–88]}} | {{harvnb|Smart|2023|loc=Lead Section, § Types of Materialist Theory}} }}</ref> Idealism,{{efn|Some theorists use the term "ontological idealism" to distinguish it from idealistic views in epistemology.<ref>{{harvnb|Berendzen|2023|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=C0DAEAAAQBAJ&pg=PA17 17]}}</ref>}} a minority view in contemporary philosophy,<ref>{{harvnb|Guyer|Horstmann|2023|loc=§ 9. The Fate of Idealism in the Twentieth Century}}</ref> rejects matter as ultimate and views the mind as the most basic reality.<ref>{{harvnb|Sprigge|1998|loc=Lead Section|ps=, "Idealism is now usually understood in philosophy as the view that mind is the most basic reality and that the physical world exists only as an appearance to or expression of mind, or as somehow mental in its inner essence."}}</ref> [[Dualists]] like [[René Descartes]] (1596–1650) believe both physical and mental entities exist on the most-fundamental level. They state they are connected to one another in several ways but that one cannot be reduced to the other.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kelly|2004|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=AFwr3CCoqAEC&pg=PA87 87–88]}} | {{harvnb|Calef|loc=Lead Section, § 3. Descartes' Dualism}} }}</ref> | ||
=== Other types === | === Other types === | ||
Fictional entities are entities that exist as inventions inside works of [[fiction]].{{efn|Some [[empiricist]] philosophers also include entities that are [[Unobservable|not directly observable]], like powers and moral obligations.<ref>{{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>}} For example, [[Sherlock Holmes]] is a fictional character in [[Arthur Conan Doyle]]'s book ''[[A Study in Scarlet]]'' and [[flying carpets]] are fictional objects in the folktales ''[[One Thousand and One Nights]]''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kroon|Voltolini|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Prior|2006|p=493}} }}</ref> According to anti-realism, fictional entities do not form part of reality in any substantive sense. Possibilists, by contrast, see fictional entities as a subclass of possible objects; creationists say that they are artifacts that depend for their existence on the authors who first conceived them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kroon|Voltolini|2023|loc=§ 1. The Metaphysics of Fictional Entities}} | {{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=§ 2. Deflationary theories, § 3. Hospitable theories}} }}</ref> | Fictional entities are entities that exist as inventions inside works of [[fiction]].{{efn|Some [[empiricist]] philosophers also include entities that are [[Unobservable|not directly observable]], like powers and moral obligations.<ref>{{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=Lead Section}}</ref>}} For example, [[Sherlock Holmes]] is a fictional character in [[Arthur Conan Doyle]]'s book ''[[A Study in Scarlet]]'' and [[flying carpets]] are fictional objects in the folktales ''[[One Thousand and One Nights]]''.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kroon|Voltolini|2023|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Prior|2006|p=493}} }}</ref> According to anti-realism, fictional entities do not form part of reality in any substantive sense. Possibilists, by contrast, see fictional entities as a subclass of possible objects; creationists say that they are artifacts that depend for their existence on the authors who first conceived them.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Kroon|Voltolini|2023|loc=§ 1. The Metaphysics of Fictional Entities}} | {{harvnb|Lamarque|1998|loc=§ 2. Deflationary theories, § 3. Hospitable theories}} }}</ref> | ||
[[Intentionality#The problem of intentional inexistence|Intentional inexistence]] is a similar phenomenon concerned with the existence of objects within mental states. This happens when a person perceives or thinks about an object. In some cases, the [[intentional object]] corresponds to a real object outside the mental state, like when accurately perceiving a tree in the garden. In other cases, the intentional object does not have a real counterpart, like when thinking about [[Bigfoot]]. The [[problem of intentional inexistence]] is the challenge of explaining how one can think about entities that do not exist since this seems to have the paradoxical implication that the thinker stands in a [[Relation (philosophy)|relation]] to a nonexisting object.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jacob|2023|loc=2. Intentional inexistence}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2007|pp=307–308}} | {{harvnb| | [[Intentionality#The problem of intentional inexistence|Intentional inexistence]] is a similar phenomenon concerned with the existence of objects within mental states. This happens when a person perceives or thinks about an object. In some cases, the [[intentional object]] corresponds to a real object outside the mental state, like when accurately perceiving a tree in the garden. In other cases, the intentional object does not have a real counterpart, like when thinking about [[Bigfoot]]. The [[problem of intentional inexistence]] is the challenge of explaining how one can think about entities that do not exist since this seems to have the paradoxical implication that the thinker stands in a [[Relation (philosophy)|relation]] to a nonexisting object.<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Jacob|2023|loc=2. Intentional inexistence}} | {{harvnb|Kriegel|2007|pp=307–308}} | {{harvnb|O'Madagain|loc=§ 2. Intentional Objects}} }}</ref> | ||
== Modes and degrees of existence == | == Modes and degrees of existence == | ||
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=== Eastern philosophy === | === Eastern philosophy === | ||
[[File:Raja Ravi Varma - Sankaracharya - cropped.png|thumb|left|upright=.7|alt=Painting of Adi Shankara|[[Adi Shankara]] taught that only the divine exists on the most fundamental level.]] | [[File:Raja Ravi Varma - Sankaracharya - cropped.png|thumb|left|upright=.7|alt=Painting of Adi Shankara|[[Adi Shankara]] taught that only the divine exists on the most fundamental level.]] | ||
