Historicism: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
imported>OAbot m Open access bot: url-access updated in citation with #oabot. |
imported>Buzludzha No edit summary |
||
| Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Short description|Approach to explaining social and cultural phenomena by studying their history}} | {{Short description|Approach to explaining social and cultural phenomena by studying their history}} | ||
{{about|philosophical theories | {{about|the philosophical theories|the school of historiography|Historism|other uses}} | ||
{{Multiple issues| | {{Multiple issues| | ||
{{lead rewrite|date=February 2023}} | {{lead rewrite|date=February 2023}} | ||
{{more footnotes|date=February 2023}} | {{more footnotes|date=February 2023}} | ||
{{ | {{split|Anthropological historicism|discuss=Talk:Historicism#Anthropological historicism page|date=February 2023}} | ||
}} | }} | ||
'''Historicism''' is an approach | '''Historicism''' is an approach in the study of phenomena, particularly social and cultural practices, including ideas and beliefs, which emphasizes understanding these phenomena through the historical processes by which they developed. The concept is widely applied in fields such as philosophy, anthropology, and sociology. | ||
This historical approach to explanation differs from and complements the approach known as [[Structural functionalism|functionalism]], which seeks to explain a phenomenon, such as for example a [[social form]], by providing reasoned arguments about how that social form fulfills some function in the structure of a society. In contrast, rather than taking the phenomenon as a given and then seeking to provide a justification for it from reasoned principles, the historical approach asks "Where did this come from?" and "What factors led up to its creation?"; that is, historical explanations often place a greater emphasis on the role of process and contingency. | This historical approach to explanation differs from and complements the approach known as [[Structural functionalism|functionalism]], which seeks to explain a phenomenon, such as for example a [[social form]], by providing reasoned arguments about how that social form fulfills some function in the structure of a society. In contrast, rather than taking the phenomenon as a given and then seeking to provide a justification for it from reasoned principles, the historical approach asks "Where did this come from?" and "What factors led up to its creation?"; that is, historical explanations often place a greater emphasis on the role of process and contingency. | ||
In [[philosophy]], historicism is defined as the view that an object can be fully understood only in terms of its historical development, that its values can be explained by tracing their origins, and that its nature is comprehensively revealed through its evolutionary course. This perspective does not address critiques related to the historical fallacy.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1844717.pdf|title=The Meaning of "Historicism"|last1=Dwight E.|first1=Lee|journal=The American Historical Review|pages=568–577|last2=Robert N.|first2=Beck |date=1954 |volume=59 |issue=3 |doi=10.2307/1844717 |jstor=1844717 }}</ref> | |||
The term '''[[historism]]''' is an English translation of the German ''Historismus'', but its usage has declined over time in favour of "[[historicism]]." For example, [[James Mark Baldwin]]’s 1918 ''Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology'' includes the entry "[[historism]]" but omits "[[historicism]]," whereas [[Dagobert D. Runes|Dagobert D. Runes’]] 1942 ''Dictionary of Philosophy'' emphasizes "historicism." In contemporary usage, historicism is employed to describe approaches that integrate both German and Italian (''storicismo'') traditions and that focus on the explanation of historical processes.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1844717.pdf|title=The Meaning of "Historicism"|last1=Dwight E.|first1=Lee|journal=The American Historical Review|pages=568–577|last2=Robert N.|first2=Beck |date=1954 |volume=59 |issue=3 |doi=10.2307/1844717 |jstor=1844717 }}</ref> | |||
Mundane historicism refers to the view that examining an idea or individual within its historical context yields more accurate and comprehensive results, combining empirical observations with conceptual considerations. Methodological historicism argues that the social sciences and the natural sciences require different methods due to the distinct nature of their subject matters, and it evaluates the non-experimental character of history within this framework. Popperian historicism grounds the search for general laws of [[history]] in both the examination of historical records and abstract theoretical arguments; [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel’s]] [[philosophy of history]], based on a dialectical process, is often cited as a classical example of this approach. [[Epistemic]] historicism draws on historical and [[anthropological]] research to suggest that modes of reasoning and conceptions of rationality change over time; Ian Hacking adopts this historical perspective, while [[Hilary Putnam]] argues that attempts to formalize reasoning—such as Carnap’s project of inductive logic—have been unsuccessful and maintains that rationality is closely tied to value judgments.