Many schools of thought in Eastern philosophy discuss the problem of existence and its implications. For instance, the ancient [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu]] school of [[Samkhya]] articulated a metaphysical dualism according to which the two types of existence are pure consciousness (''[[Purusha]]'') and matter (''[[Prakriti]]''). Samkhya explains the manifestation of the universe as the interaction between these two principles.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Leaman|2002|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_4crBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA77 77–78]}} |2={{harvnb|Perrett|2016|loc=§ The Classical Period of Indian Philosophy}} |3={{harvnb|Ruzsa|2023|loc=Lead Section, §4. Metaphysics}} |4={{harvnb|Eraly|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=te1sqTzTxD8C&pg=PA514 514–516]}} }}</ref> The [[Vedic]] philosopher [[Adi Shankara]] (c. 700–750 CE) developed a different approach in his school of [[Advaita Vedanta]]. Shankara defended a metaphysical monism by defining the divine (''[[Brahman]]'') as the ultimate reality and the only existent. According to this view, the impression that there is a universe consisting of many distinct entities is an illusion (''[[Maya (religion)|Maya]]'').<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Perrett|2016|loc=§ The Medieval Period of Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Dalal|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Life and Works}} | {{harvnb|Menon|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Dalal|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DH0vmD8ghdMC&pg=PA6 6]}}}}</ref> The essential features of ultimate reality are described as ''[[Sat Chit Ananda]]''—meaning existence, consciousness, and bliss.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Vanamali|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QGAoDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT53 53–54]}} |2={{harvnb|Reddy|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tRveDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA110 110]}} |3={{harvnb|Sastry|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LXmUEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT38 38]}} }}</ref> | Many schools of thought in [[Eastern philosophy]] discuss the problem of existence and its implications. For instance, the ancient [[Hindu philosophy|Hindu]] school of [[Samkhya]] articulated a metaphysical dualism according to which the two types of existence are pure consciousness (''[[Purusha]]'') and matter (''[[Prakriti]]''). Samkhya explains the manifestation of the universe as the interaction between these two principles.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Leaman|2002|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=_4crBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA77 77–78]}} |2={{harvnb|Perrett|2016|loc=§ The Classical Period of Indian Philosophy}} |3={{harvnb|Ruzsa|2023|loc=Lead Section, §4. Metaphysics}} |4={{harvnb|Eraly|2011|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=te1sqTzTxD8C&pg=PA514 514–516]}} }}</ref> The [[Vedic]] philosopher [[Adi Shankara]] (c. 700–750 CE) developed a different approach in his school of [[Advaita Vedanta]]. Shankara defended a metaphysical monism by defining the divine (''[[Brahman]]'') as the ultimate reality and the only existent. According to this view, the impression that there is a universe consisting of many distinct entities is an illusion (''[[Maya (religion)|Maya]]'').<ref>{{multiref | {{harvnb|Perrett|2016|loc=§ The Medieval Period of Indian Philosophy}} | {{harvnb|Dalal|2021|loc=Lead Section, § 1. Life and Works}} | {{harvnb|Menon|loc=Lead Section}} | {{harvnb|Dalal|2010|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=DH0vmD8ghdMC&pg=PA6 6]}}}}</ref> The essential features of ultimate reality are described as ''[[Sat Chit Ananda]]''—meaning existence, consciousness, and bliss.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Vanamali|2015|pp=[https://books.google.com/books?id=QGAoDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT53 53–54]}} |2={{harvnb|Reddy|2020|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=tRveDwAAQBAJ&pg=PA110 110]}} |3={{harvnb|Sastry|2022|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=LXmUEAAAQBAJ&pg=PT38 38]}} }}</ref> | ||
A central doctrine in [[Buddhist philosophy]] is called the "[[three marks of existence]]", which are ''[[anicca|aniccā]]'' (impermanence), ''[[anattā]]'' (absence of a permanent self), and ''[[dukkha]]'' (suffering). ''Aniccā'' is the doctrine that all of existence is subject to change, meaning everything changes at some point and nothing lasts forever. ''Anattā'' expresses a similar state in relation to persons by stating that people do not have a permanent identity or a separate self. Ignorance about ''aniccā'' and ''anattā'' is seen as the main cause of ''dukkha'' by leading people to form attachments that cause suffering.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Smith|Worden|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8emELTpHWSEC&pg=PA18 18]}} |2={{harvnb|Gómez|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sQULdfIlBIYC&pg=PA110 110]}} |3={{harvnb|Allen|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Tw2VCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114 114]}} }}</ref> | A central doctrine in [[Buddhist philosophy]] is called the "[[three marks of existence]]", which are ''[[anicca|aniccā]]'' (impermanence), ''[[anattā]]'' (absence of a permanent self), and ''[[dukkha]]'' (suffering). ''Aniccā'' is the doctrine that all of existence is subject to change, meaning everything changes at some point and nothing lasts forever. ''Anattā'' expresses a similar state in relation to persons by stating that people do not have a permanent identity or a separate self. Ignorance about ''aniccā'' and ''anattā'' is seen as the main cause of ''dukkha'' by leading people to form attachments that cause suffering.<ref>{{multiref |1={{harvnb|Smith|Worden|2003|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=8emELTpHWSEC&pg=PA18 18]}} |2={{harvnb|Gómez|2007|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=sQULdfIlBIYC&pg=PA110 110]}} |3={{harvnb|Allen|2015|p=[https://books.google.com/books?id=Tw2VCgAAQBAJ&pg=PA114 114]}} }}</ref> | ||