<ref>{{Cite journal|url=http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02698599908573626|title=What is historicism?|last=Reynolds|first=Andrew Reynolds|journal=International Studies in the Philosophy of Science|date=1999 |issue=3|volume=13|pages=278–280 |doi=10.1080/02698599908573626 |url-access=subscription}}</ref> | |||
Historicism is often used to help contextualize theories and narratives, and may be a useful tool to help understand how social and cultural phenomena came to be. | Historicism is often used to help contextualize theories and narratives, and may be a useful tool to help understand how social and cultural phenomena came to be. | ||
| Line 18: | Line 24: | ||
== History of the term == | == History of the term == | ||
The term ''historicism'' (''Historismus'') was coined by German philosopher [[Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel]].<ref>Brian Leiter, Michael Rosen (eds.), ''The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy'', Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 175: "[The word 'historicism'] appears as early as the late eighteenth century in the writings of the German romantics, who used it in a neutral sense. In 1797 Friedrich Schlegel used 'historicism' to refer to a philosophy that stresses the importance of history..."; [[Katherine Harloe]], Neville Morley (eds.), ''Thucydides and the Modern World: Reception, Reinterpretation and Influence from the Renaissance to the Present'', Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 81: "Already in Friedrich Schlegel's ''Fragments about Poetry and Literature'' (a collection of notes attributed to 1797), the word ''Historismus'' occurs five times."</ref> Over time, what historicism is and how it is practiced have developed different and divergent meanings.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Reynolds|first=Andrew|date=1999-10-01|title=What is historicism?|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/02698599908573626|journal=International Studies in the Philosophy of Science|volume=13|issue=3|pages=275–287|doi=10.1080/02698599908573626|issn=0269-8595|url-access=subscription}}</ref> Elements of historicism appear in the writings of French essayist [[Michel de Montaigne]] (1533–1592) and Italian philosopher [[G. B. Vico]] (1668–1744), and became more fully developed with the [[dialectic]] of [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831), influential in 19th-century Europe. The writings of [[Karl Marx]], influenced by Hegel, also occasionally include historicism. The term is also associated with the empirical social sciences and with the work of [[Franz Boas]]. Historicism tends to be [[hermeneutics|hermeneutic]] because it values cautious, rigorous, and contextualized interpretation of information; or [[relativism|relativist]], because it rejects notions of universal, fundamental and immutable interpretations.<ref>Kahan, Jeffrey. "Historicism." ''Renaissance Quarterly'', vol. 50, no. 4 December 22, 1997, p. 1202</ref> | The term ''historicism'' (''Historismus'') was coined by German philosopher [[Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel]].<ref>Brian Leiter, Michael Rosen (eds.), ''The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy'', Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 175: "[The word 'historicism'] appears as early as the late eighteenth century in the writings of the German romantics, who used it in a neutral sense. In 1797 Friedrich Schlegel used 'historicism' to refer to a philosophy that stresses the importance of history..."; [[Katherine Harloe]], Neville Morley (eds.), ''Thucydides and the Modern World: Reception, Reinterpretation and Influence from the Renaissance to the Present'', Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 81: "Already in Friedrich Schlegel's ''Fragments about Poetry and Literature'' (a collection of notes attributed to 1797), the word ''Historismus'' occurs five times."</ref> Over time, what historicism is and how it is practiced have developed different and divergent meanings.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Reynolds|first=Andrew|date=1999-10-01|title=What is historicism?