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* {{cite web |last1=Nolt |first1=John |title=Free Logic |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-free/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 August 2023 |date=2021 |archive-date=4 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221204203831/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-free/ |url-status=live }} | * {{cite web |last1=Nolt |first1=John |title=Free Logic |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-free/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=15 August 2023 |date=2021 |archive-date=4 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221204203831/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-free/ |url-status=live }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Orilia |first1=Francesco |last2=Paolini Paoletti |first2=Michele |title=Properties |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=3 April 2024 |date=2022 |archive-date=April 16, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240416092556/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/ |url-status=live }} | * {{cite web |last1=Orilia |first1=Francesco |last2=Paolini Paoletti |first2=Michele |title=Properties |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=3 April 2024 |date=2022 |archive-date=April 16, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240416092556/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties/ |url-status=live }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1= | * {{cite web |last1=O'Madagain |first1=Cathal |title=Intentionality |url=https://iep.utm.edu/intentio/ |website=Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy |access-date=28 April 2024 |issn=2161-0002 |archive-date=April 28, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240428121740/https://iep.utm.edu/intentio/ |url-status=live }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Pack |first1=Justin |title=Environmental Philosophy in Desperate Times |publisher=Broadview Press |isbn=978-1-77048-866-3 |language=en |date=2022 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Pack |first1=Justin |title=Environmental Philosophy in Desperate Times |publisher=Broadview Press |isbn=978-1-77048-866-3 |language=en |date=2022 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Parkin |first1=Alan J. |title=Essential Cognitive Psychology |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-1-135-00511-5 |language=en |date=2013 |edition=Classic }} | * {{cite book |last1=Parkin |first1=Alan J. |title=Essential Cognitive Psychology |publisher=Psychology Press |isbn=978-1-135-00511-5 |language=en |date=2013 |edition=Classic }} | ||
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* {{cite book |last1=Vinogradov |first1=I. M. |last2=Karatsuba |first2=A. A. |chapter=The Method of Trigonometric Sums in Number Theory |title=Algebra, Mathematical Logic, Number Theory, Topology |publisher=American Mathematical Society |isbn=978-0-8218-3096-3 |language=en |date=1986 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Vinogradov |first1=I. M. |last2=Karatsuba |first2=A. A. |chapter=The Method of Trigonometric Sums in Number Theory |title=Algebra, Mathematical Logic, Number Theory, Topology |publisher=American Mathematical Society |isbn=978-0-8218-3096-3 |language=en |date=1986 }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Wang |first1=Yueqing |last2=Bao |first2=Qinggang |last3=Guan |first3=Guoxing |title=History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms |date=2020 |publisher=Springer Nature and Nanjing University Press |isbn=978-981-15-2572-8 |language=en }} | * {{cite book |last1=Wang |first1=Yueqing |last2=Bao |first2=Qinggang |last3=Guan |first3=Guoxing |title=History of Chinese Philosophy Through Its Key Terms |date=2020 |publisher=Springer Nature and Nanjing University Press |isbn=978-981-15-2572-8 |language=en }} | ||
* {{cite book |last1=Waxman |first1=Wayne |title=Kant's Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-932831-4 |language=en |date=2014 }} | * {{cite book |last1=Waxman |first1=Wayne |author-link1=Wayne Waxman |title=Kant's Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind |publisher=Oxford University Press |isbn=978-0-19-932831-4 |language=en |date=2014 }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Weatherson |first1=Brian |title=David Lewis |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 April 2024 |date=2021 |archive-date=January 27, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240127072301/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/ |url-status=live }} | * {{cite web |last1=Weatherson |first1=Brian |title=David Lewis |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=12 April 2024 |date=2021 |archive-date=January 27, 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240127072301/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/david-lewis/ |url-status=live }} | ||
* {{cite web |last1=Wheeler |first1=Michael |title=Martin Heidegger |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 August 2023 |date=2020 |archive-date=6 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220206061907/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |url-status=live }} | * {{cite web |last1=Wheeler |first1=Michael |title=Martin Heidegger |url=https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |website=The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy |publisher=Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University |access-date=18 August 2023 |date=2020 |archive-date=6 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220206061907/https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger/ |url-status=live }} | ||