|url=https://doi.org/10.1080/02698599908573626|journal=International Studies in the Philosophy of Science|volume=13|issue=3|pages=275–287|doi=10.1080/02698599908573626|issn=0269-8595|url-access=subscription}}</ref> According to [[Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel|Schlegel]], Winckelmann’s approach to historicism marked the beginning of a new era in philosophy by recognizing the unique character and distinctiveness of antiquity. In contrast, other eighteenth-century philosophers distorted the true nature of the ancient world by reinterpreting it through philosophical concepts. Schlegel particularly warned against theoretical views that were not linked to specific individuals and lacked a historical foundation. The following year, [[Novalis]], while outlining different methods, employed the term ''Historismus'', although he did not assign a precise meaning to it in this context.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term|last=Georg G.|first=Iggers|journal=Journal of the History of Ideas|issue=1|volume=56|pages=130}}</ref> Elements of historicism appear in the writings of French essayist [[Michel de Montaigne]] (1533–1592) and Italian philosopher [[G. B. Vico]] (1668–1744), and became more fully developed with the [[dialectic]] of [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel]] (1770–1831), influential in 19th-century Europe. The writings of [[Karl Marx]], influenced by Hegel, also occasionally include historicism. The term is also associated with the empirical social sciences and with the work of [[Franz Boas]]. Historicism tends to be [[hermeneutics|hermeneutic]] because it values cautious, rigorous, and contextualized interpretation of information; or [[relativism|relativist]], because it rejects notions of universal, fundamental and immutable interpretations.<ref>Kahan, Jeffrey. "Historicism." ''Renaissance Quarterly'', vol. 50, no. 4 December 22, 1997, p. 1202</ref> In the twentieth century, the Italian philosopher [[Benedetto Croce]], the English thinker [[R. G. Collingwood]], and the Spanish philosopher [[José Ortega y Gasset|Jose Ortega y Gasset]] adopted historicism as an approach aimed at enhancing the understanding of human thought and experience. | ||
[[Karl Popper]], in his work ''[[The Poverty of Historicism]]'', addressed historicism in relation to [[Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]] and [[Karl Marx|Marx]]’s attempts to justify authority through laws of historical development, though Popper departed from 19th century German historicism and then contemporary thinkers such as Collingwood in defining historicism as a predictive science. In his ''Idea of History,'' Collingwood distinguished between history as an attempt to rethink the past from psychology as a natural scientific study of the lower echelons of the mind. Popper was worried about historicism's assault on open democratic societies, while his contemporary Collingwood was concerned with understanding the past. | |||
The [[Soviet Encyclopedia]] presented the term from a [[Marxist-Leninist]] perspective, emphasizing the notion of “legitimate development.” In American literary studies, ''[[New historicism|New Historicism]]'' emerged as a postmodern interpretive approach that foregrounds the specificity of historical and cultural contexts, while making limited reference to earlier European debates.<ref>{{Cite journal|title=Historicism: The History and Meaning of the Term|last=Georg G.|first=Iggers|journal=Journal of the History of Ideas|issue=1|volume=56|pages=131–137}}</ref> | |||
==Variants== | ==Variants== | ||
===Hegelian=== | === Hegelian === | ||
[[File:G.W.F. Hegel (by Sichling, after Sebbers).jpg|right|thumb|G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831)]] | [[File:G.W.F. Hegel (by Sichling, after Sebbers).jpg|right|thumb|G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831)]] | ||
| Line 28: | Line 38: | ||
Hegel saw progress toward freedom as conducted by the "spirit" ([[Geist]]), a seemingly supernatural force that directs all human actions and interactions. Yet Hegel makes clear that the spirit is a mere abstraction that comes into existence "through the activity of finite agents". Thus, Hegel's determining forces of history may not have a metaphysical nature, though many of his opponents and interpreters have understood him as holding metaphysical and determinist views.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Cambridge Companion to Hegel|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00beis_847|url-access=limited|last=Beiser|first=Frederick C.|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1993|location=Cambridge|pages=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00beis_847/page/n298 289]–91}}</ref> | Hegel saw progress toward freedom as conducted by the "spirit" ([[Geist]]), a seemingly supernatural force that directs all human actions and interactions. Yet Hegel makes clear that the spirit is a mere abstraction that comes into existence "through the activity of finite agents". Thus, Hegel's determining forces of history may not have a metaphysical nature, though many of his opponents and interpreters have understood him as holding metaphysical and determinist views.<ref>{{Cite book|title=The Cambridge Companion to Hegel|url=https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00beis_847|url-access=limited|last=Beiser|first=Frederick C.|publisher=Cambridge University Press|year=1993|location=Cambridge|pages=[https://archive.org/details/cambridgecompani00beis_847/page/n298 289]–91}}</ref> | ||
Hegel's historicism also suggests that any human [[society]] and all human activities such as [[science]], [[art]], or [[philosophy]], are defined by their history. Consequently, their essence can be sought only by understanding said history. The history of any such human endeavor, moreover, not only continues but also reacts against what has gone before; this is the source of Hegel's famous dialectic teaching usually summarized by the slogan "[[Thesis, antithesis, synthesis|thesis, antithesis, and synthesis]]". | Hegel's historicism also suggests that any human [[society]] and all human activities such as [[science]], [[art]], or [[philosophy]], are defined by their history. Consequently, their essence can be sought only by understanding said history. The history of any such human endeavor, moreover, not only continues but also reacts against what has gone before; this is the source of Hegel's famous dialectic teaching usually summarized by the slogan "[[Thesis, antithesis, synthesis|thesis, antithesis, and synthesis]]". (Hegel did not use these terms, although [[Johann Gottlieb Fichte|Johann Fichte]] did.) Hegel's famous [[aphorism]], "Philosophy is the history of philosophy", describes it bluntly. | ||
Hegel's position is perhaps best illuminated when contrasted against the atomistic and reductionist opinion of human societies and social activities self-defining on an ''ad hoc'' basis through the sum of dozens of interactions. Yet another contrasting model is the persistent metaphor of a [[social contract]]. Hegel considers the relationship between individuals and societies as organic, not atomic: even their social discourse is mediated by [[philosophy of language|language]], and language is based on [[etymology]] and unique character. It thus preserves the culture of the past in thousands of half-forgotten [[metaphor]]s. To understand why a person is the way he is, you must examine that person in his society: and to understand that society, you must understand its history, and the forces that influenced it. The ''[[Zeitgeist]]'', the "Spirit of the Age", is the concrete embodiment of the most important factors that are acting in human history at any given time. This contrasts with teleological theories of activity, which suppose that the end is the determining factor of activity, as well as those who believe in a [[tabula rasa]], or blank slate, opinion, such that individuals are defined by their interactions. | Hegel's position is perhaps best illuminated when contrasted against the atomistic and reductionist opinion of human societies and social activities self-defining on an ''ad hoc'' basis through the sum of dozens of interactions. Yet another contrasting model is the persistent metaphor of a [[social contract]]. Hegel considers the relationship between individuals and societies as organic, not atomic: even their social discourse is mediated by [[philosophy of language|language]], and language is based on [[etymology]] and unique character. It thus preserves the culture of the past in thousands of half-forgotten [[metaphor]]s. To understand why a person is the way he is, you must examine that person in his society: and to understand that society, you must understand its history, and the forces that influenced it. The ''[[Zeitgeist]]'', the "Spirit of the Age", is the concrete embodiment of the most important factors that are acting in human history at any given time. This contrasts with teleological theories of activity, which suppose that the end is the determining factor of activity, as well as those who believe in a [[tabula rasa]], or blank slate, opinion, such that individuals are defined by their interactions. | ||
These ideas can be interpreted variously. | These ideas can be interpreted variously. The [[Right Hegelians]], working from Hegel's opinions about the organicism and historically determined nature of human societies, interpreted Hegel's historicism as a justification of the unique destiny of national groups and the importance of stability and institutions. Hegel's conception of human societies as entities greater than the individuals who constitute them influenced nineteenth-century [[romantic nationalism]] and its twentieth-century excesses. The [[Young Hegelians]], by contrast, interpreted Hegel's thoughts on societies influenced by social conflict as a doctrine of [[social progress]], and attempted to manipulate these forces to cause various results. Karl Marx's doctrine of "historical inevitabilities" and [[historical materialism]] is one of the more influential reactions to this part of Hegel's thought. Significantly, Karl Marx's [[Marx's theory of alienation|theory of alienation]] argues that [[capitalism]] disrupt traditional relationships between workers and their work. | ||
Hegelian historicism is related to his ideas on the means by which human societies progress, specifically the [[Hegelian dialectic|dialectic]] and his conception of logic as representing the inner essential nature of reality. Hegel attributes the change to the "modern" need to interact with the world, whereas ancient philosophers were self-contained, and medieval philosophers were monks. In his History of Philosophy Hegel writes: | Hegelian historicism is related to his ideas on the means by which human societies progress, specifically the [[Hegelian dialectic|dialectic]] and his conception of logic as representing the inner essential nature of reality. Hegel attributes the change to the "modern" need to interact with the world, whereas ancient philosophers were self-contained, and medieval philosophers were monks. In his History of Philosophy Hegel writes: | ||
| Line 63: | Line 73: | ||
====Eschatological==== | ====Eschatological==== | ||
{{main|Historicism (Christian eschatology)}} | {{main|Historicism (Christian eschatology)}} | ||
{{further|Historicist interpretations of the Book of Revelation}} | {{further|Historicist interpretations of the Book of Revelation}} | ||
In [[Christianity]], the term ''historicism'' refers to the confessional [[Protestantism|Protestant]] form of prophetical interpretation which holds that the fulfillment of [[Bible|biblical]] [[prophecy]] has occurred throughout history and continues to occur; as opposed to other methods which limit the time-frame of prophecy-fulfillment to the past or to the future. | In [[Christianity]], the term ''historicism'' refers to the confessional [[Protestantism|Protestant]] form of prophetical interpretation which holds that the fulfillment of [[Bible|biblical]] [[prophecy]] has occurred throughout history and continues to occur; as opposed to other methods which limit the time-frame of prophecy-fulfillment to the past or to the future. | ||
| Line 78: | Line 89: | ||
[[Karl Popper]] used the term ''historicism'' in his influential books ''[[The Poverty of Historicism]]'' and ''[[The Open Society and Its Enemies]]'', to mean: "an approach to the social sciences which assumes that ''historical prediction'' is their primary aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history".<ref name = "Poverty 3">Popper, Karl, p. 3 of ''The Poverty of Historicism'', italics in original</ref> Popper condemned historicism along with the [[determinism]] and [[holism]] which he argued formed its basis, claiming that historicism had the potential to inform dogmatic, ideological beliefs not predicated upon facts that were [[Falsifiability|falsifiable]]. In ''The Poverty of Historicism'', he identified historicism with the opinion that there are "inexorable laws of historical destiny", an opinion he warned against. If this seems to contrast with what proponents of historicism argue for, in terms of contextually relative interpretation, this happens, according to Popper, only because such proponents are unaware of the type of causality they ascribe to history. Popper wrote with reference to [[Hegel]]'s theory of [[history]], which he criticized extensively. | [[Karl Popper]] used the term ''historicism'' in his influential books ''[[The Poverty of Historicism]]'' and ''[[The Open Society and Its Enemies]]'', to mean: "an approach to the social sciences which assumes that ''historical prediction'' is their primary aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable by discovering the 'rhythms' or the 'patterns', the 'laws' or the 'trends' that underlie the evolution of history".<ref name = "Poverty 3">Popper, Karl, p. 3 of ''The Poverty of Historicism'', italics in original</ref> Popper condemned historicism along with the [[determinism]] and [[holism]] which he argued formed its basis, claiming that historicism had the potential to inform dogmatic, ideological beliefs not predicated upon facts that were [[Falsifiability|falsifiable]]. In ''The Poverty of Historicism'', he identified historicism with the opinion that there are "inexorable laws of historical destiny", an opinion he warned against. If this seems to contrast with what proponents of historicism argue for, in terms of contextually relative interpretation, this happens, according to Popper, only because such proponents are unaware of the type of causality they ascribe to history. Popper wrote with reference to [[Hegel]]'s theory of [[history]], which he criticized extensively. | ||
In ''The Open Society and Its Enemies'', Popper attacks "historicism" and its proponents, among whom he identifies and singles out Hegel, [[Plato]] and [[Marx]]—calling them all "enemies of the open society". The objection he makes is that historicist positions, by claiming that there is an inevitable and deterministic pattern to history, evade the responsibility of the individual to make free contributions to the evolution of society, hence leading to [[totalitarianism]]. Throughout this work, he defines his conception of historicism as: "The central historicist doctrine—the doctrine that history is controlled by specific historical or evolutionary laws whose discovery would enable us to prophesy the destiny of man."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Popper |first=Karl |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv15r5748.10 |title=The Open Society and its Enemies |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=2020 |volume=119 |pages=161–89 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv15r5748.10 |s2cid=243169961 |url-access=registration}}</ref> As mentioned above, such characterizations of Marx in particular are not entirely accurate to Marx in his own right, and have drawn criticism from philosophers such as [[Imre Lakatos|Lakatos]] for mischaracterizing the defense of induction in [[historical materialism]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Burawoy |first=Michael |date=1990 |title=Marxism As Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth |journal=American Sociological Review |volume=55 |pages=775–93}}</ref> Other philosophers such as [[Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)|Walter Kaufmann]] have also been critical of Popper, calling his reading of Hegel a “myth,” “known largely through secondary sources…”<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Hegel Myth and Its Method by Walter Kaufmann |url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/kaufmann.htm |access-date=2024-10-30 |website=www.marxists.org}}</ref> | In ''The Open Society and Its Enemies'', Popper attacks "historicism" and its proponents, among whom he identifies and singles out Hegel, [[Plato]] and [[Marx]]—calling them all "enemies of the open society". The objection he makes is that historicist positions, by claiming that there is an inevitable and deterministic pattern to history, evade the responsibility of the individual to make free contributions to the evolution of society, hence leading to [[totalitarianism]]. Throughout this work, he defines his conception of historicism as: "The central historicist doctrine—the doctrine that history is controlled by specific historical or evolutionary laws whose discovery would enable us to prophesy the destiny of man."<ref>{{Cite book |last=Popper |first=Karl |url=https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv15r5748.10 |title=The Open Society and its Enemies |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=2020 |volume=119 |pages=161–89 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv15r5748.10 |s2cid=243169961 |url-access=registration}}</ref> As mentioned above, such characterizations of Marx in particular are not entirely accurate to Marx in his own right, and have drawn criticism from philosophers such as [[Imre Lakatos|Lakatos]] for mischaracterizing the defense of induction in [[historical materialism]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Burawoy |first=Michael |date=1990 |title=Marxism As Science: Historical Challenges and Theoretical Growth |journal=American Sociological Review |volume=55 |pages=775–93 |doi=10.2307/2095745 |jstor=2095745 }}</ref> Other philosophers such as [[Walter Kaufmann (philosopher)|Walter Kaufmann]] have also been critical of Popper, calling his reading of Hegel a “myth,” “known largely through secondary sources…”<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Hegel Myth and Its Method by Walter Kaufmann |url=https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/kaufmann.htm |access-date=2024-10-30 |website=www.marxists.org}}</ref> | ||
Another of his targets is what he terms "moral historicism", the attempt to infer moral values from the course of history; in Hegel's words, that "history is the world's court of justice". Popper says that he does not believe "that success proves anything or that history is our judge".<ref>''The Open Society and its Enemies'', vol. 2 p. 29.</ref> Futurism must be distinguished from prophecies that the right will prevail: these attempt to infer history from ethics, rather than ethics from history, and are therefore historicism in the normal sense rather than moral historicism. | Another of his targets is what he terms "moral historicism", the attempt to infer moral values from the course of history; in Hegel's words, that "history is the world's court of justice". Popper says that he does not believe "that success proves anything or that history is our judge".<ref>''The Open Society and its Enemies'', vol. 2 p. 29.</ref> Futurism must be distinguished from prophecies that the right will prevail: these attempt to infer history from ethics, rather than ethics from history, and are therefore historicism in the normal sense rather than moral historicism. | ||